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This research explores how “big data” leads to shifts in the distribution of power and 
risk  between  natural  persons  and  data  controllers,  and  how  the  General  Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) addresses these shifts.
Big data currently is the subject of  lively scholarly discourse.  In their well-known 
book, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier call it a “revolution”.1 However, the underlying 
technological developments have been shaping our society for a long time and the 
dilemmas facing law and society have been dealt with before. This chapter presents 
the central question that my research project aims to answer, the delineation of the 
research and the methodology. It will also position this research within the large body 
of legal scholarly work that has already been laid down – and still is being written – in 
this feld.  To provide context to the research question,  this chapter starts with an 
outline of the technical origins of the term “big data”, its applications in the consumer 
market and the emergence of  platforms (sections 1.1 and 1.2).  Subsequently,  it will 
briefly explore some of the ways that power and risk shift as a result of the deployment 
of big data and the history European data protection law from 1968 to 2018.
1.1 Big data as technology: defnition and origins
This research is not intended to conclude – or even take part in – any discussion on 
the meaning of “data”, “information” or other concepts, but a working defnition of 
both terms may still be useful to avoid unnecessary confusion when discussing big 
data.  Therefore,  in  this  research,  “information”  is  interpreted  as  in  the  General 
Defnition of  Information (GDI):  information –  or semantic content –  consists of 
“meaningful, well-formed data”; “data” is plural of “datum” which the GDI defnes as 
“a  lack  of  uniformity”,  for  example  between  two  physical  states  or  the  symbols 
describing those states.  Using those defnitions,  “Big data”  is a large collection of 
symbols  discerning  non-uniform  states,  which  serves  to  derive  or  generate 
1 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will 
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (Houghton Mifin Harcourt 2013).
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information.2 The  term  “big  data”  purportedly  originated  in  the  mid-1990s  in 
commercial computer graphics. By the year 2000, the term had appeared in academic 
papers in the feld of  computer science and statistics/econometrics.3 In 2008,  the 
popular  science  magazine  Wired  published  “Visualizing  big  data:  Bar  charts  for 
words” as part of  an issue dedicated to the “Petabyte Age” (a Petabyte equals 1000 
Terabytes).4 According to the New York Times, 2012 was the “crossover year” for big 
data,  due to the use of  the term in a mainstream photo book,  the Davos world 
economic forum and a Dilbert comic, among others.5 Two months after publication of 
Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier’s book with the same title, the term “big data” entered 
the Oxford Dictionary of English, with the following defnition:6
“extremely large data sets that may be analysed computationally to 
reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human 
behaviour and interactions.”
Apart from its large volume, Zikopoulos and Eaton attribute two additional technical 
characteristics to big data to help distinguish it from traditional or “small” data in the 
context of computational analysis: variety and velocity. Variety indicates that big data 
consists of  both structured (or relational)  data and unstructured data.  Structured 
data is data that originates from, or could be added to, traditional database systems; 
unstructured data is a catch-all name for data from “web pages,  web log fles (…), 
search indexes, social media forums, e-mail, documents, sensor data from active and 
passive systems”.7 Velocity means not only that data is generated faster than before – 
which would essentially be similar to volume per unit of time – but also that analysis 
2 Luciano Floridi, ‘Philosophical Conceptions of Information’ in Giovanni Sommaruga (ed), 
Formal theories of information: from Shannon to semantic information theory and general 
concepts of information (Springer 2009) 16, 18.
3 Francis X Diebold, ‘A Personal Perspective on the Origin(s) and Development of “Big Data”: 
The Phenomenon, the Term, and the Discipline’ (2012) 
<http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~fdiebold/papers/paper112/Diebold_Big_Data.pdf> accessed 
20 March 2019.
4 Mark Horowitz, ‘Visualizing Big Data: Bar Charts for Words’ (2008) 16 Wired Magazine 
<https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-visualizing/>.
5 Steve Lohr, ‘How Big Data Became So Big - Unboxed’ The New York Times (11 August 2012) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/business/how-big-data-became-so-big-
unboxed.html> accessed 20 March 2019.
6 Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Tweet Geekery and Epic Crowdsourcing: An Oxford English 
Dictionary Update’ (OxfordWords blog, 13 June 2013) 




on the data is performed sooner, while the data “is still in motion, not just after it is at  
rest” (emphasis in original).8
Big data was not purposefully designed as a separate technology. Instead, it is the 
result  of  continuing  technological  progress.  The  following  developments  appear 
especially relevant for the advent of big data: datafcation, the digital transformation, 
telecommunications  and  the  exponential  capacity  growth  of  computers,  digital 
storage and telecommunications.
Datafcation:  Many  processes  have  been  automated  over  the  years:  from doing 
laundry  and  transferring  money  between  bank  accounts  to  delivering  news  and 
entertainment to mobile devices.  Due to the possibility of  errors or malfunctions, 
automation  requires  some  form  of  monitoring.  In  simple  processes,  such  as 
performed in washing machines, a direct readout of  the cycle status on the device 
itself  may sufce. But automation of  more complex processes, or of  tasks that are 
performed  remotely,  often  requires  that  events  in  these  processes  are  somehow 
recorded, not only for the short term (to make automated branching decisions), but 
also for a longer period to enable review and monitoring. Recordable events, such as 
the dialling of a phone number in a telephone network, generate data which is laid 
down in log fles. Analysis of log fles enables billing, the detection and correction of 
malfunctions,  and the discovery of  hacking and crime. As more processes become 
automated, more events are recorded, which leads to ever larger data sets as indicated 
by the moniker “petabyte age”.
But datafcation did  not start in the petabyte age:  the automated generation and 
processing of log fles has been done for over half a century. An early example is the 
data from automated switches in the telephone network, which was already collected 
and analysed at larger scales in 1949.9 ERMA, the frst automated bookkeeping system 
for retail  banking,  had  similar capabilities;  it  became operational  in  1959. 10 Both 
developments constituted the datafcation of their respective processes and both were 
essential in the development of  new services: automated billing for phone services 
and linking of bank accounts and credit cards, respectively. They could have qualifed 
7 Paul Zikopoulos and Chris Eaton, Understanding Big Data: Analytics for Enterprise Class 
Hadoop and Streaming Data (McGraw-Hill Osborne Media 2011) 7.
8 ibid 9.
9 Godfrey Hammond, ‘Your Phone Dial Computes Your Bill’ (1949) 154 Popular Science 135.
10 AW Fisher and JL McKenney, ‘The Development of the ERMA Banking System: Lessons 
from History’ (1993) 15 IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 44.
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as “big data” applications in their time. Due to the progress of technology, the number 
of  recordable  events  in  telecommunications  has  dramatically  increased. 
Telecommunication networks have shifted  away from recording “numbers dialled” 
towards technologies that record smaller events at a higher frequency.11 Furthermore, 
many more phenomena are now converted  to data and  the number of  processes 
generating data has grown with the number of sensors. This is not limited to events 
relating  to  accounting  and  computing:  today,  a  typical  smartphone  contains  an 
accelerometer, a gyroscope, a GPS sensor, an ambient light sensor and a thermometer, 
plus  the capacity to connect  with  other systems that can register other variables 
pertaining to the environment or the human body; all these sensors provide data that 
can be made available for further processing.
Digital transformation: This term has no strict defnition, but can be understood to 
be “the change associated with the application of digital technology in all aspects of 
human  society.”12 An  important  efect  of  this  transformation  is  the  increased 
availability of information in digital form: information on pricing and availability of 
goods and services, text, images, audio and video are commonly digitally available. 
But digital technology has also become the basis of economical and social interaction. 
This has increased the number of human activities that employ automation at the end 
user level. As a result, an increasing number of activities generate data. This includes 
the buying and selling of goods and services, the retrieval of information, and keeping 
up with friends next door or at the other side of the world. This has led to increased 
logging of  everyones’  everyday activities. Where a person reading information in a 
physical book does not generate data, the same person reading the same information 
online involves sending a request identifying the user’s device and, consequently, the 
user;  this request is logged at several nodes of  internet infrastructure.  Similarly,  a 
fnancial  transaction  using  cash  tends  not  to  generate  identifying  information, 
whereas the same transaction paid through a check or a bank card generates a log 
entry  recording  both  the  payer  and  the  payee.  As  a  result  of  the  digital 
transformation, the rate of production of digital data has increased signifcantly: in 
2016, IBM asserted that “90 percent of the data in the world today has been created in 
the last two years alone”.13
11 JS Turner, ‘New Directions in Communications (or Which Way to the Information Age?)’ 
(2002) 40 IEEE Communications Magazine 50, 50–51.
12 Digital transformation, ‘Digital Transformation’, Wikipedia (2018) 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_transformation> accessed 19 March 2019.
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Electronic Telecommunications:  Collecting single points of  data into big data is 
not possible without some form of  centralisation: data from all  relevant locations 
needs to be transferred to a central point to enable logging for a large number of  
processes or sensors. In the big data context, this centralisation is typically achieved 
through  telecommunication.  The  layout  of  the  telephone  network  has  included 
switching  centres  at  several  levels  of  centralization  for  a  long  time.  This  made 
telephony especially suitable for early datafcation.14 Centralisation across national 
borders became much easier after 1988, when the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU, a United Nations specialised agency) decided on a treaty containing a 
new  set  of  telecommunication  regulations.  These  regulations  empowered  private 
entities  to establish telecommunication links  through “special  arrangements”,  i.e., 
outside of the scope of the public switched telephone network (PSTN, the network 
accessible  through  the  ITU  numbering  plan).15 Specifcally,  article  9  of  the  new 
Regulations  established  that  “for  the  frst  time,  private  operators  were  explicitly 
allowed to use leased lines to provide services, including data services.”16
This could have resulted in a panoply of non-interoperable networks, if a standard for 
network interoperability had not already been available. In October 1982, the United 
States  Department  of  Defense  adopted  the  Internet  Protocol  Suite  enabling  the 
establishment  of  an  interconnected  network  of  computer  networks,  efectively 
creating  the  internet  per  the  1st  of  January,  1983.17 The  availability  of  a  suitable 
protocol and the legal possibility of establishing network arrangements outside the 
PSTN enabled the emergence of the internet as the global open “network of networks” 
we know today: Hill asserts that “the Internet would not exist without article 9”.18 The 
13 Watson Marketing, ‘10 Key Marketing Trends for 2017 and Ideas for Exceeding Customer 
Expectations’ (IBM Marketing Cloud 2017) WRL12345USEN 3 <https://www-
01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfddWRL12345USEN> accessed 21 March 
2019.
14 Hammond (n 9); For banking, centralisation was originally achieved by mail: Fisher and 
McKenney (n 10).
15 International Telecommunication Union, International Telecommunication Regulations. 
Final Acts of the World Administrative Telegraphe and Telephone Conference, Melbourne, 
1988, (WATTC-88). (ITU 1989) 11; ITU-T, ‘The International Public Telecommunication 
Numbering Plan - Recommendation ITU-T E.164’ (Telecommunication Standardization 
Sector of ITU 2010) Recommendation E 36438.
16 Richard Hill, The New International Telecommunication Regulations and the Internet 
(Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2014) 8.
17 J Postel, ‘NCP/TCP Transition Plan’ (1981) Request for Comments RFC 801 4–5 
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc801> accessed 20 March 2019.
18 Hill (n 16) 44.
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internet has undercut the monopolies of  national telephone carriers, reducing the 
price of  telecommunications.  This,  in turn,  has reduced the costs associated with 
providing services remotely. For example, a US-based company like Uber can ofer a 
digital platform for taxi services in several European cities simultaneously without 
establishing a physical presence there. This platform also allows for the gathering of 
status  and  location  information  of  drivers  and  customers  in  several  countries 
simultaneously,  and users can book a taxi  in diferent countries through a single 
interface – features unavailable in traditional taxi services that are centralised at the 
city or district level.
Exponential  growth:  The  capacity  and  performance  of  computers,  storage  and 
telecommunications  has  increased  exponentially  over  the  past  decades.  These 
observations are often referred to as Moore’s law (for microprocessors), Keck’s law (for 
data cables) and Kryder’s law (for storage).19 These “laws” have pushed the envelope of 
big  data ever since its frst applications.  Because the amount of  data that can be 
efciently generated, stored, analysed and transferred has exponentially increased, 
the scope of big data has expanded to include an ever wider range of applications.
Two important use cases  of  big  data are the use of  analytics  for the creation of  
knowledge (a term that is used loosely here, indicating the ability to assign attributes 
to objects or persons of interest) and the automation of decision-making.20 This has 
not only assisted scientists in their search for subatomic particles and remote celestial 
objects:21 it has also helped commercial parties to record and analyse an ever larger 
number  of  human  activities  and  leverage  the  created  knowledge  in  economic 
activities through data-generating platforms.22
19 Gordon E Moore, ‘Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits’ (1965) 38 
Electronics Magazine 114 f <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/4785860> 
accessed 20 March 2019; Jef Hecht, ‘Is Keck’s Law Coming to an End?’ (2016) 2016 IEEE 
Spectrum 11 <https://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/optoelectronics/is-kecks-law-
coming-to-an-end>; Chip Walter, ‘Kryder’s Law’ (2005) 293 Scientifc American 32.
20 OECD, ‘Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report’ 
(OECD 2014) 30–33; OECD (ed), Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-
Being (OECD 2015) 150.
21 Cliford Lynch, ‘How Do Your Data Grow?’ (2008) 455 Nature 28 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/455028a>.
22 OECD, Data-Driven Innovation (n 20) 90.
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1.2 Personalisation, two-sided markets and the dominance of 
platforms
Big data has given rise to a number of opportunities for increased economic efciency. 
This research focuses on the application of one particular type of data: personal data.  
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) defnes personal data as:
“any information relating to an identifed or identifable natural person 
(‘data subject’); an identifable natural person is one who can be 
identifed, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifer 
such as a name, an identifcation number, location data, an online 
identifer or to one or more factors specifc to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural 
person”.23
Initial use of big data in the consumer market involved knowledge creation. An early 
example is the datafcation of retail transactions. From 1996, “integrated customer-
facing front-ends” enabled retailers to record the link between transaction details and 
individual  consumers.24 A  well-known  example  is  a  customer  loyalty  program 
extending benefts to customers when they present a personalised card at the time of 
purchase.  Efective  personalisation  can  reduce  costs,  for  example  if  it  reduces 
spending on inefective marketing for the merchant;  it has potential  value for the 
consumer through the extension of attractive ofers and the reduction of irrelevant 
advertising. Additionally, it ofers insights into characteristics like brand loyalty and 
price sensitivity of individuals and groups, which is useful for market segmentation. 
This  form  of  knowledge  creation  expands  on  loyalty  programs  based  simply  on 
“amount of money spent” like airlines’ frequent flyer programs or retail trading stamp 
campaigns. Similar forms of knowledge creation result from individual credit scoring, 
which  can  provide  more  detailed  insights  in  fnancial  risk  than  earlier  forms  of 
knowledge creation based on smaller amounts of  personal  data,  like bonus-malus 
systems and actuarial tables in the insurance market.
23 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1, art 4(1); a data subject is a natural person 
identifable by personal data (art. 4(1), GDPR).
24 Vineet Kumar and Werner Reinartz, Customer Relationship Management: Concept, 
Strategy, and Tools (Springer Science & Business Media 2012) 17.
7
1. Introduction
Apart  from  the  creation  of  knowledge,  datafcation  has  also  brought  about  the 
automation  of  decision-making.  For  example,  big  data  enables  algorithms  to 
autonomously make data-driven pricing  decisions.  These algorithms use personal 
data  (like  the  location  of  a  consumer  or  their  browser  history),  fluctuations  in 
demand and competitor’s prices as inputs – a technique known as dynamic pricing.25 
A Dutch insurance company now ofers to adjust car insurance premiums based on 
real-time monitoring of  location and driving behaviour in an attempt to “improve 
trafc safety”.26 Credit reporting frms, themselves controllers of large data sets, ofer 
services that provide real-time risk assessment for merchants to use in their pricing 
algorithms and in their decisions to extend credit.27
Automated  decision-making  plays  an  even  more  important  part  in  two-sided 
markets,  defned  here  as  “markets  in  which  one  or  several  platforms  enable 
interactions between end-users, and try to get the two (or multiple) sides ‘on board’ 
by  appropriately  charging  each  side.”28 Two-sided  markets  existed  long  before 
datafcation – newspapers charging fees to both subscribers and advertisers are a well-
known  traditional  example.29 However,  datafcation  has  enabled  new  two-sided 
markets, while automation has made them more efcient. Today’s largest processors 
of personal data, also known as the “Tech’s Frightful Five” (Amazon, Apple, Facebook, 
Google and Microsoft)30 all provide platforms where consumers and merchants can 
25 PK Kannan and Praveen K Kopalle, ‘Dynamic Pricing on the Internet: Importance and 
Implications for Consumer Behavior’ (2001) 5 International Journal of Electronic 
Commerce 63 <https://doi.org/10.1080/10864415.2001.11044211> accessed 20 March 2019; R 
Preston McAfee and Vera L Te Velde, ‘Dynamic Pricing in the Airline Industry’ in Terrence 
Hendershott (ed), Economics and Information Systems (1st edition, Elsevier 2006) 551–552.
26 Consumentenbond, ‘Review: ANWB Veilig Rijden’ (Consumentenbond, 21 July 2016) 
<https://www.consumentenbond.nl/autoverzekering/anwb-veilig-rijden> accessed 19 
March 2019.
27 See, for example, Experian, ‘Determine the Best Ofer: Make Credit Decisions That Yield 
the Best Results’ (2018) <http://www.experian.com/business-services/customer-
leads.html> accessed 19 March 2019.
28 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, ‘Two-Sided Markets: An Overview’ (Institut 
d’Economie Industrielle working paper 2004) 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1181/ee3b92b2d6c1107a5c899bd94575b0099c32.pdf> 
accessed 20 March 2019.
29 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, ‘Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ (2003) 1 
Journal of the European Economic Association 990, 992 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1162/154247603322493212/abstract> accessed 20 
March 2019.




meet. The popularity of these platforms is based on commercial success in the sales of 
books  and  consumer  products,  smartphones,  a  social  network,  web  search  and 
operating  systems,  respectively.  One  reason  that  these  companies  deserve  the 
“frightful”  qualifer  is  their  large  number  of  users,  indicating  possible  market 
dominance. For example: Facebook reported over 2 billion monthly active users in the 
second quarter of  2017, Google reported one billion active Gmail users in February 
2016 and Apple reported 800 million iTunes accounts in 2014 although it did not 
estimate the number of active users.31 
Platform providers use several business models. Revenue streams typically consist of 
charging  consumers and sellers for access (e.g.,  through subscriptions or tying to 
hardware purchases), charging sales commissions to sellers and charging sellers for 
personalisation options for advertising and pricing decisions. Platform providers have 
a strong incentive to both maximise the number of consumers and to improve the 
accuracy of consumer profling: both increase the value of the platform to sellers. 32 
Platforms can attract additional consumers both by reducing the costs for consumers 
and by increasing the perceived value of  their services. As a result, many platform 
services use one or more forms of community building, and many services are ofered 
to consumers at no charge or tied to another purchase. Increased accuracy of profling 
is achieved through the analysis of  big data. Personalised advertising services ofer 
market segmentation based on user profles. The necessary data is generated by using 
a persistent method for consumer identifcation and the logging of events such as web 
search,  maintaining lists of  contacts,  sending e-mail  messages,  mobile device use, 
us.html> accessed 20 March 2019.
31 Nigam Arora, ‘Seeds Of Apple’s New Growth In Mobile Payments, 800 Million ITune 
Accounts’ (Forbes, 24 April 2014) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/nigamarora/2014/04/24/seeds-of-apples-new-growth-in-
mobile-payments-800-million-itune-accounts/> accessed 19 March 2019; statista.com, 
‘Facebook Users Worldwide 2018’ (Statista, 2018) 
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-
worldwide/> accessed 20 March 2019; statista.com, ‘Gmail: Global Active Users Worldwide 
2016’ (Statista, 2017) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/432390/active-gmail-users/> 
accessed 20 March 2019.
32 A phenomenon known as “network externalities”. Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian, 
Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard Business Press 
1998) 194; for networks, this is called “Metcalfe’s law”: B Briscoe, A Odlyzko and B Tilly, 
‘Metcalfe’s Law Is Wrong - Communications Networks Increase in Value as They Add 
Members-but by How Much?’ (2006) 43 Spectrum, IEEE 34; For a brief introduction to 
network externalities, see Paul Krugman and Robin Wells, Economics (Third Edition, 
Worth Publishers 2012) 469–472.
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interaction  with  content,  social  interaction,  buying  behaviour,  the  logging  of 
geographical location and the output of additional sensors.
The growth of  the “Frightful  Five’s”  two-sided markets has economic signifcance: 
since 2007, the fve tech frms have replaced energy frms and fnancial institutions in 
dominating the rankings of “largest market capitalisation in the world”.33 A number of 
high-profle  EU  competition  law  cases  against  these  companies  underlines  this 
signifcance: the European Commission fned Google €2.42 billion in 2017; Microsoft 
was fned €561 million in 2013, both for matters relating to article 102 of the Treaty on 
the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  regarding  abuse  of  a  dominant 
position.34 The German Bundeskartellamt (German national competition authority) 
initiated  proceedings  based  on  a  similar  complaint  against  Facebook  in  2016.35 
Political  efects are also visible:  in 2017,  the European Commission deemed a 1991 
Republic of  Ireland decision for a low tax rate for Apple to be illegal state aid and 
announced to take the Republic to court over its failure to reclaim a possible €13 
billion in “illegal benefts” from the frm.36
For the individual  consumer,  a platform provider may appear to be “just  another 
contract partner”. But without the platforms of the Frightful Five dominating large 
sectors of  the economy, the use of  data analytics could very well have taken more 
33 List of public corporations by market capitalization, ‘List of Public Corporations by Market 
Capitalization’, Wikipedia (2018) 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_public_corporations_by_market_capitalization> 
accessed 20 March 2019.
34 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping 
Service’ (27 June 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm> accessed 
19 March 2019; European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Microsoft for Non-
Compliance with Browser Choice Commitments’ (6 March 2013) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-196_en.htm> accessed 19 March 2019.
35 Bundeskartellamt, ‘Bundeskartellamt Eröfnet Verfahren Gegen Facebook Wegen 
Verdachts Auf Marktmachtmissbrauch Durch Datenschutzverstöße’ (Meldung, 3 March 
2016) 
<https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/DE/Pressemitteilungen/2016/0
2_03_2016_Facebook.html> accessed 19 March 2019.
36 European Commission, ‘State Aid: Commission Refers Ireland to Court for Failure to 
Recover Illegal Tax Benefts from Apple Worth up to €13 Billion’ (4 October 2017) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3702_en.htm> accessed 19 March 2019; 
Vanessa Houlder, Alex Barker and Arthur Beesley, ‘Apple’s EU Tax Dispute Explained’ 
Financial Times (London, 30 August 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/3e0172a0-6e1b-
11e6-9ac1-1055824ca907> accessed 20 March 2019.
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time, or could have been less pervasive. After all, their platforms have gathered data 
from a wide range of markets and a large consumer base, and made this data available 
to a large number of economic actors. Therefore, platforms have probably increased 
the use and the capabilities of data analytics.
1.3 Big data as a source of risk for individuals
Apart from the efects indicated above, datafcation has introduced new risks. A small 
number of  controllers  now have access  to large amounts  of  personal  data about 
millions or billions of consumers. This causes a pronounced information asymmetry 
between controllers and data subjects and between controllers and governments. This 
information asymmetry is  often qualifed  as  a threat to individual  privacy.  It  has 
introduced risks for both the individual and for society.
Theoretically, privacy risks are associated with the loss of individual autonomy – the 
opportunity to have one’s own identity and independently make individual choices – 
and  a  diminishing  separation  between  self  and  society  that  threatens  the 
opportunities  for  dissent  and  critique.37 Such  a  loss  of  autonomy  can  have  far-
reaching  legal  efects,  because  important  legal  concepts  –  eg,  the  right  to  vote, 
individual liability and freedom of contract – are based on the assumption that this 
autonomy is protected. Stated in terms of fundamental rights, big data can threaten 
the right to respect for private and family life and the prohibition of discrimination 
(articles 8 and 14, European Convention on Human Rights).
The threat to the right to private life can take many forms. A few examples:
• Information asymmetry can result in privacy losses by exposing information 
regarding contexts where data subjects have a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy”.38 This reduces the private sphere for data subjects, especially if the 
data is collected during the time that a data subject otherwise has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy or if data is combined from diferent 
contexts.
37 Julie E Cohen, ‘Turning Privacy Inside Out’ (2019) 20 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
(forthcoming), 3 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstractd3162178> accessed 19 March 2019.
38 ECtHR Halford v. the United Kingdom, 25 June 1997, 1997-III, para 45.
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• Being “observed in all matters” puts data subjects under constant “threat of 
correction, judgement and criticism”39 with possibly far-reaching 
psychological efects.
• A sufciently large amount of personal data could enable a controller to 
digitally emulate a person, exposing data subjects to the threat of “plagiarism 
of their own uniqueness”,40 a well-known form of which is identity theft.
• Datafcation extending across many contexts of social interaction can reduce 
the opportunities for anonymous expression, increasing personal inhibitions 
on personal expression due to the pressures associated with the “tyranny of 
the majority”.41
• Storage of large amounts of data increases the adverse efects of data loss and 
breach of confdentiality.42
• The free flow of personal data can reduce informational self-determination as 
recognised by, for example, German law.43 It also increases the likelihood that 
unlawful use of personal data can be hidden from view.
1.4 Big data and power relations: risks for society
Several authors claim that big data will bring about change at the societal level. Some 
of these changes are seen as risks. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier mention the risks of 
endangered privacy,  penalties based on propensities (instead of  evidence) and the 
misuse  of  big  data  as  a  means  for  oppression.44 According  to  Constantiou  and 
Kallinikos, big data “reawakens the ghost of abstract or generic descriptions that may 
carry  dubious  social  relevance”.45 Zubof sees  big  data  as  a  new  “logic  of  
accumulation”:  a new form of  wealth inequality that she has dubbed “surveillance 
capitalism”.46 This leads to “substantial asymmetries of  knowledge and power”: the 
users of  Google know less about themselves than Google does, they know little of 
39 Bruce Schneier, ‘The Eternal Value of Privacy’ (WIRED, mei 2006) 
<http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886
> accessed 20 March 2019.
40 ibid.
41 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (JP Mayer and George Lawrence eds, Harper 
Perennial Modern Classics 2006) ch 15.
42 Hal Berghel, ‘Equifax and the Latest Round of Identity Theft Roulette’ (2017) 50 IEEE 
Computer 72.
43 Bundesverfassungsgericht: Volkszählungsurteil [1983] BVerfGE 65,1 para C II 1 a.
44 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 1) ch 8.
45 Ioanna D Constantiou and Jannis Kallinikos, ‘New Games, New Rules: Big Data and the 
Changing Context of Strategy’ (2015) 30 Journal of Information Technology 44.
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Google’s operations, and this diference is insurmountable because the data-gathering 
happens through “undetectable functions of  a global infrastructure that is also […] 
essential for basic social participation.”47 This infrastructure is ominously called “big 
other”.48
Indeed, datafcation and the associated information asymmetries can cause power to 
shift from data subjects towards controllers. Firstly, collecting large amounts of data 
on  a  large  number of  natural  persons  is  comparable  to  mass  surveillance,49 and 
surveillance is a well-known means of  exerting power over individuals or groups of  
people. It is the central idea behind Bentham’s Panopticon;50 philosophical analysis 
was ofered by Foucault.51 But the risks of  surveillance have been known for much 
longer. The two notions, that relations governing the availability of information are 
also power relations, and that society benefts if individuals are somehow protected 
against information asymmetry, are much older than data protection law – perhaps 
even dating back to biblical times.52 Because of the resulting power diferences, the 
notion of a surveillance state is alarming to many people, and the power that private 
controllers of large datasets can accumulate can have comparable efects.
Depending on the desired purpose,  controllers can either practice  overt or  covert 
surveillance.  Overt  surveillance  is  often  used  to  enforce  conformity,  both  by 
governments and private actors: people who feel that they are being watched, tend to 
46 Shoshana Zubof, ‘Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information 
Civilization’ (2015) 30 Journal of Information Technology 75, 77.
47 ibid 83.
48 ibid 85.
49 Bruce Schneier, ‘Metadata d Surveillance’ (2014) 12 IEEE Security & Privacy 84, 84 
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper.htm?arnumberd6798571> accessed 20 
March 2019.
50 Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings (Miran Božovic ed, Verso 1995) 31.
51 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Second Vintage Books 
edition, Vintage 1991) 201–202.
52 Kai Von Lewinski, ‘Zur Geschichte von Privatsphäre Und Datenschutz-Eine 
Rechtshistorische Perspektive’ [2012] Datenschutz: Grundlagen, Entwicklungen und 
Kontroversen, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 23, 23; see also; Omer Tene, 
‘Vint Cerf Is Wrong. Privacy Is Not An Anomaly’ (Center for Internet and Society at 
Stanford Law School - Other writing, 22 November 2013) 
<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/vint-cerf-wrong-privacy-not-anomaly> 
accessed 21 March 2019 in response to; Gregory Ferenstein, ‘Google’s Cerf Says “Privacy 
May Be An Anomaly”. Historically, He’s Right.’ (TechCrunch, 20 November 2013) 
<http://social.techcrunch.com/2013/11/20/googles-cerf-says-privacy-may-be-an-anomaly-
historically-hes-right/> accessed 19 March 2019.
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modify their behaviour both to comply with applicable norms and to not stand out 
too much from the crowd. The Chinese government is known to use overt surveillance 
to feed its “social credit” system, a system that enforces social norms by combining 
ubiquitous face scanning technology, internet trafc interception and data mining to 
control access to credit and public transport.53 Overt surveillance by private parties 
can be seen on many internet discussion boards (including social networks), where 
content moderators can enforce standards by editing or deleting comments and by 
visibly removing ofenders from the community.
On the other hand, covert surveillance is often used to discover individual features 
that could otherwise remain hidden. If individuals are permanently aware that they 
are being watched, the resulting increased conformity in their behaviour can make it 
more difcult to discover meaningful diferences in traits of interest to a party using 
the  data.  Many  governments  permit  their  secret  services  to  use  covert  mass 
surveillance in the interest of  national  security.  Similarly,  private entities that use 
personal  data  as  part  of  their  business  model  –  especially,  the  aforementioned 
“Frightful Five” – tend to include data collection as a part of some other function of 
the platform while disclosing their data collection activities only in their terms and 
conditions or privacy statements.
Regardless of  whether it is employed by governments or private parties, the power 
resulting from permanent mass surveillance can have far-reaching efects that can 
easily be qualifed as risks:
• Governments can intend to use mass surveillance for the beneft of society, but 
Schneier asserts that it is “poor civic hygiene to install technologies that could 
someday facilitate a police state.”54 Apart from that, permanent surveillance of a 
society  has  been  linked  to  negative  efects  on  social  capital  and  economic 
performance.55
53 Rene Chun, ‘Big In… China: Machines That Scan Your Face’ [2018] The Atlantic 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/04/big-in-china-machines-that-
scan-your-face/554075/> accessed 19 March 2019; Adam Greenfeld, ‘China’s Dystopian 
Tech Could Be Contagious’ [2018] The Atlantic 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/chinas-dangerous-dream-of-
urban-control/553097/> accessed 20 March 2019.
54 Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World (1 edition, Wiley 
2004) 53.
55 Andreas Lichter, Max Loefer and Sebastian Siegloch, ‘The Economic Costs of Mass 
Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany’ (IZA Discussion Papers 2015) s 
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• Enhanced  possibilities  for the identifcation of  group membership and  group 
attributes can exacerbate discriminatory trends in society and reduce solidarity, 
especially to the detriment of underprivileged groups.
• Similarly, if private controllers achieve a dominant position in their markets, this 
can have adverse efects at the societal level. A dominant position could be abused 
for rent-seeking,56 to drive existing  competitors  out of  the market  or to raise 
barriers to entry for new competitors, thereby reducing economic vitality.
• If  a  dominant  platform  provider  can  control  the  flow  of  news  and  other 
information,  this  platform  can  facilitate  reduced  social,  political  or  cultural 
pluralism  and  solidarity,  for  example  by  creating  “flter  bubbles.”  A  platform 
provider can  subsequently  ofer the creation  of  flter bubbles  as  a  service to 
providers of other services. This can have far-reaching efects for an economy if it 
distorts the marketplace of goods and services, for example by a platforms’ rent-
seeking  behaviour;  it  can  have social  and  political  efects  if  it  fragments  the 
marketplace of ideas57 in a society.58 Distortions in the marketplace of ideas can be 
disproportionally efective where electoral margins are thin and electoral systems 
can  enable  single-party  dominance:  activity  on  Facebook  has  been  linked  to 
meddlesome activity in the 2016 United States presidential elections.59
One of the aims of data protection law is to manage the risks associated with the 
processing of personal data and the resulting power diferentials. The need for 
5.3 and 6.
56 Richard A Posner, ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’ (1975) 83 Journal of 
Political Economy 807, 809–812 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830401> accessed 20 March 
2019.
57 “(…) that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market (…)”. Jacob Abrams, et al. v. United States [1919] 250 U.S. 616, p. 630.
58 Frederik J Zuiderveen Borgesius and others, ‘Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and 
Threats for Democracy’ (2018) 14 Utrecht Law Review 82, 89 
<https://www.utrechtlawreview.org/article/10.18352/ulr.420/> accessed 21 March 2019.
59 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (Penguin Press 2011); 
Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus, ‘Ich Habe Nur Gezeigt, Dass Es Die Bombe Gibt’ 
[2016] Das Magazin <https://www.dasmagazin.ch/2016/12/03/ich-habe-nur-gezeigt-dass-
es-die-bombe-gibt/> accessed 20 March 2019; Emma Graham-Harrison and Carole 
Cadwalladr, ‘Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in 
Major Data Breach’ (the Guardian, 17 March 2018) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-
influence-us-election> accessed 20 March 2019.
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regulating automated processing arose almost as soon as its large-scale deployment 
by governments in post-war Europe.
1.5 Development of European data protection law, 1968-2018
In the late 1960’s, political bodies began responding to the perceived threat of data 
processing  technology for human rights  and  freedoms.60 In  1968,  the  Council  of 
Europe Parliamentary assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers study 
whether “the national legislation in the member States adequately protects the right 
to privacy against violations which may be committed by the use of modern scientifc 
and technical methods.”61 The frst known European data protection law entered into 
force in 1970 in Hesse, Germany.62 It was aimed at data processing by government 
bodies. Since this “Datenschutzgesetz” did not mention personal data specifcally, it 
covered processing of  both personal data and other data. Its enactment followed a 
recent  Hessian  innovation:  the  establishment  of  a  government  body  for  data 
processing and fve associated computer centres processing a wide range of personal 
and non-personal data. The state of  Hesse was well aware of  possible power shifts 
associated  with  the  processing  of  large  data  sets:  the  law  provided  for  a  data  
protection  supervisor charged  with  observing  the  efects  of  processing,  and  with 
preventing shifts in the balance of powers between government bodies.63 According to 
its Prime Minister, the law was enacted “to prevent the Orwellian vision of the all-
knowing State seeking out the utmost intimate corners of  the human sphere from 
becoming reality.”
Legal protections were seen as necessary because citizens greeted the introduction of 
the use of  computers in government administration with considerable skepticism. 
Apart from Germany,  this was also registered in the Netherlands,  where the 1971 
census met resistance due to privacy concerns. These concerns intensifed once the 
bureau of statistics stressed that the data would be processed largely by computers. 
The assertion that humans would hardly see the data did not provide the reassurance 
that ofcials  had  expected.  Instead,  activists  considered  the use of  computers  as 
60 Sian Rudgard, ‘Origins and Historical Context of Data Protection Law’ in Eduardo Ustaran 
and others (eds), European Privacy: Law and Practice for Data Protection Professionals 
(International Association of Privacy Professionals 2012) 6.
61 Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Human Rights and Modern Scientifc and Technological 
Developments’ (Council of Europe 1968) Recommendation 509 (1968).
62 Datenschutzgesetz vom 7. Oktober 1970, GVBl. II 300-10, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt 
für das Land Hessen nr. 41 (Teil I), 12 October 1970, p. 625 (“Datenschutzgesetz 1970”).
63 Datenschutzgesetz 1970, §10(2).
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increasing  the threat  of  government intrusion  into  private  lives.  The census  was 
nevertheless concluded, although some 250.000 people declined to participate and 
the results were severely delayed, due to both accidental errors in the question forms 
and  deliberate  errors  in  the  answers.  The  Dutch  government  established  a 
Commission to investigate the possibility of the introduction of privacy legislation in 
1972.64
The increasing use of computers soon gave rise to legislative eforts in the feld of data 
protection on both the European and the national levels. In 1972, “Resolution No. 3 on 
the protection of privacy in view of the increasing compilation of personal data into 
computers” was adopted by the seventh Conference of European Ministers of Justice 
in Basel. Resolutions 73 (22) and (74) 29 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe (COE) can be seen as the frst steps towards “establish[ing] a framework of  
specifc principles and norms to prevent unfair collection and processing of personal 
data”. Many of  the principles in these resolutions are still relevant: article 2 of  the 
Annex to Resolution (74) 29 states that the information stored in data banks in the 
public sector should be “obtained by lawful and fair means, accurate and kept up to 
date,  and appropriate and relevant to the purpose for which it has been stored” – 
principles that are carried over to the GDPR’s articles 5(1)(a, c-d), and 6(2).65
In  1977  the Member States  of  the COE started  negotiations for a  treaty on data 
protection.66 This initiative was at least partly attributable to events in France: in 1974, 
the newspaper Le Monde unveiled the French national government’s plans to link all 
personal  administrative data of  the French citizenry in  a computer system called 
“Système automatisé pour les fchiers administratifs et le répertoire des individus” 
(SAFARI) under the headline “SAFARI or the hunt for the French”. The wide-ranging 
concern resulting from this report eventually resulted in the Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier  
64 Jan Holvast, ‘Op weg naar een risicoloze maatschappij? De vrijheid van de mens in de 
informatie-samenleving’ (Leiden University 1986) ch 5; quoted in: Maurice Blessing, ‘Het 
Verzet Tegen de Volkstelling van 1971’ (2005) 15 Historisch Nieuwsblad 
<https://www.historischnieuwsblad.nl/nl/artikel/6697/het-verzet-tegen-de-volkstelling-
van-1971.html> accessed 19 March 2019.
65 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Resolution (74) 29 on the protection of the 
privacy of individuals vis-a-vis electronic data banks in the public sector 1974; Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers, Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of 
individuals vis-a-vis electronic data banks in the private sector 1973.
66 Council of Europe, ‘Convention 108 and Protocol: Background’ (Data Protection) 




1978 relative  à l'informatique,  aux fchiers et aux libertés.67 This law is notable for 
being the frst data protection law where special categories of  personal data where 
recognised as a separate concern and worthy of specifc protections.
Several  other European countries enacted data protection legislation in the same 
period,  in  some  cases  based  on  a  new  and  specifc  constitutional  foundation.68 
Supranational eforts soon followed: in 1980, the Council of the OECD published a 
“Recommendation concerning  guidelines  for the processing  of  personal  data and 
cross-border data  flows”.69 In  1981,  the  “Convention  nr.  108  for  the  protection  of 
individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data” (“Convention 108” 
or “Strasbourg Convention”)  was concluded.70 It has since been ratifed by all  the 
Member States of  the COE.71 This Convention, like the OECD guidelines before it, 
covers  personal  data  processed  by  both  public  bodies  and  private  entities.  The 
accompanying Explanatory Report all  but recognises Moore’s,  Kryder’s  and Keck’s 
laws when it states:
“There is a need for such legal rules [strengthening data protection] in 
view of the increasing use made of computers for administrative 
purposes. Compared with manual fles, automated fles have a vastly 
superior storage capability and ofer possibilities for a much wider 
variety of transactions, which they can perform at high speed. Further 
growth of automatic data processing in the administrative feld is 
expected in the coming years inter alia as a result of the lowering of data 
processing costs, the availability of "intelligent" data processing devices 
67 Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fchiers et aux libertés 1978 
(JORF [Journal Ofciel de la Republique Française]) 227; Philippe Boucher, ‘Safari Ou La 
Chasse Aux Français’ Le Monde (Paris, 21 March 1974) 
<http://rewriting.net/2008/02/11/safari-ou-la-chasse-aux-francais/>; Molly Guiness, 
‘France Maintains Long Tradition of Data Protection’ (DW.COM, 26 January 2011) 
<http://www.dw.com/en/france-maintains-long-tradition-of-data-protection/a-14797711> 
accessed 20 March 2019.
68 Rudgard (n 60) 15–17.
69 Council of the OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data - C(80)58/FINAL’ 
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtra
nsborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm> accessed 19 March 2019.
70 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 




and the establishment of new telecommunication facilities for data 
transmission.”72
The Netherlands and Germany were two countries where protests against the national 
census persisted.  The 1981  Dutch census was never performed due to continuing 
protests  based  on  privacy  concerns.  The  Dutch  national  government  has  since 
decided to end the practice of  door-to-door census and has performed only partial 
and virtual censuses.73 In Germany, the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic 
of Germany granted an injunction against the April 1981 census, followed by its fnal  
verdict  against  the  Census  law  on  15  December.  This  verdict  declared  the  law 
underlying  the  1981  census  incompatible  with  the  German  constitution  and 
introduced  the  right  to  “informational  self-determination”  into  German 
jurisprudence.74
In the years following 1981, European states implemented national data protection 
laws based on the OECD Guidelines and Convention no. 108. These national laws 
could difer in scope and in the extent of the protection. Since the OECD guidelines 
and  Convention  no.  108  both  required  that  cross-border  data  flows  were  to  be 
encouraged only if the receiving state had a similar level of data protection enshrined 
in law,75 diferences in national laws could stand in the way of the free flow of personal 
data  between Member States.  When the Member States  of  the  (then)  European 
Community signed the Single European Act with the purpose to establish a single 
European market in 1986, these diferences in national law were seen as a possible 
hindrance  in  development  of  this  market.76 Therefore,  in  1990,  the  European 
Commission published its frst proposal for a data protection directive.77 In 1992, a 
72 Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data’ (Council of Europe 1981) 
Explanatory Report 108 1.
73 E Schulte Nordholt and others, Dutch Census 2011: Analysis and Methodology. (Statistics 
Netherlands 2014).
74 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Volkszählungsurteil [1983] BVerfGE 65,1
75 Council of the OECD (n 69) para 17; Convention 108, art. 12(3).
76 Article 13, Single European Act [1987] OJ L 169/1, p. 7.
77 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals 




revised proposal was published.78 Eventually, the fnalised Data Protection Directive 
(DPD) was published in the Ofcial Journal in 1995.79
Article 39 of the Treaty on the European Union and article 16 of the Treaty on the  
Functioning of the European Union provided a new legal basis for EU legislation in 
the area of data protection.80 Preparations for data protection reform commenced in 
2009 by means of two public consultations; a frst draft for the GDPR was proposed in 
2012.81 The fnal version was published in the Ofcial Journal of the European Union 
on 4 May 2016 and became applicable 25 May 2018 (art. 99(2)).
1.6 Interaction between science, policy and law
Considering  that the processing  of  personal  data forms a source of  risks for data 
subjects and society,  the GDPR can be seen as a policy response to these risks.82 
Presumably, this response is based on an assessment of the threat and an appropriate 
solution that is testable to a reasonable degree, to allow for meaningful evaluation of 
the legislation and to promote coherence in judicial decisions. However, the extent of 
78 European Commission, ‘Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data’ (European Commission 1992) COM (92) 422 fnal.
79 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31, p. 31–50 (Data Protection Directive).
80 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306, p. 1–271
81 European Commission, ‘Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World. A European Data 
Protection Framework for the 21st Century’ (European Commission 2012) Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2012) 9 fnal 3 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uridCOM:2012:0009:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 20 
March 2019; European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection 
Regulation) COM(2012) 11 (FINAL)’ (European Commission 2012) <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uridCELEX:52012PC0011> accessed 19 March 2019.
82 ‘Regulation can be seen as being inherently about the control of risks, whether these relate 
to illnesses caused by the exposure to carcinogens, inadequate utility services, or losses 
caused by incompetent fnancial advice.’ Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, 
Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (2nd edition, Oxford University 
Press 2013) 83; TNS Opinion and Social, ‘Special Eurobarometer 359: Attitudes on Data 




the risks of big data is not yet fully clear.83 For-proft surveillance of a large part of the 
populace has no precedent in modern history. Government surveillance at the scale of 
entire  populations  used  to  be  expensive  and  labor-intensive,  and  was  therefore 
practiced only by the most totalitarian or authoritarian of  regimes.  But it is now 
becoming  a  viable  option  for  almost  any  government,  especially  if  governments 
dominate large areas of a society’s economic and social life, or if  private companies 
can be convinced or coerced to cooperate in surveillance eforts.84
Even though the development of big data applications is relatively recent, societies 
have some experience dealing  with power diferentials and unknown risks of  new 
technologies  through  legislation.  The  interplay  between  risk  perception,  power 
relations,  fairness  and  legislation  has  been  described  and  modelled,  mainly  in 
economics and the social  sciences.  Competition law and consumer protection law 
have  the  preservation  of  fairness  and  the  moderation  of  the  efects  of  power 
diferentials  as  their  focus.  Similarly,  questions  surrounding  the  regulation  of 
technological risks have also raised matters of fairness and power diferentials, and 
models have been developed to better understand the interplay between relevant 
actors.  These  models  have  also  been  used  in  legislation,  e.g.  in  environmental 
protection  law.  This  provides  a  number  of  points  of  reference  to  compare  data 
protection legislation with legislative eforts in other areas.
The GDPR aims to regulate several types of  risks. A number of  examples from the 
recitals: 
• risks against the “rights and freedoms”  of  natural  persons (Recitals  3  and 9),  
sometimes focused on sensitive data (recital 51);
83 Nadezhda Purtova, ‘Who Decides on the Future of Data Protection? Role of Law Firms in 
Shaping European Data Protection Regime’ (2014) 28 International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology 204, 209 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2013.801591> 
accessed 20 March 2019.
84 Maya Wang, ‘China’s Chilling “Social Credit” Blacklist’ Wall Street Journal (11 December 
2017) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-chilling-social-credit-blacklist-1513036054> 
accessed 21 May 2019; Sharon Weinberger, ‘Son of TIA: Pentagon Surveillance System Is 
Reborn in Asia’ (WIRED, 22 March 2007) <https://www.wired.com/2007/03/son-of-tia-
pentagon-surveillance-system-is-reborn-in-asia/> accessed 21 March 2019; See also the 
now-defunct Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 




• the risk that children are not fully aware of the risks involved by the processing of 
their data at the moment they consent to processing (recital 65);
• more generally,  “risks to the interests and rights of  the data subject”  or “risks 
inherent in the processing” of personal data, including the risk of discriminatory 
efects (recitals 71, 83, 122).
This focus on risk management justifes an exploration into the degree to which the 
GDPR employs current theories on risk identifcation, evaluation and management. 
Such an exploration seems especially justifed when considering, as will become clear 
in  subsequent  chapters,  that  several  other  felds  of  EU  legislation  have  indeed 
incorporated testable models developed and verifed in a scientifc context.
In this research, the GDPR is evaluated using a limited number or models regarding  
distribution of  power and technological  risk.  These models have originated in the 
social and the exact sciences. They are briefly mentioned here; their relevance and 
application in this book will be discussed in section 1.8 below (Methodology):
• Neil Komesar’s method of comparative institutional analysis from the feld of law 
and economics is used to evaluate or model the results of choosing a large-scale 
decision-making process to which a class of decisions is (to be) assigned. In this 
research, this method is applied to compare several options of decision-making 
where the processing of personal data is part of a consumer contract;
• Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s theory of  power in social relations from 
the social sciences  is used to compare the GDPR with EU consumer protection 
law to  assess  the GDPR’s  protection  against  unfair  contract terms and  unfair 
commercial practices where the processing of personal data is part of a consumer 
contract;
• Ulrich  Beck’s  theory  of  the  risk  society, Charles  Perrow’s  theory  of  normal  
accidents, and Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn’s approach to risk evaluation and  
management, also stemming from the social sciences but partly based in the exact 
sciences, are used to compare how the GDPR and various EU legal instruments of 
environmental protection law acknowledge and deal with technological risks;
• The science of  complex systems is used to evaluate the expected efectiveness of 
two articles relating to the processing of  sensitive personal  data as defned in 
article 9(1) of the GDPR.
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European Data protection law has shown periods of relative stability punctuated by 
moments of substantial change. The development of new iterations of regulation can 
take over a decade and is likely to involve fnding acceptable compromises between 
conflicting interests and viewpoints. The GDPR, for example, replaces a directive that 
came into force 23 years earlier; the directive from 1995 succeeded a Council of Europe 
treaty from 1981. The European Commission hopes that the GDPR will be future proof 
for decades to come.85
But long periods of  legislative standstill  increase the risk that data protection law 
becomes less efective due to technological progress. The years between subsequent 
iterations could therefore be used to increase our understanding of the efects of both 
innovation  and  legislation  on  risks  and  power relations,  and  to build  a  body of 
jurisprudence where the assumptions of legislators are tested against the outcomes of 
real-life  disputes  before  the  courts.  The  aim  of  gaining  these  insights  is  to 
systematically improve the efcacy of the law. Still, we must recognise, as Coase did, 
that both the presence and the absence of regulation will rarely result in any sort of 
optimal solution.86
1.7 Introducing the research question
In the case of the GDPR, improving our understanding of the interaction between law 
and technology stands a good chance of being useful because a number of  experts 
seem to have doubts about its expected efectiveness. Criticism emerged already in 
the period leading up to the GDPR’s passing into law. Three examples:
• Moerel has opined that the GDPR needs to be made future proof. Technological 
developments will negate the efects of  the informed consent requirement, the 
profling  prohibition  and  overly  specifc  documentation  requirements;  she 
dismisses  the purpose limitation principle as  “at  odds with  the reality  of  big 
data”.87
85 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation’ (n 81) 104.
86 ‘It is obvious that if you are comparing the performance of an industry under regulation 
with what it would be without regulation, there is no reason to assume (indeed there is 
good reason not to assume) that either of these situations will correspond to anything an 
economist would call optimal. (…) Until we realize that we are choosing between social 
arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are not likely to make much headway.’ 
Ernest W Williams and Ronald H Coase, ‘Discussion’ (1964) 54 The American Economic 
Review 192, 194–195 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1818503> accessed 21 March 2019.
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• Koops has put forth that there is a number of  fallacies underlying the GDPR: it 
focuses too much on the concept of informational self-determination, it puts too 
much faith in controllers to perform certain actions, and it attempts to regulate 
developments like behavioural advertising and profling that require their own 
kinds of regulation.88
• Zarsky claims that the GDPR is incompatible with “the data environment that the 
availability of  big  data generates”,  which could  either lead to the Regulation’s 
irrelevance or to making big data analysis “suboptimal and inefcient.”89
Considering the possible impact of big data on individuals and societies discussed in 
sections 1.3–1.4, data protection law should be future proof, free from obvious fallacies 
and compatible with both its social and technological contexts. The above criticisms 
therefore give rise to the following question:
To what extent does the GDPR refect or employ theories of power relations 
and  risk  management  presented  by  Komesar,  Barnett  and  Duvall,  Beck, 
Perrow, Klinke and Renn, and complex systems science?
The question is approached through the following sub-questions:
• How do the decision-making mechanisms in the GDPR itself,  and in the EU 
lawmaking process that produced the GDPR, compare to other available decision-
making mechanisms with regards to opportunities for efective participation by 
data subjects?
• How do the GDPR’s protections for data subjects giving consent or entering into a 
contract compare to the protections in EU consumer protection law?
• To what extent were existing insights from the social sciences and environmental 
law applied in the GDPR insofar as it deals with the identifcation of risks of big 
data or with the addressing of new or unknown risks?
87 Lokke Moerel, Big Data Protection: How to Make the Draft EU Regulation on Data 
Protection Future Proof. Oratie 14 Februari 2014 (Tilburg University 2014) 51–54.
88 Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The Trouble with European Data Protection Law’ (2014) 4 International 
Data Privacy Law 250, ss II–IV <https://academic.oup.com/idpl/article-
abstract/4/4/250/2569063/The-trouble-with-European-data-protection-law> accessed 20 
March 2019.
89 Tal Zarsky, ‘Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data’ (2017) 47 Seton Hall Law 
Review 995, 996 <http://scholarship.shu.edu/shlr/vol47/iss4/2>.
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• Is the GDPR’s protection of sensitive personal data adequate in the context of big 
data and relevant insights in the feld of Complex Systems Science?
1.7.1 Delineation
Geographically, this research deals primarily with the European Union. The treaties 
underlying  the  institutions  and  the  workings  of  the  Union,  secondary  EU  law, 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, but also the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, are the foundations 
of  the EU legal  order and therefore count as primary sources.  Additionally,  other 
treaties and Member States’ domestic law and jurisprudence will be referenced where 
appropriate. However, the subject matter of the question implies that developments 
outside of the EU can be of signifcance: they will be included where relevant.
The primary focus is on the processing of personal data based on the necessity for the 
performance of  a contract and on consent. Observations are mostly limited to the 
private and consumer context and the provisions of  Chapters I to III of  the GDPR 
(General  provisions  principles  and  rights  of  the data  subject).  The processing  of 
personal  data  (including  profling)  based  on  the  need  to  comply  with  a  legal 
obligation,  the vital  interest  of  the data subject or the legitimate interest  of  the 
controller will not be covered: this mostly excludes use cases from the administrative 
law and criminal law contexts from the scope of this work. The specifc processing 
situations of chapter IX (e.g., freedom of expression, employment and archiving) are 
not  covered  as  they  have  only  limited  relevance  to  the  consumer  context.  This 
research also excludes the provisions specifcally regarding the consent of minors and 
the specifc national provisions on the capabilities of minors to enter into contracts.
Provisions pertaining to the obligations of  controllers and processors towards each 
other  and  towards  supervisory  authorities,  as  well  as  the  provisions  regarding 
transfers  of  personal  data  to  third  countries  and  the  authority  of  supervisory 
authorities and their cooperation and consistency are not covered in depth for the 
same reason, although they can be mentioned in passing.
This research does only occasionally identify diferences between platform providers 
and non-consumer end users of a platform. Even though platform providers in two-
sided markets play an essential role in the development of datafcation and the efects 
of  big data, the GDPR does not distinguish platform providers from other types of  
controllers. Both a platform provider and the non-consumer end users of the platform 
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tend to count as controllers in the sense of article 4(7) of the GDPR, especially if they 
have separate contracts with the consumer. Also, consumer contracts are held to the 
same legal standards, regardless of whether the other party is a platform provider or  
not.
1.8 Methodology
This section accounts for the relevance of the proposed models and their application 
in this thesis, and describes how they will be used in the analysis of the GDPR in the 
following chapters. A more comprehensive overview of the relevant elements of these 
models is presented in the relevant chapters.
Because a large part of  the GDPR is outside the scope of  the research, a complete  
overview of GDPR provisions is omitted. Where necessary, reference is made to the 
relevant handbooks published by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights and 
the Council of Europe.90
1.8.1 Komesar’s theory of Comparative Institutional Analysis
The efects of  power diferentials between the individual and the government and, 
more generally,  between the “haves and the have nots”91 have been moderated to 
various extents extent in the political systems and the economies of modern nations.  
In  the  social  democracies  typical  for  the  European  Union,  application  of  the 
principles of the Rechtsstaat  has led to the emergence and regulation of  large-scale 
decision making processes,  specifcally the legislative process,  the market and the 
courts.  These processes – or  institutions –  can redistribute power through general 
principles (like “one man, one vote” or “equality before the law”) as well as through 
more focused instruments like consumer protection law, competition law or forum 
90 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, European Court of Human Rights and 
Council of Europe, Handbook on European Data Protection Law (Publications Ofce of the 
European Union 2014); European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and European 
Court of Human Rights, Handbook on European non-discrimination law (Publications 
Ofce of the European Union 2011) 
<http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/fles/fra_uploads/1510-fra-case-law-handbook_en.pdf> 
accessed 19 March 2019.
91 Marc Galanter, ‘Why the Haves Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Society Review 95 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3053023> 
accessed 13 February 2019.
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choice rules.92 The goal of these processes can be manifold, but achieving a more level 
playing feld for participants wielding comparatively little power when compared to 
governments or large corporations is often one of them.
The  creation  or  recognition  of  institutions  then  gives  rise  to  the  question  of 
institutional choice: which decision-making process should handle a certain class of 
decisions by default? In this book, Komesar’s method of  comparative institutional  
analysis93 will be used to compare the efect of diferent institutional choices on the 
opportunities  for  efective  consumer  participation  in  decision-making  regarding 
contracts that involve the processing of personal data. After all, where opportunities 
for efective participation are reduced for one class of participants, power diferentials 
can be expected to increase in favour of the party whose opportunities for efective 
participation are greater.
Komesar  proposes  a  comparative  analysis  by  considering  and  comparing  the 
dynamics of participation, or the costs and benefts of participating in each decision-
making  process.  The  analysis  ofers  an  opportunity  to  estimate  which  decision-
making processes are more prone to favour the special interests of the few, and which 
processes are more suitable to favour the interests of the many. The analysis accounts 
for variables such as the costs of information, the costs of organisation and the height 
and  the  distribution  of  the  stakes  that  participants  have  in  the  outcome of  the 
decision-making process for each individual decision.
The relevance of this model for analysis of decision-making processes lies in article 6 
of the GDPR, enumerating the grounds for lawfulness of the processing of personal 
data. Article 6(1)(a–b) states that processing of personal data can be lawful if a data 
92 Note that the term ‘institutions’ can refer to the ‘forms, outcomes and dynamics of 
economic organisation’, the ‘rules of the game in a society’ and ‘legal systems, political 
systems’ and other form of organisation. Morgan, Glenn and others, ‘Introduction’ in 
Glenn Morgan and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional 
Analysis (Oxford University Press 2010) 2; Masahiko Aoki, Toward a Comparative 
Institutional Analysis (1st edition, The MIT Press 2001) 1; Douglass C North, Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press 1990) 4 
includes among institutions “any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape 
human interaction".
93 Neil K Komesar, ‘Governance, Economics and the Dynamics of Participation’ in Neil 
Komesar and others (eds), Understanding global governance : institutional choice and the 
dynamics of participation (European University Institute 2014); Neil K Komesar, Law’s 




subject gives  consent or if  the processing  is  “necessary for the performance of  a 
contract”; article 6(1)(c) and 6(1)(e) state that processing is lawful if it is “necessary for 
compliance with a legal obligation” and if it is “necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of ofcial authority vested in the 
controller.”  In  other  words,  often  a  choice  exists  between  providing  lawfulness 
through decisions made in the market or in the legislative process, and in cases where 
no  choice  is  made,  courts  will  eventually  decide.  In  this  context,  comparative 
institutional analysis and considering the dynamics of  participation in the market, 
the political process and the courts can ofer insights in the efects of developments 
like the emergence of big data and the widespread use of personal devices that use 
telecommunications  to  send  personal  data  of  large  groups  of  consumers  to 
controllers.
1.8.2 Barnett and Duvall’s theory of power in social relations
According to Barnett and Duvall,  “power is the production, in and through social 
relations,  of  efects  that  shape  the  capacities  of  actors  to  determine  their 
circumstances and fate.”94 As was mentioned earlier,  many controllers of  personal 
data can efectively keep data subjects under surveillance, which increases their power 
over these data subjects. This is observed in its most visible form in social network 
services, but many other types of commercial contracts can ofer similar insights in a 
data subjects’ personal life and use the results of knowledge creation in commercial 
enterprise.
A power diferential opens an avenue for unfair treatment of the entity that holds less 
power.  This risk of  unfairness is a rationale for EU consumer protection law.95 For 
example, if a commercial contract meets the criteria for an unfair commercial practice 
as defned in article 5(2), Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and falls within its 
scope,  it  is  prohibited  according  to  article  5(1)  of  that  Directive.96 However,  in 
jurisdictions where the lex specialis doctrine is prevalent, an argument could be made 
94 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’ (2005) 59 
International Organization 39, 42 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877878> accessed 13 
February 2019 (paraphrasing John Scott’s 2001 work ‘Power’).
95 Stephen Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 93.
96 European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council 
Directive 84/450/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC 
and 2002/65/EC and European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, 
[2005] OJ L 149/22 (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive).
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that unfairness concerning the processing  of  personal  data should  not be judged 
against  consumer  protection  criteria,  but  exclusively  against  the  data  protection 
provisions that have their own context-specifc defnition of fairness.97 The same case 
could be made if  the processing falls outside the scope of  the Unfair Commercial  
Practices Directive.
Even though Barnett  and  Duvall  wrote their article  with  international  politics  in 
mind,  their framework has been applied  to power relations between citizens and 
frms before.98 In this research, Barnett and Duvall’s theory provides a framework for 
evaluating and qualifying the power diferentials resulting  from processing,  and a 
comparison  between the expected  results  of  fairness  provisions  in  two directives 
containing EU consumer protection law and the GDPR. 
1.8.3 Beck’s theory of the risk society
In 1986, Ulrich Beck proposed that the nature of risk had changed in modern times 
due to technological progress. He asserted that technology had transformed from a 
way to reduce hazards into a source of possible disaster e.g., in the form of nuclear 
technology and persistent poisons. Where during the “frst modernity”, societies were 
mainly concerned with the distribution of  wealth, in second modernity it was also 
concerned with the distribution of risk. At the same time, individualisation of social  
inequality reduced the efcacy of collective decision-making.99 
Beck’s theory of risk has been subject to valid criticisms, mainly because it views risks 
in terms of worst-case scenarios and because it does not consider individual choice 
and risk acceptance.100 In the context of this research, these criticisms are considered 
to be of limited relevance. First of all, the processing of personal data is not seen as a 
harbinger of impending catastrophe. Instead, it is assumed that big data be seen as a 
net gain to society, but having possible adverse side-efects that merit consideration 
97 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, European Court of Human Rights and 
Council of Europe (n 90) 76–78.
98 Andreas Dür and Dirk De Bièvre, ‘The Question of Interest Group Influence’ (2007) 27 
Journal of Public Policy 1, 6 
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifer/S0143814X07000591/type/journal_ar
ticle> accessed 17 May 2019.
99 A more complete overview is presented in chapter 4 below. Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft. 
Auf Dem Weg in Eine Andere Moderne (1st ed., Suhrkamp Verlag 1986).




and prevention measures. Secondly, this research focuses on the possibilities for data 
subjects to exercise their own agency. Thirdly, these criticisms, valid as they are, do 
not diminish the relevance of risk society theory in the context of consumer contracts 
and  consent.  As  it  turns  out,  the  development  of  EU  environmental  protection 
legislation shows some signs of the adoption of some of Beck’s core notions. Together 
with Perrow’s normal accident theory, they provide a useful frame of  reference for 
evaluating legislation that deals with technological risks.
1.8.4 Perrow’s theory of normal accidents
In  1984,  Charles  Perrow  proposed  that  systems  that  are  difcult  to  intuitively 
comprehend and that are highly time-sensitive to escalation in the event of failure 
could sufer system accidents. A system accident occurs when timely recovery from a 
partial failure is so time-sensitive that it can lead to catastrophic breakdown of  an 
entire system. In his opinion, system accidents could occur in high-risk systems such 
as nuclear and chemical plants. They could be so inherent to these systems that they 
could be called  normal accidents.101 Perrow proposes a system of  social and cultural  
rationality, where societies decide through political discourse whether technologies 
should be abandoned, restricted, or tolerated and improved. 
Perrow’s theory of  normal accidents has faced considerable criticism regarding its 
usefulness in understanding and preventing large disasters.102 In this regard, it has 
been  pitted  against  High  Reliability  Theory,  among  others.  In  response,  Perrow 
expanded his theory to include power and social relations. In a further development 
of the theory, he added the idea of fantasy documents, being used in decision-making 
processes leading to the acceptance of high-risk systems. Such documents will claim 
that system accidents will be virtually impossible; they serve to make the many bear 
the risk of these systems for the beneft of the few.103
101 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Basic Books 1984).
102 For an overview, see Andrew Hopkins, ‘Discussion: The Limits of Normal Accident Theory’ 
(1999) 32 Safety Science 93 
<https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0925753599000156> accessed 16 May 2019.
103 Charles Perrow, ‘The Limits of Safety: The Enhancement of a Theory of Accidents’ (1994) 2 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 212 
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5973.1994.tb00046.x> accessed 16 
May 2019; Charles Perrow, ‘Accidents, Normal’, International Encyclopedia of the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier 2001) 




The usefulness of  Perrow’s theory,  as expanded,  lies not so much in its ability to 
predict and avert disasters as in its framework for looking at who decides that risks are 
acceptable and why. Indeed, EU environmental law instruments as well as national 
environmental protection law in Member States have implemented several aspects of 
Perrow’s model of risk evaluation and control.
The relevance of the models proposed by Beck and Perrow can be seen as follows: like 
the risks addressed by environmental  protection law, datafcation has its origin in 
technological  progress.  Furthermore,  datafcation  potentially  afects  not  only 
individuals but also societies, and if societies want to address these risks, the qualities 
of  decision-making  processes  and  the  properties  of  control  mechanisms become 
relevant. In this research, Beck’s and Perrow’s theories are the starting point for a two-
part  comparative  analysis  between  the  GDPR  and  EU  environmental  protection 
legislation.
1.8.5 Klinke and Renn’s approach to risk evaluation and management
Klinke  and  Renn  have  proposed  a  classifcation  of  technological  risks  based  on 
whether the risk potential of technology is known, whether the damage potential is 
known, whether the disaster potential is high and whether social mobilisation on the 
technology is  high.  Based  on the result of  this  classifcation,  a risk  management 
strategy could then be based on quantitative risk analysis, guided by an attitude of 
precaution, or negotiated in discourse.
Alternatives to Klinke and Renn’s model have been proposed, but these seem to have 
left  the basic  premise of  their  model  intact.  Kristensen  et  al,  for example,  have 
proposed a more refned method for arriving at a risk management strategy but the 
list of  characteristics that of  risky technologies appears to span a similar space as 
Klinke and Renn’s. The same counts for the management strategies that they ofer. 104 
The validity of  the approach by Klinke and Renn therefore appears to be hitherto  
essentially undisputed.
Klinke and Renn’s model is used in to determine what is the nature of the risk that the 
drafters of the GDPR aimed to address, and whether the risk management strategy 
matches the implicit risk assessment. This analysis is performed separately for the 
104 V Kristensen, T Aven and D Ford, ‘A New Perspective on Renn and Klinke’s Approach to 
Risk Evaluation and Management’ (2006) 91 Reliability Engineering & System Safety 421, 




general  case of  consumer contracts,  and for the special  case of  the processing  of 
sensitive personal data as defned in article 9(1) GDPR.
1.8.6 Complex systems science
Complex systems science (or  complexity theory) considers the similarities between 
seemingly unrelated observable phenomena. It has been observed that some types of 
events, such as nonlinear response to relatively small inputs, and the emergence of 
spontaneous order,  can occur in many types of  systems like individual  organisms, 
cells, rainforests and weather systems. The shared property of these systems is called 
complexity, and the aforementioned classes of events can be described or predicted 
using similar techniques across disciplines.
Due to the widespread use of individual electronic devices with telecommunications 
capabilities,  occurrences  like spontaneous  order in  groups  of  people can  now be 
distilled from a distance by centralised analysis of  personal  data emitted by these 
devices.  This opens new possibilities for knowledge creation,  for example through 
covert or semi-covert surveillance.  If  this knowledge pertains to sensitive traits as 
defned in article 9(1) of the GDPR, it can trigger prohibitions on the processing of 
sensitive personal data and automatic decision-making including profling based on 
sensitive data (article 22(4)).
Complexity theory is used to evaluate the expected efcacy of articles 9 and 22 of the 
GDPR, regarding the processing of sensitive personal data and automated decision-
making (including profling) based on the processing of sensitive data.
1.9 Structure
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 consist of four original research articles that were accepted by 
peer-reviewed journals between November 2014 and April 2018. These four chapters 
each deal with one of the sub-questions, in order, and contain their own conclusions 
as presented at the time of publication.
These articles  are presented  essentially  as  they were published,  and  in  the same 
chronological order.  The edits to the chapters have been kept to a minimum. The 
article appearing as chapter 2 was published before the GDPR appeared in the Ofcial 
Journal of  the European Union. Therefore,  the references to GDPR articles in this 
chapter have been updated for consistency. Other edits are limited to the correction 
of  misspellings  and  grammatical  errors,  the application of  a uniform scheme for 
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references  in  footnotes  and  the bibliography,  the re-numbering  of  the footnotes, 
updating the uniform resource locators (URLs) in the footnotes – identifable by an 
“accessed” date more recent than the original publication date for almost all URLs) – 
and the combination of the published bibliographies into a single bibliography at the 
end of this book. References to articles that appear as chapters in this book have been 
converted to internal references. 
Chapters 4 and 5 were published in journals that prohibited the referencing of the  
authors’ own works, and each article was aimed to be self-contained. The conclusions 
of  each chapter in this book do therefore not always refer to earlier chapters. The 
chapters’  preludes  illustrate  the  timeline  and  the  context  in  which  each  article 
originated: they are not part of the research.
Chapter 5 was co-authored with dr. Qing Yi Feng from Utrecht University. Dr. Feng 
kindly provided section 5.2 (on emergence); Dr. Feng and I co-wrote sections 5.7 and 
5.8; I provided the frst drafts for these sections.
The  fnal  chapter  answers  the  research  question.  Additionally  it  merges  the 
conclusions of  the four preceding  chapters to identify underlying  issues,  propose 
remedies and suggest further research. Due to the fact that it was written after the  
completion of the preceding chapters, it occasionally contains pointers to works not 
previously  cited.  The fnal  chapter also  contains  some additional  insights  gained 
during the research project that did not fnd their way into any of the articles due to 
word limits, scope restrictions or timing.
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2 Big data and consumer participation in 
privacy contracts
Deciding who decides on privacy
Prelude
A short remark in Guibault and others,  Digital Consumers and the Law. Towards a  
Cohesive European Framework (Kluwer Law International 2012) inspired me to write 
the text that is now included in this book as Chapter 2. Page 144 of Digital Consumers 
and  the Law reads:  “Given  the relatively small  (and  costly)  scope of  the judicial 
process, further legislative action may serve to strengthen the position of consumers 
of  digital  content.”  The accompanying  footnote referred  to  Komesar’s  method  of 
Comparative Institutional Analysis and his 2001 book Law’s Limits.
The remark made me curious:  I  could  readily believe that the position of  digital  
consumers were better strengthened through law than trough court cases. But how 
did  the  footnote  support  this?  It  turns  out  that  the  way  that  Komesar  looks  at 
decision-making processes can help point out strengths and weaknesses in the GDPR.
Timeline and citation
The original article was published in the Privacy special issue of the Utrecht Journal 
of International and European Law on 27 February 2015 under a “Creative Commons 
Attribution 3.0 Unported” open-access license. The call for papers was published on 
16 July 2014 and is archived at https://www.utrechtjournal.org/announcement/.
The  original  version  was  submitted  on  16  November  2014.  The  Utrecht  Journal 
conditionally  accepted  the frst  version on 21  December.  The revised  version was 
submitted  10  January  2015  and  was  accepted  11  February.  The  Utrecht  Journal 
recommends the following citation:
Rhoen, M., (2015). Big Data and Consumer Participation in Privacy 
Contracts: Deciding who Decides on Privacy. Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 31(80), pp. 51–71. DOI: 
http://doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.cu
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2.1 Introduction
In late spring of 2011, Dutch Parliament debated the transposition of the revised EU 
Telecoms  Package  into  national  law.105 This  debate  became the  centre  of  public 
interest after telecom provider KPN proudly explained to its investors that they were 
ready to start using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to see which applications generated 
data  trafc over  their  wireless  network.  Marco Visser  stated:  ‘We will  not  block 
services but […] we will price them’.106 Packets in this context are units of data at the 
network  layer  level  of  telecommunications.  Each  packet  consists  of  control 
information (containing, among others, the origin and destination of the packet) and 
user data (the actual data being sent). DPI involves analysing data packets for both 
their control information and their user data.
Responding to declining Short Message Service (SMS) revenues, KPN announced the 
company had the intention to use this DPI technology to charge for the use of instant 
messaging (IM) applications on smartphones (apps). Use of IM apps (like WhatsApp) 
substituted consumers’ use of  individually priced SMS messages. This dramatically 
reduced the profts of KPN (and later other telecom providers all over the world). 107 
DPI would allow KPN to reverse this trend, as it enabled the company to distinguish 
IM  trafc  from  other  trafc,  and  charge  a  higher  price  for  the  IM  services.  
105 European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/140/EC of 25 November 2009 amending 
Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation 
of electronic communications networks and services, [2009] OJ L 337/, p. 37–69 (the 
Framework Directive); European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/136/EC of 25 
November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, [2009] 
OJ L 337/, p. 11–36 (the Rights Directive); and European Parliament and Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1211/2009 of 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Ofce, [2009] OJ L 337/1, p. 1–10.
106 Marco Visser, ‘KPN Investor Day: Consumer Wireless. Strengthen - Simplify - Grow’ (KPN 
Investor Day, London, 10 May 2011) 6 
<https://ir.kpn.com/download/companies/koninkpnnv/Presentations/KPN_Investor_Day
_-_Selective_topics.pdf> accessed 21 March 2019 (video no longer available).
107 Dawinderpal Sahota, ‘Global SMS Revenue Declines for First Time’ (Telecoms.com, 14 
January 2014) <http://telecoms.com/212062/global-sms-revenue-declines-for-frst-time/> 
accessed 20 March 2019.
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Consequently, KPN would no longer provide a “neutral” network, understood here as 
a network that treats all  types of  trafc equally,  but would be able to distinguish 
between diferent origins of trafc (i.e. diferent apps) and use diferent policies for 
the corresponding services. For this purpose, KPN would analyse the user data within 
packets sent across its network, as well as their control information – hence the name 
Deep Packet Inspection. This is, to some extent, analogous to the postman reading a 
letter to see whether it is priority mail, instead of looking at the indication and stamps 
on the envelope. Although imperfect in many ways, this analogy indicates the privacy 
implications of DPI.
2.1.1 Parliament steps in
KPN’s  announcement  brought  the  net  neutrality  debate  to  Dutch  Parliament. 
Essentially, net neutrality is about control: are network operators allowed to ‘block […] 
or prioritise […] certain network trafc or trafc from particular sources’?108 Should 
KPN  be  allowed  to  charge  its  subscribers  a  premium  for  their  use  of  specifc 
applications?
Several  non-governing  minority  parties  proposed  an  amendment  to  the  Bill 
implementing the revised Telecoms Package, demanding network neutrality from all 
telecommunications providers and specifcally prohibiting the analysis of  trafc by 
content other than for technical reasons (e.g. ensuring network integrity or security). 
The proposed amendment was meant to secure the possible benefts of  a neutral 
network,109 but also to secure consumers’  privacy.  DPI,  these parties argued,  gave 
telecommunications providers an unhealthy degree of insight into consumers’ private 
communications, since it must include analysis of their content.110
Initially, the cabinet minister responsible for the Bill opposed the amendment. In his 
view,  telecoms  law  already  provided  safeguards  against  DPI.  For  example,  it  
prohibited telecom providers from secretly ‘limiting access to and/or use of services’ 
as well as ‘procedures to measure and shape trafc’: providers could use DPI for price 
discrimination only if they told consumers beforehand.111 If consumers objected to a 
108 Paul Ganley and Ben Allgrove, ‘Net Neutrality: A User’s Guide’ (2006) 22 Computer Law & 
Security Review 454, 457 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364906000902> accessed 19 
March 2019.
109 ibid 461.
110 KST II 2010-2011, 24095 nr. 285, p. 8, 28 (Dutch Parliamentary documents).
111 Rights Directive, article 1(14).
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provider’s use of DPI, they could choose another provider. Imposing net neutrality, he 
contended, could make the Dutch market less attractive to investors because it would 
close an avenue of revenue maximisation, left open in the Telecoms Package. He also 
suggested  that  BEREC,  the  European  body  of  regulators, 112 was  better  suited  to 
regulate net neutrality than the national legislator. A specifc requirement within the 
Netherlands  might  undo  the  EU  eforts  at  harmonising  the  internal  market  for 
telecom services. In the end however, after some debate, the minister accepted the 
proposed amendment and Parliament adopted the amendment,  thereby including 
the net neutrality obligation in the Dutch Telecommunications Act.113
2.1.2 Consumer participation options for privacy contracts
The network neutrality debate hints at a wider privacy issue: nowadays, consumer 
contracts for everyday services allow private parties to collect and use large quantities 
of data. This data identifes individuals, for example by making use of cookies, e-mail  
addresses,  shipping  addresses,  device identifers  (and  other hardware properties), 
subscriber information,  account numbers or unique tokens like loyalty cards.  The 
term “data”  can describe the contents of  communications but also trafc data or 
metadata – “data about data”, e.g. timestamps and location identifers. All this data 
can reveal many aspects of individuals. If, and to the extent that, such data is about 
identifed or identifable individuals, it qualifes as personal data as per article 2(a) of 
the Data Protection Directive and article 4(1) of  the GDPR, which implies that the 
processing of  the data has to comply with national law based on said instruments 
and, since the GDPR has become applicable, with the GDPR itself.114 
Usually, these consumer contracts ofer benefts to consumers that are unrelated to 
their personal data. Sometimes, these contracts are unavoidable for the consumer: 
everybody  needs  banking,  telecommunications  and  public  transport.  Sometimes 
consumers enter into these contracts to obtain a side beneft to another transaction 
(e.g.  using  a loyalty  program to  obtain  a  rebate from a retailer).  Sometimes  the 
112 BEREC is established by Regulation no. 1211/2009, art 1(1).
113 Article 7.4a Telecommunicatiewet, as amended by Act of 10 May 2012, Stb 2012, nr. 235 
(Dutch National Journal); KST II 2010-2011, 24095 nr. 285, p. 29 (Dutch Parliamentary 
documents); Handelingen II, 8 June 2011, nr. 90, item 3, p. 90-3-36 (Dutch Parliamentary 
proceedings).
114 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, [1995] OJ L 281/, p. 31–50 (Data Protection Directive).
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exchange of personal data for services is an essential performance of the contract (e.g. 
when using a social network site) and sometimes the data only has value for the party 
collecting  it,  for  example  when  a  web  site  uses  tracking  cookies  to  follow  the 
behaviour of every website visitor.
The ubiquity of these contracts is the result of the increased datafcation115 of daily life 
and the increasing sophistication of algorithms for analysis. This has made such data 
valuable to an increasing  number of  businesses.  Often the aim is  to  retain  data 
indefnitely in order to create an enduring profle of the individuals, for example to  
analyse (online)  shopping habits to determine whether a consumer is  pregnant. 116 
These and similar developments have spawned the phrase “big data” to indicating the 
volume, variety and velocity of the data streams.117 Obviously big data can have privacy 
implications.118
In  this  research,  the  term  ‘privacy  contracts’  is  used  for  all  varieties  of  such 
contracts.119 Privacy contracts can take the form of written two-party agreements, but 
they are usually “agreed upon” by means of non-negotiable terms and conditions or 
unilateral privacy statements on websites. These contracts often govern services that 
consumers cannot easily do without like telecommunications,  banking or grocery 
shopping, or that are increasingly a part of  modern life like being part of  a social  
network or using household appliances like smart TV’s.120
Consumers have reduced opportunities for participation in determining the contents 
of privacy contracts: they cannot voice their opinion on the contents, the contents are 
not influenced by their opinions, and not entering into the contract is often not an 
option.  KPN’s  announcement  to  start  pricing  IM  apps  by  using  DPI  increased 
awareness  among  consumers  and  legislators  that  contracts  about  the  use  of 
115 "the ability to render into data many aspects of the world that have never been quantifed 
before”: Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, ‘The Rise of Big Data: How It’s 
Changing the Way We Think about the World’ (2013) 92 Foreign Afairs 28, 29.
116 Charles Duhigg, The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business 
(Random House Trade Paperback Edition, Random House Trade Paperbacks 2014) 194–195; 
209–210.
117 Zikopoulos and Eaton (n 7) 5–8; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 1).
118 Neil M Richards and Jonathan H King, ‘Three Paradoxes of Big Data’ (2013) 66 (2013) 
Stanford Law Review Online (passim) and referenced literature.
119 Eric W Verhelst, Recht Doen Aan Privacyverklaringen: Een Juridische Analyse van 
Privacyverklaringen Op Internet (Kluwer 2012) ch 3.
120 Walter Peissl, ‘Information Privacy in Europe from a TA Perspective’ in Serge Gutwirth, 
Yves Poullet and Paul De Hert (eds), Data protection in a profled world (Springer 2010) 251.
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telecommunication services are indeed privacy contracts, i.e. contracts pertaining to 
the use of personal data and its privacy implications.
The Dutch Parliamentary net neutrality debate compared two large-scale decision-
making processes that could decide on the terms of privacy contracts: the market will 
and the political process. Komesar calls these large-scale processes institutions; he 
distinguishes  the  market,  the  political  process  and  the  courts.121 Seen  from  this 
perspective,  the  case  of  DPI  is  an  example  of  institutional  choice.  This  can  be 
illustrated by the subsequent (and partly hypothetical) stages in the net neutrality 
discussion:
• First  stage:  after  intense  lobbying  by  interest  groups  including  the 
telecommunications  industry,122 the aforementioned  revised  Telecoms package 
explicitly left net neutrality decisions to the market. If too many consumers refuse 
to enter into a contract with KPN, another provider will ofer a better deal or KPN 
will change their ofering.
• Second stage: In the Netherlands, a number of interest groups and Parliament felt 
that users could be forced or misled to agree to DPI contracts. For them, DPI was 
equal  to permanent unwarranted eavesdropping on private communications.123 
They  claimed  these  decisions  should  be  made  in  the  political  process.  The 
permissible  terms  of  all  privacy  contracts  between  subscribers  and  telecoms 
providers were changed as a result.124
• Third (hypothetical) stage: Had both the market and the political process failed 
to sufciently protect consumer privacy, a consumer would be entitled to involve 
the national  courts.  Article  8  of  the European Convention  of  Human Rights 
(ECHR) guarantees the right to respect for one's ‘private and family life, his home 
121 Komesar, Law’s Limits (n 93) 31.
122 Yana Breindl, ‘Promoting Openness by “Patching” European Directives: Internet-Based 
Campaigning during the EU Telecoms Package Reform’ (2011) 8 Journal of Information 
Technology & Politics 346, 354 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2011.595326> accessed 13 
February 2019.
123 Handelingen II, 8 June 2011, nr. 90, item 3, p. 90-3-36 (Dutch Parliamentary proceedings); 
Daphne van der Kroft, ‘Persbericht: Bits of Freedom Roept KPN-Abonnees Op Om 
Aangifte Te Doen Tegen Aftappen’ (12 May 2011) 
<https://www.bof.nl/2011/05/12/persbericht-bits-of-freedom-roept-kpn-abonnees-op-om-
aangifte-te-doen-tegen-aftappen/> accessed 13 February 2019.
124 Similarly: Lucie MCR Guibault and others, Digital Consumers and the Law. Towards a 
Cohesive European Framework (Kluwer Law International 2012) 144.
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and (…) correspondence’. Article 13 of the Convention requires an efective remedy 
before a national court for violations of this right. However, a verdict from a court 
would typically afect only the contracts to which the litigants are a party.
Diferent  institutions  might  ofer  diferent  outcomes.  Evidently,  the  market,  the 
political process and the courts all ofer diferent opportunities for efective consumer 
participation:  the  market  allows  for  negotiations  on  particular  contract  terms; 
consumers can elect legislators and authorise them to impose rules to govern all  
contracts; courts settle disputes between consumers and their contract partners (such 
as telecoms providers).
Participation opportunities for consumers are of interest to privacy contracts because 
participation  is  one  of  three  traditional  legitimacy  requirements,  together  with 
transparency  and  accountability,  for  an  act  that  afects  a  fundamental  right. 125 A 
society,  such  as  a  State  or  the  European  Union,  can  deliberately  choose  which 
institution  decides  on  privacy  contracts.  A  clear  choice  of  institution  promotes 
efcient decision-making by increasing legal certainty and pre-arranging channels for 
dispute resolution and business development.
2.1.3 Consumer participation as a question of Institutional Choice
Consumer participation takes diferent forms in diferent institutions: consumers can 
act as citizens, voters, litigants and participants in consumer interest groups. They are 
the holders  of  specifc  protections  in  the Charter of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the 
European  Union  (the  Charter).126 The term  “consumers”  is  used  throughout  this 
chapter,  to  easily  distinguish  them  from  their  contract  partners,  indicated  as 
“producers”. Producers are providers of  goods and services and the controllers and 
125 These three elements of due process are generally believed to be necessary to provide 
legitimacy to any legal act that afects a fundamental right. For examples, see Danielle 
Keats Citron, ‘Technological Due Process’ (2007) 85 Wash. UL Rev. 1249, 1256–1257; note 
the similarity between these safeguards and the concept of due process in United States 
law: Serge Gutwirth and Paul de Hert, ‘Een Theoretische Onderbouw Voor Een Legitiem 
Strafproces. Reflecties over Procesculturen, de Doelstellingen van de Straf, de Plaats van 
Het Strafrecht En de Rol van Slachtofers’’ (2001) 31 Delikt & delinkwent 1048, paras 12–13 
<http://www.vub.ac.be/LSTS/pub/Gutwirth/006.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019 
(“Theoretical underpinnings for legitimate criminal procedure. Reflections on process 
cultures, the aims of punishment, the place of criminal law and the role of victims”).
126 Art. 38, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2010] OJ C 83/02.
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processors of personal data within the market,127 whilst in other institutions they can 
operate as lobbyists or litigants.
Certain participation possibilities may be more desirable than others, depending on 
the policy objectives a society wants to achieve, and the level of privacy protection it  
wishes to ofer. In this context, the following question becomes relevant:
When  deciding  on  privacy  contracts  in  the  age  of  big  data,  how  does 
institutional choice afect consumer participation opportunities and how does 
it  afect  the  feasibility  of  policy  objectives  in  the  European  multilevel  
jurisdiction?
The question will be addressed by answering the following sub-questions:
1. Why does institutional choice matter for privacy protection?
2. How do the possibilities of participation for consumers and producers 
qualitatively compare between institutions, if decisions on consumer privacy 
were to be left to the market, the political process or the courts, respectively?
3. What does the analysis imply for diferent policy objectives concerning the 
impact of big data on society?
The scope of this chapter is restricted to privacy contracts in which one party qualifes 
as  a  consumer.128 This  implies  that  criminal  or  national  security  investigations, 
employment relationships and torts are not covered. Further, since the comparison of 
the efectiveness of institutions is not directly dependent on substantive law, aspects 
of  substantive  law  are  not  addressed.  Moreover,  as  data  protection  and  privacy 
protection are not always easily distinguished and sometimes used interchangeably, 
this chapter distinguishes between both concepts only when this is required for the 
subject at hand.129
127 Art. 2(d-e), Data Protection Directive.
128 As defned by article 2(b) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts, [1993] OJ L95/29 (Unfair Terms Directive), art 2b:, “any natural person 
who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his 
trade, business or profession”.
129 DLA Piper, ‘Part 4: The Future of Online Privacy and Data Protection’ (European Union 
2009) SMART 2007/0037 s 1.1.3 <http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?
doc_idd833> accessed 13 February 2019; Gerrit-Jan Zwenne, Diluted Privacy Law (Leiden 
University 2013) 12 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractd2488486> accessed 13 February 2019.
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2.1.4 Comparative Institutional Analysis – Methodological notes
This  chapter  answers  the  questions  set  out  above  by  performing  a  comparative 
institutional analysis between the political process, the market and the courts at both 
national and European Union levels. The comparison focuses on each institution’s 
possibilities for providing efective participation opportunities to consumers.
Comparison between institutions is possible if the same individuals participate in all 
compared institutions. In the case of big data and privacy contracts, we assume that 
buyers and sellers,  or consumers and producers, or litigants before the courts and 
voters and lobbyists are indeed members of the same mass of people. Comparison is 
useful,  even  though  no  single  institution  can  be  expected  to  perform  perfectly.  
Institutional  performance  deteriorates  when  the  number  and  complexity  of  the 
required decisions increase.  In these cases,  ‘institutions tend to move together’. 130 
Even the best available institutional option may leave much to be desired.
In the model  ofered by Komesar,  the essence of  institutional  comparison lies in 
comparing the incentives that drive the actions of the mass of participants in these 
institutions  (consumers,  producers,  litigants,  voters,  lobbyists).  He  calls  this  the 
dynamics of participation. These dynamics are determined by a simple comparison of 
costs and benefts.
• The benefts of participation are dependent on the distribution of stakes at 
play for the participants. This distribution is determined by the average per 
capita stakes within the population and by the extent to which the stakes vary 
within the population.
• The costs of participation are the costs of information and the costs of 
organising collective action. Depending on the institution, participation 
costs are known as transaction costs, litigation costs or political participation 
costs. In the model of regulatory capture ofered by Levine and Forrence, 
they can also include monitoring costs.131
130 Komesar, Law’s Limits (n 93) 23, 28.
131 Michael E Levine and Jennifer L Forrence, ‘Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis’ (1990) 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 
167, 171 <http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.167> accessed 13 
February 2019.
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2.1.5 Structure of this chapter
The  relevance  and  the  specifcs  of  the  application  of  comparative  institutional 
analysis to the research question are addressed in sections 2.2-2.4. Sections 2.5-2.9 
contain the actual analysis. Sections 2.9-2.10 then apply the outcome of this analysis  
to a number of possible policy objectives. The fnal section contains some concluding 
remarks.
2.2 How institutions matter for consumer privacy
To efectively make use of  a legal  right,  it  must be reasonably achievable.  If  two 
parties’ interests are not fully aligned and a decision is required, a rule of substantive 
law usually cannot fully provide its’  intended protection because decisions always 
have a cost. Coase’s theory of  transaction costs suggests that some parties will not 
seek a decision if the cost of getting that decision outweighs its benefts.
The level of legal protection ofered by substantive law can therefore be expected to 
be lower if transaction costs are higher.132 Transaction costs vary within institutions, 
and they may vary from State to State, causing diferent levels of legal protection. To 
prevent these diferences from becoming excessive, both the European Union and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)133 set minimum standards for the 
efectiveness of legal decision-making processes, at least before the courts.134
Transaction costs will rise in every institution if  numbers and complexity increase. 
Therefore,  it  is  of  particular relevance that,  as  a  result  of  datafcation,  both  the 
number  and  the  complexity  of  decisions  on  privacy  contracts  have  increased 
substantially.  The number of  decisions is  related to the rising  number of  privacy 
contracts  and  the number of  transactions  generating  personal  data,  as  indicated 
earlier. The complexity of privacy contracts is also increasing, particularly in terms of 
the  technology  used  for  executing  them,  and  the  number  of  parties  involved. 
132 ‘I'll let you write the substance… you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you every 
time.’ Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327. House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong. 312 (1983) (United States Parliamentary proceedings, statement of Rep. John 
Dingell).
133 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Sept. 3, 1953, ETS 5, 213 UNTS 221.
134 Two examples: Art. 13, ECHR of the Convention (right to an effective remedy); CJEU 19 June 
1990, Case 213/89 Q. v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others 
(Factortame I), [1990] ECR I-02433, paras. 21-23 (availability of interim relief as a condition 
for efectiveness).
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Technology  has  increased  the  complexity  of  privacy  contracts.  The  fact  that 
technological  aspects  need  not  be disclosed  to  consumers135 makes  it  difcult  to 
determine whether a particular use of personal data remains within the boundaries 
set in the contract, or even to determine those boundaries themselves. The increasing 
number of parties involved increases complexity, because data will be collected from 
multiple sources  and  shared  with  multiple users.  This  may result  in  multilateral 
exchanges of personal data based on bilateral contracts.
In  the  market,  increasing  numbers  and  complexity  can  lead  to  the  use  of  form 
contracts, eliminating party bargaining options. In the political process, increasing 
numbers and complexity make any law less likely to be well suited to the majority of 
transactions.  The courts have limited  capacity to efciently provide every market 
party with the decisions they need. Institutional  choice when deciding on privacy 
contracts is a matter of choosing among ‘imperfect alternatives’.136
2.3 Everything has a price: privacy analysis by cost and beneft
Coase’s theory of transaction costs dictates that if  an institution decides on privacy 
contracts,  the value of  these contracts plays an important part in the dynamics of 
participation. This presents a problem for two reasons. Firstly, privacy – which, in the 
European legal tradition, qualifes as a fundamental right and an aspect of  human 
dignity – may be considered not to have a monetary value, or even to not be suitable 
to be bought and sold.137 Secondly, many privacy contracts do not specifcally put a 
monetary value on the personal data portion of the performance. This incompatibility 
manifests itself at the level of individual transactions (the microeconomic level) and 
135 Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive), Recital 41; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
(GDPR), Recital 63; Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘Why a Right 
to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data 
Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 76 
<https://academic.oup.com/idpl/article/7/2/76/3860948> accessed 13 February 2019.
136 Neil K Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and 
Public Policy (University Of Chicago Press 1997).
137 Corien Prins, ‘When Personal Data, Behavior and Virtual Identities Become a Commodity: 
Would a Property Rights Approach Matter?’ (2006) 3 SCRIPT-ed 270, 275 <https://script-
ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/3-4-Prins.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019; Joseph W 
Jerome, ‘Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Diferent Burdens and Benefts’ (2013) 66 
Stanford Law Review Online 47, 47–49 
<https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data-buying-and-selling-
privacy/> accessed 13 February 2019.
45
2. Big data and consumer participation in privacy contracts
at the level of privacy as a factor promoting or hindering societal prosperity or wealth 
(the macroeconomic level).
To facilitate decision-making,  law and economic theory attach economic value to 
privacy in an indirect way. The law solves the microeconomic part of the problem by 
separating decisions on the legitimate processing of personal data from decisions on 
privacy.  The latter lacks a precise defnition.  Evaluating  conformity with article 8 
ECHR requires judicial decisions, which are difcult to achieve, low in volume and 
come with  high  transaction  costs.  The Data  Protection  Directive  and  the  GDPR 
simplify this process by allowing a high volume of  decisions at  a low cost.  They 
achieve this both by making compliance easier for producers (by setting relatively 
simple standards for the processing of personal data) and by authorising consumers 
to enter into agreements (art. 7(a-b), Data Protection Directive; art. 6(1)(a-b) of the 
GDPR).  This,  by  the  way,  gives  two  examples  of  institutional  choices  made  by 
legislative bodies.
Requiring consumers’  agreement enables them to exchange their personal data for 
services without money changing hands.  The business model of  Google is a good 
example.  Google  provides  its  users  with  an  e-mail  service,  online  document 
collaboration, photo and video sharing services, a searchable map of the world and a 
search engine to the World Wide Web at no cost. Google also generates and populates 
databases for and from all these activities. Taken together, these are Google’s costs. 
The company then monetises the users’ personal data by ofering targeted advertising 
options within its’ services to third parties (an example of a two-sided market). 138 The 
revenues of this operation exceeded the costs by approximately a billion dollars per 
month  in  the  third  quarter  of  2013.139 For  consumers,  Google’s  “free”  services 
apparently ofer good value.  The price they pay is  the risk of  decreased personal 
privacy. Many consumers (implicitly) decide that this is a good deal, whether or not 
they are aware of all the privacy implications of their contracts.
At the macroeconomic level, economic theory provides a concept for comparing costs 
and benefts. Loss of privacy for individuals or groups can be considered a form of 
social  cost.140 This  cost  does  not  manifest  itself  in  individual  transactions  and  is 
therefore not suitable for analysing participation in the market. It can, however, be 
138 Rochet and Tirole (n 29) 992.
139 Bruce Schneier, ‘“Stalker Economy” Here to Stay’ (CNN-Opinion, 26 November 2013) 
<http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/20/opinion/schneier-stalker-economy/index.html> 
accessed 13 February 2019.
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taken  into  account  in  the  political  process  or  the  courts,  for  example  when 
considering admissibility of terms, taxation, bona fdes or the common good.
2.4 All created unequal: the catalogue of comparisons
This  chapter compares  markets,  the  political  process  and  courts  at  the  levels  of 
Member States and the European Union. Institutions at the level of the Council of 
Europe (CoE) are excluded. They are not open to the same mass of  participants – 
there is no common market in the CoE,  and neither its political  process nor the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is accessible to consumers or producers 
participating at the EU or national levels. The ECtHR only handles cases against a 
State or between States.141 The ofcials taking part in the political process of the CoE 
are not appointed after general elections. The verdicts of the ECtHR do not bind the 
institutions of the EU, although the EU accepts the ECtHR’s interpretation of human 
rights as its own (article 6, TEU).
Furthermore, national courts cannot be compared to the European Court of Justice. 
As  far  as  disputes  over  privacy  contracts  between  consumers  and  producers  are 
concerned, the latter court is inaccessible to litigants. If litigants reside in the same 
State, national courts have jurisdiction. If litigants reside in diferent Member States,  
the so-called Brussels I regulation decides which national court has jurisdiction.142 In 
all other cases, domestic law decides whether the national courts have jurisdiction. If 
a dispute before a national court requires a uniform interpretation of  EU law, the 
highest national court is required to put the matter before the CJEU (art. 267, TFEU). 
However, this serves only to interpret EU law, not to decide the case.
Therefore, this chapter only compares:
• At the national level: the internal market, the political process and the 
courts;
• At the EU level: the internal market and the political process;
140 Ronald Harry Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1, 
(passim); Paul Sholtz, ‘Transaction Costs and the Social Cost of Online Privacy’ (2001) 6 
First Monday <http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/859> accessed 13 
February 2019.
141 Arts. 33-34, ECHR.
142 European Parliament and Council Regulation of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), [2012] 
OJ L 351/1 (Brussels I Regulation).
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• Between the national and the EU levels: the market and the political process.
2.5 National and European institutions compared
The  following  comparisons  assume  that  privacy  contracts  do  not  specify  the 
processing of personal data for monetary compensation as the primary performance 
of  one  of  the  parties.  This  is  probably  a  safe  assumption  given  permission  for 
collection of personal data is usually part of a contract with a wider scope. Many of  
these contracts do not involve payment, e.g. the terms of use of social networks or 
other web services. In those contracts that do involve monetary exchange (telephone 
contracts, bank accounts), the privacy aspect is usually not the main consideration.
2.6 Privacy contracts at the national level
2.6.1 In the market
The terms and conditions of a privacy contract are usually not negotiable. As a result, 
the decision of  the market is  efectively the decision of  the party who drafts the 
contract.  In  a  transaction  between a  consumer and  a  producer,  this  will  be the 
producer.
The dynamics of  participation in this decision making process can be described as 
follows. As for the benefts in terms of monetary exchange, the stakes per contract are 
roughly  equivalent  for  consumers  and  producers.  The  stakes  per  contract  are 
supposedly symmetrical. Competition in the market will presumably cause the price 
the consumer pays to be near cost, so the price for the services will only be marginally 
diferent  between  producers  for  an  equivalent  level  of  service.  If  no  money  is 
changing  hands,  the  “price”  one consumer pays  is  close  to  the  marginal  cost  of 
operating the service for one more consumer. If  the number of  consumers is large 
enough the same is probably true for the increase in profts that a producer can obtain 
by  making  the  personal  data  of  one  more  consumer  available  for  personalised 
advertising services.
The large number of  contracts for producers makes their per capita stakes much 
higher  than  consumers’.  Producers  have  the  combined  value  of  all  their  privacy 
contracts at stake. The earlier example of Google’s 2013 quarterly profts indicates that 
these stakes can indeed be considerable.
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In this chapter, the distribution of stakes over consumers and producers as a group is 
assumed to be close to homogenous. For consumers, this assumption is based on the 
idea that consumers as a group have roughly the same need for these services. For the 
scope of this chapter, this seems a safe assumption given there is no discernible group 
of consumers that has a lot more depending on a phone contract, a loyalty card or a 
Facebook  account,  than  the  average  of  all  consumers  combined.  For  producers 
engaging in privacy contracts, distribution of stakes is assumed to be homogenous as 
a starting assumption in the absence of sufcient data. Producers’ stakes are not easily 
determined, with some enterprises standing to gain more from privacy contracts than 
others; depending on their size, their business case and whether they wield specifc 
market  power.  Determining  the  per  capita  stakes  and  distribution  of  stakes  for 
producers is further complicated by the recent tendency of actors in traditionally one-
sided markets, to make their market into a platform working as a two-sided market.143 
To keep the comparison manageable, this subject is not explored further.
On the costs side, consumers face higher costs of  participation than producers do. 
The costs of information, for example of reading the terms of a privacy contract, can 
be signifcant.144 These terms will tell a consumer whether he will incur an extra cost 
for using IM apps on his smartphone, or what liberties a service provider reserves for 
himself in sharing and using personal data. Every consumer incurs this cost for every 
contract he or she considers entering  into.  He or she is a one-shotter every time 
because the terms are diferent for every contract. A producer on the other hand only 
has to draft the contract once. The cost of information can thereby be spread out over 
a  large  number  of  contracts,  resulting  in  a  very  low  cost  of  information  per 
transaction. A producer is the repeat player in the market.145
143 Rochet and Tirole (n 29); Nick Jue, ‘ING En Het Gebruik van Klantgegevens. Open Brief 
van ING Aan Haar Klanten’ (maart 2014) 
<https://www.ing.nl/nieuws/nieuws_en_persberichten/2014/03/ing_en_het_gebruik_van_
klant_brief.html> accessed 13 February 2019 (ING and the use of customer data. Open 
letter from ING to her Customers).
144 Aleecia M McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, ‘The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies’ (2008) 
4 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 540, 540; Rainer Böhme and 
Jens Grossklags, ‘The Security Cost of Cheap User Interaction’, Proceedings of the 2011 
workshop on New security paradigms workshop (ACM 2011) s 2.3.2 
<https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?idd2073284> accessed 13 February 2019.
145 Galanter (n 91) 98.
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Likewise,  the  cost  of  organisation  is  lower  for  producers. 146 A  producer  of  even 
moderate size can organise collective bargaining force by forming alliances with only a 
few other producers  to combine the interests  of  a relatively large portion  of  the 
market,  for  example  in  a  trade  association  (presuming  this  is  possible  without 
violating article 101 TFEU). Although it is true that consumers can – and do – organise 
themselves into consumer rights associations, the large number, the low per capita 
stakes, and the homogenous nature of the mass of consumers, means that even these 
associations usually have to divide their attention between many subjects. Consumer 
associations  focusing  on  privacy  concerns  are  regularly  struggling  for  money, 
indicating that resource pooling does not always raise sufcient funds.147
All in all, when bargaining for a privacy contract in the market, consumers can be said 
to be at a disadvantage when compared to producers. They have only small stakes per 
contract and the presumed homogenous distribution of stakes makes it more difcult 
to organise buying power to negotiate better terms. They also tend to qualify as one-
shotters,  with little opportunities to gain signifcant experience.  Producers on the 
other hand, have the opportunity to beneft from repeat-player status by using the 
same contract repeatedly.  The value of  all  privacy contracts  combined raise their 
stakes  and  costs  of  organisation  are  low  because  of  their  low  numbers.  This 
encourages them to invest larger amounts of resources into the contents of privacy 
contracts.
2.6.2 In the political process
In the political process, the per capita stakes for producers are still determined by the 
value of  all  their privacy contracts combined.  However,  for consumers acting as a 
society with the ability to afect the contents of all privacy contracts at once by means 
of elected representatives, per capita stakes can also increase. Combining the value of 
all  voters,  the  stakes  are  increased  from  the  value  of  one  privacy  contract  per 
transaction, to the social cost of privacy.148 These increased stakes encourage resource 
146 ibid 100.
147 Digital Rights Ireland, ‘We Need Your Help to Keep Working for European Digital Rights in 
2014’ (Digital Rights Ireland, 1 January 2014) <http://www.digitalrights.ie/support-us-in-
2014/> accessed 13 February 2019; Marie-José Klaver, ‘Bits of Freedom Staakt Strijd Op Web; 
Oprichter: Digitale Burgerrechtenbeweging Harder Nodig Dan Ooit’ NRC Handelsblad (5 
August 2006) 26 26 <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2006/08/05/bits-of-freedom-staakt-
strijd-op-web-11172796-a826780> accessed 13 February 2019.
148 Sholtz (n 140).
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pooling for voters, which helps in levelling the playing feld on the beneft side when 
compared  to  the  market.  Participants  also  take  on  a  diferent  roles,  consumers 
generally acting as voters and producers active as – or via – lobbyists.
Although votes usually have identical weight for all voters, the distribution of stakes 
in the political process is possibly less homogenous than in the market. For example, 
if a political party does not consider privacy contracts an issue for the past or coming 
elections platform, voters and legislators for this party can be said to have lower stakes 
in privacy contracts. Producers with large stakes in a certain outcome (or status quo) 
can  exploit  diferences  between  political  parties  by  concentrating  their  lobbying 
eforts,  or  donations,  to  beneft  parties  with  favourable  viewpoints.  Unevenly 
distributed stakes will have a positive efect on the formation of pressure groups or 
political action committees.
Consumers may not stand to proft too much from this change in dynamics. It is not 
easy to attach a monetary value to privacy as a social cost. Therefore the increased 
stakes do not easily translate to voters’  increased willingness to spend money on 
participation. Producers do not have to deal with this uncertainty to determine how 
much they want to spend.
The costs of  participating in the political process are usually the cost of  gathering 
information, popular campaigning and the influencing of legislators. These processes 
are  used  to  organise  and  spread  information  among  voters  to  promote  public 
awareness, to gather support among voters and to bring specifc viewpoints across to 
legislators, to influence their political activities (e.g. by hiring lobbyists). These costs 
can be high, which – at least in theory – again works in favour of producers, who have 
higher per capita stakes and correspondingly larger resources at their disposal.
When compared to the market, the cost of participation in the political process for 
consumers is either lower or higher, depending on a number of circumstances. Their 
costs of organisation can be reduced if groups of voters are pre-organised in political 
parties or interest groups by reducing sunk costs. This lowers the cost of activities for 
subsequent issues.149 In the DPI/net neutrality example, the involvement of existing 
political  parties  and  interest  groups  made  all  the  diference,  even  if  the  parties 
pushing for the amendment did not form a majority in Parliament.  On the other 
149 “Sunk costs are those costs that have to be incurred to enter or be active on a market but 
that are lost when the market is exited.” European Commission, ‘Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints’ (European Commission 2010) OJ 2010/C 130/01 26.
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hand, if none of the political parties see privacy contracts as an important issue, the 
low per-capita stakes for voters work to their disadvantage as they do in the market.  
Producers can use this as an opportunity to lobby all parties in Parliament, increasing 
the costs of organisation for consumers. In those cases, pressure groups or political 
action committees have to fnd another way to influence legislators, increasing the 
cost of organisation. Seeking press coverage is one possible way to reduce these costs. 
As  was  seen  in  the  DPI/net  neutrality  example,  press  coverage  (triggered  by 
statements  of  interest  groups)  was  the  second  important  factor  in  influencing 
politicians. It increased awareness among voters and legislators for privacy aspects of 
DPI and probably alerted a large number of voters who were unaware of KPN’s plans.  
This  added  to  the  efectiveness  of  organised  lobbying  from  consumers’  action 
committees.
Press  coverage  can  reduce  the  opportunities  for  legislators  to  vote  against  their 
constituents’ interests: it reduces their slack.150 Legislators may use their slack to align 
their political  activity to lobbying eforts of  producers in return for money, career 
opportunities  or other benefts.  Assuming  that  fundamental  rights  in  a  business 
context  remain  relevant  to  the  press  establishment,  engaging  the  press  can 
signifcantly lower monitoring costs. As a result, the outcome of the political process 
is  less  likely  to  be  a  producers’  interest-group  policy. 151 Interest-group  policy  (or 
regulatory capture) is an example of minoritarian bias: decision making dominated 
by the influence of the concentrated interests of any high-stakes minority, such as the 
producers in the market for privacy contracts.152
All  in all,  the dynamics of  participation in the national  political  process are more 
favourable to consumers than they are in the market, due to reduced sunk costs and 
monitoring  costs.  However,  producers  can  also  have  considerable  clout  in  the 
legislative process, mainly as a result of their high per capita stakes.
2.6.3 In the national courts
Before a court, the dynamics of participation change once again. On the beneft side, 
the stakes for a producer can be signifcant, if the verdict can afect a large number of 
contracts. On the consumer side, the stakes depend on whether the case is a matter of 
collective redress,  or a dispute over a single contract.  Collective redress allows for 
150 Levine and Forrence (n 131) 167–176.
151 ibid 176.
152 Komesar, Law’s Limits (n 93) 60–70.
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resource pooling among plaintifs acting as one single litigator,  increasing the per 
capita stakes by “rolling  many capita into one”.  However,  collective redress is  not 
always  available.153 Furthermore,  seeking  collective  redress  may  eliminate  any 
advantages that domestic procedural law would grant individual consumers.  In an 
individual action, the stakes for the consumer are once more no higher than the value 
of  the  contract,  putting  him at  a  disadvantage  when compared  to  a  high  stakes 
producer.
Costs of  participation in the courts are not fxed. Both parties are free to spend as 
much as they want on information or organisation. Rational litigants will not spend 
more than the stakes of the case as spending more will result in a net loss, even if the 
case is won. Under this assumption, producers will generally be prepared to spend 
more as a result of their higher per capita stakes. The party with more willingness to 
spend can usually rally more influential allies and produce more expert opinions. 154 
Information produced by one party may still increase both parties’ costs, even if it is  
available to the opposing party at no extra cost. For example, if judges act as ‘passive  
umpires’, they may regard information that is not countered as being undisputed by 
the opposing party.155 In such a case, producing excessive amounts of information can 
exhaust the means of the lower-stakes litigant.
The costs  of  organisation  are  also  in  the  hands  of  the  litigants,  apart  from  the 
minimum costs associated with court fees and counsel. Once more, the party with the 
most resources at its disposal (e.g. more lawyers) could exhaust the resources of other 
parties  and  force  them to  give  up,  by  using  every  available legal  avenue and  by 
153 European Commission, ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress 
COM(2013) 401 Final’ (European Commission 2013) 4–5 <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/202773> accessed 13 February 2019.
154 Samuel Issacharof, ‘Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. 
Experience’ (1999) 34 Texas International Law Journal 135, 145.
155 In common law jurisdictions Galanter (n 91) 120. For the United Kingdom Neil Andrews, 
‘Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure: Order Out of Chaos’ in Xandra Ellen Kramer 
and others (eds), Civil litigation in a globalising world (TMC Asser Press ; Springer 2012) 29. 
In the Netherlands, the ‘lijdelijke rechter’; in Germany, ‘Parteibetrieb’, in France, the ‘juge 
passive’: Regine Genin-Meric, ‘Droit de la preuve: l’Example Français’ in José Lebre de. 
Freitas (ed), The law of evidence in the European Union = Das Beweisrecht in der 
Europaischen Union = Le droit de la preuve dans l’Union Europeenne (Kluwer Law 
International 2004) 140–141; CH van Rhee, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Burgerlijk Procesrecht 
in het Twintigste-Eeuwse Europa: Een Terugblik’ in D Heirbaut, G Martyn and R 
Opsommer (eds), De Rechtsgeschiedenis Van De Twintigste Eeuw. the Legal History of the 
Twentieth Century: Handelingen van het contactforum (Peeters Bvba 2006) 1–5.
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complicating or lengthening proceedings to the maximum extent possible. The level 
of profciency in the task at hand also determines the costs of organisation.156 By this 
metric, repeat players are at an advantage because they can use their experience in 
organising their work more efciently. Producers are more likely to be repeat players 
because of the large number of contracts they engage in.
All  this puts consumers at a clear disadvantage before the courts.  To quote Prof.  
Giesen on Dutch law:  ‘Private law […] does not deal  in afrmative action for the 
weaker party (rather the opposite, really)’.157 The diference in per capita stakes makes 
it unlikely that an individual consumer can efectively challenge a privacy contract if  
there is no clear-cut legislation on which the Court can easily decide the case. The 
individual consumer is more likely to be a one-shotter. Compared to a producer with 
high stakes, the consumer also qualifes as a have-not. 158 Producers are more likely to 
be repeat players in the court system. Given their increased stakes and proportionally 
larger resources, they qualify as the haves in this context.
Collective redress opportunities may compensate this disadvantage: it may increase 
the stakes, allow for resource pooling and reduce the costs of information. In high-
profle test cases, publicizing fundraising eforts may lower the cost of organisation 
and engage experts that will regard increased publicity as a form of compensation, 
thus lowering the costs of information. However, this reintroduces some of the factors 
we  already  saw  working  against  consumers  in  the  market.  Both  test  cases  and 
collective redress rely on contributions from a large class of  consumers.  In a large 
class, the benefts of participation may again be low because of the evenly distributed 
stakes.
Substantive  and  procedural  law  ofer  another  way  to  reduce  consumers’ 
disadvantages.  For example,  Dutch consumers are usually entitled  to a procedure 
before  a  court  that  does  not  require  legal  representation  –  a  measure  aimed 
specifcally at reducing their costs of organisation.159 European consumers may proft 
156 Ivo Giesen, ‘Sommige Procespartijen Zijn “More Equal than Others”. De Macht van de 
Tabaksindustrie En de Nederlandse Rechtspleging’ in Nienke Doornbos, Nick Huls and 
Wibo van Rossum (eds), Rechtspraak van Buiten. Negenendertig door de rechtssociologie 
geïnspireerde annotaties (Liber Amicorum prof. dr. J.F. Bruinsma) (Kluwer 2010).
157 ‘… dat het privaatrecht […] niet aan “positieve discriminatie” van de zwakkere partij doet 
(eerder het tegendeel).’ ibid 21.
158 Galanter (n 91) 103; Giesen (n 156).
159 Almost certainly applicable to privacy contract cases: art. 93 a and c, Rv (Dutch law of civil 
procedure).
54
2. Big data and consumer participation in privacy contracts
from ex ofcio application of EU consumer protection law. As a side efect, the cost of 
information may be reduced in some cases.160 The efectiveness of these measures is 
not explored  further in  this  chapter,  as  it  goes  beyond  the scope of  comparative 
institutional analysis.
It  seems  unlikely  that  these  measures  are  able  to  compensate  consumers’ 
disadvantage completely because producers’ per capita stakes remain much higher 
than consumers’. Galanter’s observation still rings true: before the courts, the haves 
come out ahead.161
2.6.4 Comparison at the national level
When seeking decisions on the contents of  privacy contracts at the national level, 
participation  opportunities  for  consumers  compare  unfavourably  to  those  of 
producers in the market and the courts, and probably in the political process as well.
Consumer disadvantage is smallest when participating in the political process. Earlier 
organisational  eforts lower the cost of  organisation for consumers on new issues, 
even if these parties organise only a tiny fraction of the mass of consumers. The cost 
of participation can also turn out lower if privacy contracts continue to be of interest 
to the press. The macroeconomic aspect of the political process helps raise the stakes, 
from the value of a single contract to the value of privacy as a social cost of big data. 
The  raised  stakes  help  increase  the  resources  available  by  encouraging  resource 
pooling. But this smaller disadvantage for consumers is no guarantee for their success 
in the political process. Per-capita stakes for producers are high. The political process 
is therefore not immune to the lobbying force of concentrated minority interests. The 
results of the political process may still have a minoritarian bias.
For producers, the courts and the market are very efcient institutions to achieve their 
objectives. In the market, they enjoy low costs of information and organisation and 
the benefts of repeat player status. They are also motivated by high per capita stakes 
as a result of the large number of contracts. In court, where the stakes per decision 
may be higher than in the market, this diference is enhanced even further. In the 
political process, this advantage is reduced.
160 Case 618/10 Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, para 42.
161 Galanter (n 91).
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2.7 The market vs. the political process at the EU level
The dynamics of participation at the EU level difer from those at the national level 
for two reasons.  Firstly the institutions themselves are diferent,  and secondly the 
scope of  the EU is much larger. Comparing diferent institutions at the EU level is 
therefore  not  easily  separated  from  comparing  their  similar  institutions  at  the 
national  and  EU  level.  As  a  result,  this  section  addresses  both  comparisons 
simultaneously.  This subsection ofers conclusions for the comparison on the EU 
level. Subsection C briefly summarises the comparison between institutions at the 
national and the EU-levels.
2.7.1 In the market
For consumers,  the dynamics of  participation on the European level  are partially 
similar to those on the national  level.  The efects of  being a one-shot player with 
stakes not exceeding the value of a single contract are the same.
Consumers’  benefts of  participation are lower in the internal  market.  The larger 
number of  individuals makes the distribution of  stakes even more uniform.162 This 
again means there probably is no substantial subgroup of consumers for which the 
benefts  of  participation  are  signifcantly  higher.  This  lowers  the  incentives  for 
consumers to organise themselves. The stakes for a single consumer still don’t exceed 
the value of a privacy contract.
Consumers also face higher costs of participation at the European level. A penalty on 
participation in the market at the European level exists if cross-border transactions 
bear higher costs than domestic transactions, as may be the case with telephone or 
wireless Internet contracts.163 For most consumers, the cost of information rises if this 
involves  acquiring  information in  a  foreign language that needs translation.  This 
applies both to the contents of the contract and to the law of the land. Translation 
costs may similarly increase the cost of  organisation for consumers, for example if  
162 Actually, stakes are most likely spread according to a normal distribution: many consumers 
will have stakes near the mean; very few consumers will have stakes that are much higher 
or lower.
163 World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference and International 
Telecommunication Union, ‘International Telecommunication Regulations: Melbourne, 
1988 (WATTC-88).’, Final acts of the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone 
Conference (ITU 1989) 4 (art. 1.5).
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they want to organise across  national  borders.  Incentives  for compensating  these 
increased costs are low because of the low per capita stakes.
Consumers are not alone in thinking (and actually experiencing) that cross-border 
participation is expensive. The European Commission has undertaken specifc eforts 
to reduce the costs translating the law of  sales by proposing a Common European 
Sales Law.164 Furthermore, the Commission subsidises consumer organisations, as can 
be  seen  in  the  fnancial  statements  of  BEUC  (Bureau  Européen des  Unions  de 
Consommateurs).  Even  though  national  consumer  associations  contribute  the 
greatest share of the expenses, the European Commission provided 49% of BEUC’s 
revenues in 2016, indicating that voluntary resource pooling alone cannot cover the 
increased costs.165
Conversely, for producers the dynamics of  participation on the internal market are 
working in their favour. The potential number of contracts a producer can enter into 
is increased, raising the per-capita stakes. This is the same for all producers engaging 
in privacy contracts. Therefore, producers can still be seen as a small, more-or-less 
uniform group with high per-capita stakes.
The opportunity  to  spread  the  costs  of  doing  business  over  a  larger  number of  
contracts  will  encourage producers  to participate in  the market on the EU level. 
Trading in the internal market potentially lowers costs of participation per contract 
for producers, making one more contract more proftable. The internal market is one 
of  the largest economic areas in the world, ofering a large potential for additional 
contracts.166 As a side efect, this may enhance the benefts of repeat player status.
164 European Commission, ‘A Common European Sales Law to Facilitate Bross-Border 
Transactions in the Single Market’ (European Commission 2011) Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM/2011/0636 fnal <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uridCELEX:52011DC0636> accessed 13 February 
2019.
165 BEUC, ‘Annual Report 2016’ (BEUC 2017) 14 <http://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-
2017-045-annual-report-2016.pdf> accessed 19 March 2019. Subsidies for consumer 
participation are part of a EU programme of 188,8 million Euros over the 2014-2020 period; 
European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 254/2014 of 26 February 2014 on a 
multiannual consumer programme for the years 2014-20 and repealing Decision No 
1926/2006/EC, [2014] OJ L 84/42, article 3(1)(b).
166 The EU economy is larger than that of the US. ‘Europa- The economy’: , 
<http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-fgures/economy/index_en.htm> accessed 1 November 
2014.
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The free movement of  personal data,  guaranteed by the Data Protection Directive 
article 1(2) and the GDPR article 1(3), lowers compliance costs associated with data 
processing.  Compliance  with  data  protection  legislation  in  one  Member  State 
guarantees free movement of these data to other Member States. 167 As a result, large 
telecom providers and most social network websites tend to work in several Member 
States simultaneously. This, in turn, helps reduce costs even further, for example by 
consolidation of processing equipment and administrative functions. Many producers 
engaging in privacy contracts formally rely on a single point of presence in the EU. For 
example, LinkedIn and Facebook provide an address in the Republic of Ireland for 
correspondence on data protection matters.168
2.7.2 The political process
For consumers,  the political  process at the EU level  compares unfavourably to its 
equivalent at the national level.  On the beneft side, the distribution of  stakes for 
voters  is  strongly  homogenised  by  the  combination  of  national  seats  from  28 
countries into 7 larger parties in the European Parliament. This is reflected in voter 
turnout. Average turnout in all Member States in 2014 was 42,54%, trailing far behind 
typical voter turnouts in national general elections.
The per  capita  stakes  at  the  EU  level  are  larger than  on  the  national  level.  EU 
decisions afect a much larger number of  citizens and businesses,  increasing their 
impact on privacy as a social  cost.  They also afect legislation in many countries, 
eliminating opportunities for consumers to fnd a better legal arrangement in another 
Member  State.  The  stakes  may  however  appear  smaller  to  voters,  because  the 
European  Parliament’s  powers  are  less  pronounced  than  those  of  national 
parliaments. The EP can pass a motion of censure on the entire Commission only with 
a two-thirds majority whereas national parliaments can usually do so with a simple 
majority and for single Ministers.169 Compared to national  parliaments,  the EP is 
elected  for  a  longer  period  of  time  and  it  cannot  be  dissolved  to  enable  voter 
participation  in  unresolved  disputes  between  the  EP,  the  Council  and  the 
167 Data Protection Directive, art. 1(2); GDPR, art. 1(3)
168 Linkedin, ‘Postadres voor vragen over gebruikersovereenkomst of privacybeleid’ (in Dutch) 
<https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/79728?trkdmicrosites-
frontend_legal_privacy-policy&langdnl> accessed 13 February 2019; Facebook, 
‘Gegevensbeleid’ (in Dutch) <https://nl-nl.facebook.com/about/privacy/> accessed 28 
April 2018.
169 Art . 234 TFEU.
58
2. Big data and consumer participation in privacy contracts
Commission.170 Instead, the resolution of conflicts between these bodies is referred to 
a conciliation committee without any possibility of voter input. 171 This makes voting 
less attractive.
Consumers face higher costs of organisation in the EU than on the national level. A 
very simple example is the increased physical distance, with most voters needing to 
travel  abroad,  to Brussels  or Strasbourg,  if  they want to interact  with  legislators 
directly. Another aspect is the large number of  legislators and the large number of 
venues where participation may be required: Commissioners, MEP’s and their staf for 
primary law,  and  the  Commission,  agencies  and  comitology  for  secondary  law. 172 
Representatives in the European Parliament are under pressure not only from their 
political party on the national level, but also from the European parties on the EP 
level. Furthermore, no single national delegation can dominate a party in the EP. This 
decreases the possible benefts of  “piggybacking” on previous organisation eforts.  
European Parliament proceedings usually receive far less coverage in the national  
press, increasing the costs of information and monitoring costs for consumers. This 
gives legislators more possibilities to decide against voters’ interests.173
The higher costs and the decreased benefts of  participation at the EU level leave 
consumer interest groups short of  money.  Participation in the political  process by 
consumer organisations requires external funding from the European Commission. 174 
BEUC and  the national  consumer associations  are appointed  as  members  of  the 
European Consumer Consultative Group and in this capacity they are eligible for 
subsidies.175 The Commission decision establishing the group states that it is tasked 
with consumer interests in general, which means that it needs to spread itself  thin 
over all  consumer issues.  BEUC is thus not a special  interest privacy group.  Such 
groups do exist, but even a group like European Digital Rights also had to rely on a 
170 Art. 14(3) TEU.
171 Art. 294 (8)(b), (10-14) TFEU.
172 Marinus PCM van Schendelen, Machiavelli in Brussels: The Art of Lobbying the EU (2nd 
edn, Amsterdam University Press 2005) 58.
173 Levine and Forrence (n 131) 173.
174 National members of BEUC may be eligible for subsidies. At least in the Netherlands, these 
subsidies accounted for much less of the budget (24% for 2016). Consumentenbond, 
‘Jaarverslag 2016’ (Consumentenbond 2017) Jaarverslag 73 
<https://www.consumentenbond.nl/binaries/content/assets/cbhippowebsite/over-
ons/wie-zijn-we/consumentenbond-jaarverslag-2016.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019.
175 Article 3(1)(a) and annex, Commission Decision of 14 September 2009, setting up a 
European Consumer Consultative Group (2009/705/EC), [2009] OJ L 244/21
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grant from the European Commission of approximately 25% of their annual budget in 
2013 although this subsidy was no longer on the books in 2016. 176 Like in the market, 
resource pooling in the political process at the European level apparently does not 
sufciently ofset the higher costs of organisation at the EU level.
For producers, the benefts are quite large. The European political process is a high-
stakes game because it regulates the internal market. This makes the distribution of 
stakes almost uniform, but at a very high level. Producers have a strong incentive to 
organise, even if the costs of organisation are high.
Like  consumers,  producers  face  higher  costs  of  information  and  organisation  in 
Brussels – but in accordance with their increased stakes, this appears to present no 
extra problems. Producers are the haves in this institution. They are able to pool and 
spend considerable resources and do not need EC subsidies. If lobbying eforts in the 
United States are any indication, spending several million on influencing legislation is 
an acceptable proposition to many individual companies.177 Producers have formed 
their own lobbying groups dedicated to data protection and privacy issues.178 Like 
consumers at the national level, producers can also beneft from earlier organisation 
eforts. Many industries that engage in privacy contracts have already formed interest 
groups for their core business, like the European Competitive Telecommunications 
Association, Digital Europe and the Euro Banking Association. When lobbying for 
privacy contracts legislation, this helps them avoid sunk costs.
It  is  therefore  no  surprise  that  high-stakes  players  are  better  represented  than 
consumers in the Brussels lobbying circuit.  In 2007,  commercial  and professional 
interests made up 63% of all permanent representations in Brussels, whilst consumer 
and human rights interests accounted for 13%.179 Their apparent abundance of funding 
puts them at an advantage over consumer special interest groups like EDRi, whilst 
general-interest groups like BEUC are probably already stretched thin because of their 
176 EDRi - European Digital Rights, ‘Annual Report, January 2013 - December 2013’ (EDRi - 
European Digital Rights 2014) 31 <https://edri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/EDRi_Annual_Report_2013.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019; EDRi 
- European Digital Rights, ‘Annual Report 2016: January 2016 – December 2016’ (EDRi - 
European Digital Rights 2017) 30 <https://edri.org/fles/edri_annual_report_2016.pdf> 
accessed 13 February 2019.
177 April Dembosky, ‘Facebook Spending on Lobbying Soars’ Financial Times (24 January 
2013).
178 James Fontanella-Khan, ‘Brussels: Astroturfng Takes Root’ Financial Times (26 June 2013).
179 van Schendelen (n 172) 50.
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wide  scope.  These  diferences  express  themselves  in  increased  opportunities  to 
interact with ofcials in the EP, the Commission and comitology.
Legislators’  large  amounts  of  slack,  taken  together  with  their  larger  exposure  to 
producers than to consumers,  increase the odds of  special-interest  policies  being 
adopted in the EP. The costs and benefts of participation in the political process on 
the EU level are almost ideal for regulatory capture.
2.7.3 Comparison of the market and the political process at the EU 
level
Producers are at an advantage both in the market and in the political process at the 
EU level. This is mainly due to the large cost of participation, combined with the large 
stakes for producers, giving them a bigger incentive to participate.
For consumers, participating in the market on the European level does not increase 
their per capita stakes but it does increase their costs. In the political process, the 
stakes for consumers are actually higher, but the costs of participation are raised even 
more: lobbying on the EU level is a very expensive undertaking. The comparatively 
low  perceived  stakes  are  an  insufcient  incentive  to  achieve  sufcient  resource 
pooling on this level. As a result, consumers on the EU level need fnancial aid to  
organise efectively in the market as well as in the political process.
The internal market reduces producers’ operation and compliance costs. Therefore, 
the EU political process is capable of decision-making that afects their proftability 
signifcantly.  For  many  producers,  concluding  privacy  contracts  is  not  their  core 
activity, but a side efect of other activities already being lobbied for in Brussels. As a 
result, they qualify as repeat players in the political process when compared to single-
issue consumer groups dedicated to privacy issues.  Their high stakes,  resulting in 
abundant funding, gives them an advantage over general consumer interest groups 
that are stretched too thin over many issues. This increases the possibility that EU 
regulations cater to special interests contrary to the interests of consumers. This risk 
of regulatory capture is not imaginary, with the efectiveness of producer lobbying in 
telecom issues already documented.180
180 Breindl (n 122) 354; Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘Three Lessons from ACTA and Its Political 
Aftermath’ (2012) 35 Sufolk Transnational Law Review 575, 595.
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2.8 Comparison between the national and EU levels
2.8.1 The market
At the national  level,  the market favours producers of  privacy contracts  –  at  the 
European level, the market favours them even more. The free movement of services, 
capital and personal data within the internal market can lower the cost of information 
and organisation signifcantly. These lowered costs together with the high per-capita 
stakes provide producers with a powerful incentive for participating in the market on 
the  European  level.  These  benefts  ofset  any  extra  costs  for  organisation  and 
information.
Consumers,  on the other hand,  reap no such benefts at the European level.  The 
increased costs of  participation are such that contracts in their home country are 
signifcantly  more  attractive,  and  consumer  organisations  need  EU  subsidies  to 
participate efciently. Their per capita stakes in privacy contracts are not raised when 
participating in the European market. Increased costs of information – for example, 
the costs of  translation – make it even less attractive to look for a better privacy 
contract in another EU Member State.
2.8.2 The political process
Both for producers and consumers, shifting the political process to the European level 
increases costs of participation signifcantly. However, consumers may falsely tend to 
think of the EU political process as having lower stakes than their national process,  
because the European Parliament has  less  pronounced  powers  than  the national  
parliaments and press coverage of other institutions and decisions is relatively scarce. 
Yet consumers’ stakes in the EU political process may actually be higher. A decision at 
the EU level  decreases  consumers’  opportunities to obtain a better agreement in 
another  Member  State.  However,  lower  perceived  stakes  decrease  active  voter 
participation in the political process. Consumer lobbying groups need grants from the 
European Commission as a result.
Judging by the resources spent on lobbying eforts, producers are very well aware that 
the stakes in Brussels are higher than in national Parliaments. Their higher stakes, 
their  low  numbers  and  the  homogenous  nature  of  producers  form  an  efective 
incentive to organise.
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2.9 Summary of institutional comparisons
Based on the dynamics of participation, the circumstances for consumer participation 
aimed at influencing the contents of privacy contracts are least unfavourable in the 
political process at the national level. The costs of information and participation are 
lowest here, mainly as a result of previous organisation eforts. They are also lower 
than in  the internal  market.  This doesn’t  automatically imply that conditions are 
favourable  as  consumers’  low per capita  stakes  weaken their  opportunities  in  all 
institutions. Consumers really have to choose between imperfect alternatives.181
The efectiveness of consumer participation at the national level is further reduced or 
limited due to the fact that data protection legislation is mainly decided in Brussels. A 
concerted efort on behalf of all consumers at the European level could theoretically 
be more efective, but the lower perceived stakes and the signifcantly increased costs 
of participation in Brussels might make this an unattainable goal for the foreseeable 
future.
Producers  seeking  to  influence  the  contents  of  privacy  contracts  can  efectively 
achieve their goals in the market, in the national courts or in the European political 
process. Their advantage is arguably most pronounced in the political process at the 
EU level, where their stakes are highest. The high costs of participation for consumers 
in this forum increase the opportunities for legislators to decide against consumers’ 
interests, increasing the risk of regulatory capture.
2.10 Institutional choice and policy objectives
Comparative institutional analysis in itself provides no guidance on which institution 
is  best charged with deciding  on privacy contracts.  The goals a society wishes to 
achieve are equally important; not every institutional diference is equally relevant to 
every  policy  choice.  This  chapter  explores  the  margins  inside  which  national  or 
European  policy  choices  must  remain.  Subsequently  it  broadly  categorizes  two 
possible  policy  objectives  and  proposes  matches  between  institutions  and  these 
objectives.
181 Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives (n 136).
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2.10.1Two sets of European margins
Both EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights limit the adverse efects 
of privacy contracts for consumers. They show signifcant diferences, in both their 
scope and their available enforcement mechanisms.
The Convention requires Member States to respect private and family life. 182 This 
makes safeguarding consumer privacy primarily a matter for the Member States, even 
if data protection law is mostly EU law and the EU accepts the rights guaranteed in  
the  Convention  as  general  principles  of  EU  law.183 After  all,  the  EU  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights is only binding upon the institutions of  the EU. Some issues 
governing privacy contracts – like the interpretation of bona fdes – are beyond the 
scope of EU legislation.
EU law itself provides another set of minimum requirements. The principle of sincere 
cooperation requires Member States to make EU law efective.184 The Data Protection 
Directive and the GDPR (with its provisions for free movement of data) harmonise 
national requirements to privacy contracts and prevent Member States from using the 
limiting of the free flow of data as an enforcement mechanism in response to breaches 
of  data  protection  law.  Several  further  consumer  protection  directives  prevent 
Member States from giving producers too much free rein. Examples of EU legislation 
limiting  the contents of  privacy contracts  are the Unfair Terms directive and  the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.185
These limits are not enforced equally. EU law has to be applied ex ofcio in the courts 
of all Member States and the Commission can employ enforcement mechanisms to 
guarantee compliance.186 The ECtHR cannot enforce the Convention directly, since it 
has no authority to alter decisions by a State.  It can only award ‘just satisfaction’, 
usually  monetary  compensation,  if  a  State  allows  only  partial  reparation  after  a 
violation.187 Article 8 ECHR is stated in broad terms and the ECtHR interprets it on a 
case-by-case basis. This limits Member States’ abilities to predict whether legal acts 
are  a  breach  of  the  Convention,  especially  in  the  light  of  new  technological 
developments like big data.
182 Articles 1 and 8, ECHR.
183 Article 1 ECHR; article 6(3), TEU.
184 Art. 4(3), TEU.
185 Unfair Terms Directive (n 128); Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (n 96).
186 Art. 258 TFEU.
187 Art. 41, ECHR.
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The  ECtHR  will  allow  Member  States  considerable  leeway  when  judging  cases 
involving privacy contracts, due to the fact that a privacy contract is a matter between 
private parties.  Traditionally,  the right to respect for one’s  private and  family life 
primarily  means  that  the  State  should  refrain  from  undue  privacy  breaches  (a 
negative obligation). If no government body is a party to a privacy contract, any duty 
of the State will be interpreted as a positive obligation.188 States may trigger a positive 
obligation under article 8 ECHR by inaction, by insufcient action and by not taking 
control when privacy breaches are getting out of hand. On the other hand, Member 
States are aforded a margin of  appreciation that is wider than in cases concerning 
negative obligations. For example, the needs and the resources of the community may 
be taken into account.189
A wider margin of  appreciation is relevant in the case of  privacy contracts and big  
data has  large possible benefts that communities may decide not to want to do 
without. A State is allowed to weigh these benefts against the loss of  privacy that 
these contracts can entail. Societal gains are important, and gains in expensive policy 
areas, such as healthcare and education, may under certain circumstances outweigh 
an efective loss of privacy caused by a private contract. For example, it is conceivable 
(although untested) that Member States would allow the analysis of many students’ 
interactions with teaching materials in an electronic learning environment to provide 
the best form of  education for each student, even if  this analysis could also reveal 
deeply personal traits. A State may consider economic growth, jobs or investments 
essential for its general welfare. Even private gains may outweigh privacy, if  a State 
counts the right to returns on investments as a property right safeguarded by article 1 
of the Protocol to the Convention. All this remains speculative, since the ECtHR until 
now hasn’t given any verdicts on privacy contracts.
2.11 Making a match
A society might want to choose to protect privacy or to promote societal or economic 
benefts.  The analysis performed in section III  indicates that institutional  choices 
show diferent levels of compatibility with these objectives. In choosing institutions 
188 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, European Court of Human Rights and 
Council of Europe (n 90) 16. See also ECtHR Odièvre v France 2003-III 1 para 40; Jean-
François Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Directorate General of Human Rights, Council of Europe 2007) 15.
189 Powell and Rayner v the United Kingdom (1990) Series A no 172, para 41; Johnston and 
others v Ireland (1986) Series A no 122, para 55.
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for privacy contracts, it is assumed that consumers have a better chance for strong 
privacy protection if their participation opportunities are better.
2.11.1Maximizing privacy protection
Considering the comparatively unfavourable circumstances in other institutions, the 
national political process ofers consumers the best opportunities for achieving strong 
privacy protection in privacy contracts.
An important beneft of  the national political process lies in the fact that national  
Parliaments are not subject to the scope limitations of EU institutions. The scope of 
EU  decisions  is  limited  by  the  principles  of  conferral,  proportionality  and 
subsidiarity.190 EU data protection law therefore cannot capture the complete scope of 
the right to privacy as protected in article 8 of the Convention. For example, it does 
not address reasonable expectations of privacy or the interpretation of contracts.
2.11.2Maximizing social or economic benefts
It seems reasonable to expect that the supposedly large economic benefts of the big  
data  revolution191 will  arrive  more  slowly  if  restrictions  on  privacy  contracts  are 
stronger. Legal restrictions increase compliance costs and the risk of noncompliance.
The EU political process will probably ofer the best opportunities for maximizing the 
economic  and  societal  benefts  of  big  data.  The increased  scope of  the  internal 
market,  when compared to the political process at the national levels,  will  reduce 
compliance costs and increase legal certainty for producers active in several Member 
States.  This institution also ofers the most benefts of  participation to producers, 
improving the odds of the resulting legislation and not hampering their objectives. 
This however comes at a cost: the influence of consumers is greatly reduced.
Regulating privacy contracts at the European level,  regardless of  the outcome, has 
added signifcance for the interpretation of article 8 ECHR. A decision at the EU level 
indicates that Member States agree on the necessary degree of  privacy protection. 
Even if consumers in the EU have limited participation opportunities, any decision on 
the contents of privacy contracts counts as an indication of common ground between 
Member States. For the ECtHR, this is a factor in deciding whether a Member State  
190 Art. 5, TEU.
191 ‘The new oil of the internet’? Moerel (n 87) p, 20. Moerel (n 110)
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has fulflled its positive obligation within the margin of appreciation. 192 For the CJEU, 
allowing producers to retain and use personal data under private contracts is much 
more  likely  to  be  acceptable  than  the  Data  Retention  Directive.193 This  directive 
enabled governments to use personal data collected under privacy contracts and it has 
been held unlawful in both national and European courts.194
Of course, common ground between Member States is not in itself  a guarantee for 
compliance with article 8 ECHR. The fact that voters cannot easily hold legislators 
and regulators to account creates a signifcant risk of regulatory capture and special 
interest legislation. The legitimacy of EU legislation may also be signifcantly reduced 
if many consumers consider their opportunities for participation insufcient.
2.12 Concluding remarks
Privacy  contracts  authorise  a  deep  insight  into  the  personal  lives  of  consumers. 
Therefore, they require sufcient legitimacy. This chapter has focused specifcally on 
the  participation  aspect  of  the  legitimacy  requirement  (transparency  and 
accountability  aspects  were  excluded).  It  has  examined  consumers’  participation 
options in decision-making processes concerning privacy contracts.  Particularly,  it 
has compared the dynamics of  participation for consumers  and producers in  the 
political process and the market on the national and European levels, and before the 
national courts, by performing comparative institutional analysis.
Although an important factor, maximizing consumer participation opportunities will 
not guarantee adequate privacy protection by itself.  Choosing between institutions 
requires both awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of each option and a clear 
view of  the goals that a society wants to achieve.  The choice is  not an easy one. 
Optimal  privacy  protections  for  consumers  may  impede  important  societal  or 
economic  benefts,  whilst  maximizing  these  benefts  may  sooner  or  later  trigger 
positive obligations under article 8 ECHR.
192 ECtHR Rasmussen v Denmark (1984) Series A no 87, para 40.
193 Art. 4, European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC, [2006] OJ L 105 (Data Retention Directive).
194 BverfG, Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 02. März 2010 1 BvR 256/08 Rn 1 – 345; Joined Cases 
C-293 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister of Communications and Kärntner 
Landesregierung v Seitlinger and others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
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The political process at the national level ofers consumers the best opportunities for 
participation in the decision-making process on privacy contracts. In the market, the 
national courts and the political processes at the EU level, opportunities for consumer 
participation are greatly reduced. As a result,  decisions from these institutions are 
more likely the result of capture or minoritarian bias. The legitimacy of such decisions 
is possibly insufcient.
This tentatively points towards the EU Directive as the better option for regulating 
privacy contracts,  as it leaves Member States the choice of  form and methods to 
implement them.195 Transposing directives into national law will allow Member States 
to debate those aspects of privacy contracts left open due to the limited scope of EU 
decisions.  This  will  enable,  for  example,  the  setting  of  standards  for  reasonable 
expectations  of  privacy,  reasonable  interpretation  of  contracts  and  unfair  terms, 
within the limits imposed by EU law and the Convention. A regulation such as the 
GDPR,  which became applicable  in  May 2018,  precludes  national  debates  in  the 
legislative  process  and  therefore  ofers  less  opportunities  for  consumers  to 
meaningfully engage in the debate on an important issue.
However, the next step in EU data protection legislation will be a regulation, directly 
applicable in all Member States.196 In that case, options for national political debate 
are limited. On the EU level consumers already have few participation opportunities. 
Adopting a regulation calls on the members of the European Parliament to honour 
their duty to their constituents. At the same time, MEP’s large amount of slack gives 
them an opportunity to decide against consumers’  interests without sufering any 
consequences.
If  national  or EU law insufciently protect consumer privacy,  national  courts will 
eventually be called upon to apply article 8 ECHR to privacy contracts. This could take 
many years. The transaction costs for consumers before the courts are so high and 
individual stakes are so low, that individual consumers are unlikely to prevail before 
the courts against a large producer with high stakes. This result would be undesirable. 
It could efectively allow for permanent observation of every consumer in a new kind 
of panopticon, possibly with far-reaching efects on consumers’ personal autonomy. 
195 Article 288, TFEU.
196 John Bowman, ‘EU Data Protection Regulation: A Tipping Point Has Been Reached’ (The 
Privacy Advisor: The ofcial Newsletter of the IAPP, 7 November 2014) 
<https://iapp.org/news/a/eu-data-protection-regulation-a-tipping-point-has-been-
reached/> accessed 13 February 2019.
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Such a result could very well be within the limits of data protection legislation, but it  
will almost certainly be a breach of article 8 of the Convention.
The low per capita  stakes  for consumers  will  likely  continue to impede efective 
consumer participation. Altering the dynamics of participation in the market or the 
political process might seem an easy solution, but this requires careful consideration. 
For  example,  subsidizing  organisation  or  lobbying  eforts  may  introduce  new 
monitoring costs. Consumer representatives would enjoy an amount of slack similar 
to  members  of  the  European  Parliament.  It  could  also  distort  the  stakes  for 
representatives. If subsidies are much higher than the contributions from consumers,  
these subsidies could efectively become the stakes. Such an arrangement does not 
necessarily ofer more guarantees for efective consumer participation,  nor does it 
necessarily  reduce  the  risk  for  regulatory  capture  or  special-interest  legislation. 
Innovative new contract types may be a better choice to improve the legitimacy of big 
data  applications.  Wauters  et  al.  have  already  researched  a  number  of  possible 
improvements.197 Other  solutions  may  lie  in  optimizing  transparency  and 
accountability.
It is not yet clear whether big data will call for merely incremental adaptations to data 
protection law, or rather a fundamental  redesign of  privacy law. In any case,  legal 
developments in response to big data need to coherently address privacy contracts, 
non-contractual  relations,  the reasonable expectation of  privacy and  the possible 
efects of datafcation on human autonomy – in other words, an integrated framework 
for consumer privacy in the age of big data. The limits on EU decisions imposed by  
the principles of conferral, proportionality and subsidiarity may stand in the way of 
developing such a framework at the EU level.
The law has to keep up with technology to efectively continue safeguarding consumer 
privacy in the coming age of big data. The pace of technological developments shows 
no signs of slowing down. The law had better be ready.
197 Ellen Wauters, Eva Lievens and Peggy Valcke, ‘Social Networking Sites’ Terms of Use 
Addressing Imbalances in the User-Provider Relationship through Ex Ante and Ex Post 
Mechanisms’ (2014) 5 JIPITEC <https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-5-2-2014/4001> 




Improving data protection through consumer protection law
Prelude
After the previous paper was published, I frst wrote a conference paper for the 2015 
Amsterdam Privacy Conference. This conference paper was eventually converted into 
Chapter 4 of  this book. However,  the following chapter was published earlier and 
builds on the subject matter of Chapter 2: therefore, it is included as Chapter 3.
When the Internet Policy Review announced its special issue on “Big data, big power 
shifts?”, this seemed relevant in the light of my earlier work using Komesar’s method 
of  comparative  institutional  analysis.  Many  data  subjects  are  also  consumers  as 
defned  by EU consumer protection law.  Legislation in  this  area is  an important 
instrument in dealing with the power diferences between consumers and commercial 
actors.  The call  for papers gave me the opportunity to expand on the theoretical 
underpinnings for shifting power relations associated with the advent of big data.
This chapter is relatively brief: the Internet Policy Review imposes a very strict limit of 
30.000 characters (including spaces). I stayed within that limit, but the margin was 
thin.  To help authors stay within the character limit,  the Style Guide ofered sage 
advice: “Most people are not going to reach the end of the article. There is no harm in 
‘giving the story away’ in the frst paragraph.”
Timeline and citation
The original article was published in the “Big data, big power shifts” special issue of 
the Internet Policy Review on 31 March 2016 under a “Creative Commons Attribution 
3.0 Germany” open access license. The call for papers was published 8 September 2015 
and is archived at https://policyreview.info/node/374.
The original version was submitted on 18 December 2016. The Internet Policy Review 
conditionally accepted the frst version on 16 February 2017. This version was fnalised 
16 March. The Internet Policy Review recommends the following citation:
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Rhoen, M. (2016). Beyond consent: improving data protection through 
consumer protection law. Internet Policy Review, 5(1). DOI: 
10.14763/2016.1.404.
3.1 Introduction
Big  data  is  shifting  power away from consumers  and  data  subjects  towards  data 
controllers. In a legal sense, natural persons often act as both a consumer and a data  
subject at the same time.198 Controllers have come to collect data and metadata on an 
increasing number of  common consumer activities like personal  communications, 
online  behaviour,  shopping,  banking  and  public  transport  –  a  trend  known  as 
datafcation.199 The Internet of Things (IoT)200 will soon generate even more data. The 
collection and analysis of  big data streams can amount to consumers’  permanent 
surveillance.  This  gives  controllers  the  power  to  influence  consumer  behaviour 
through  dynamic  or  discriminatory  pricing,  flter  bubbles  or  subtly  influencing 
individual decisions (nudging).201
Big  data’s  power  shift  has  a  signifcant  privacy  and  data  protection  dimension. 
According to “Zimmermann’s law”,202 this happens by virtue of technological progress 
alone.  Data is also evolving into new currency.  Increasingly,  data controllers ofer 
services like games and social networking not for money, but in exchange for the right 
to collect and use personal data. Consumers often enter these “privacy contracts”203 if 
they want to enjoy a service seemingly for free, but even paying customers are not safe 
198 A consumer is “any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, 
business or profession” (Art. 2(b), Directive 93/13/EC).
199 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 115) 29.
200 ITU-T, ‘Overview of the Internet of Things’ (International Telecommunication Union 2012) 
Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000/Y.2060 1.
201 “A nudge (…) is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or signifcantly changing their economic 
incentives.” Richard H Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Revised & Expanded edition, Penguin Books 2009) 6.
202 “The natural flow of technology tends to move in the direction of making surveillance 
easier.” Om Malik, ‘Zimmermann’s Law: PGP Inventor and Silent Circle Co-Founder Phil 
Zimmermann on the Surveillance Society’ (Gigaom, 11 August 2013) 
<https://gigaom.com/2013/08/11/zimmermanns-law-pgp-inventor-and-silent-circle-co-
founder-phil-zimmermann-on-the-surveillance-society/> accessed 13 February 2019. See 
also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phil_Zimmermann#Zimmermann.27s_Law (accessed 2 
May 2018).
203 Verhelst (n 119) chap. 3.
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from this  practice.204 Nevertheless,  the recently accepted  General  Data Protection 
Regulation refers to consumer protection law only once (Recital 42). Similarly, the 
European  Commission’s  2012  proposal  for  a  consumer  agenda  mentions  data 
protection  eforts  only  in  passing.205 The  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor, 
however,  has  stated  that  consumer  protection  law  has  a  part  to  play  in  data 
protection, especially on the subject of transparency.206
EU  data  protection  law has  facilitated  the aforementioned  power shift  since the 
introduction of the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD). It allows the collection and 
use of  personal  data  based  on  consumers’  consent,  or if  it  is  “necessary  for  the 
performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party”. The GDPR contains a 
similar provision.207 Compliance with the directive is then rewarded with the right to 
freely move this data within the European Union and a number of other jurisdictions, 
depending  on  an  “adequacy  decision”  from  the  European  Commission  (art.  45, 
GDPR).208
These  provisions  seemingly  empower  data  subjects,  but  data  subjects  acting  as 
consumers lack efective participation options in the market.209 They can hardly avoid 
privacy contracts: almost all banks, software and hardware vendors, social networking 
sites,  digital  content  services,  retail  loyalty  programmes  and  telecommunications 
providers employ them. The difculties consumers face when invoking fundamental 
204 Nicole Perlroth, ‘How Superfsh’s Security-Compromising Adware Came to Inhabit 
Lenovo’s PCs’ The New York Times (1 March 2015) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/technology/how-superfshs-security-
compromising-adware-came-to-inhabit-lenovos-pcs.html> accessed 13 February 2019.
205 European Commission, ‘A European Consumer Agenda - Boosting Confdence And 
Growth’ (European Union 2012) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the 
Regions COM(2012) 225 fnal 3–4 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/fles/consumer_agenda_2012_en.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019.
206 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: 
The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the 
Digital Economy’ (2014) Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor 
2 <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/fles/publication/14-03-
26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019.
207 Article 7(a) or (b), DPD; article 6(a) or (b), GDPR.
208 European Commission, ‘Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Non-EU 
Countries’ (European Commission - European Commission) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-
eu/adequacy-protection-personal-data-non-eu-countries_en> accessed 19 March 2019.
209 See section 2.9 supra.
73
3. Beyond Consent
rights in court complicate matters further:  privacy law does not clearly describe a 
minimum level  of  privacy that should  always  be maintained;  instead,  it  provides 
criteria for the balancing of individual privacy against other interests. As a result, it 
does not ofer simple rules for courts to decide cases. Claiming damages for privacy 
breaches is hampered by the fact that consumers “give it away in exchange for so 
little”.210
If data controllers become too powerful, the validity of consumers’ and data subjects’  
consent or their autonomy when entering into privacy contracts can be questioned. 
Therefore, controllers’ increasing power should not remain unchecked. Analogous to 
the notion of due process in United States law, Gutwirth and De Hert have seen the 
application of three requirements that serve as checks on the unlimited exertion of  
power:  participation, transparency and accountability.211 In western societies,  many 
safeguards  of  fundamental  rights  at  every  level  of  government,  for  example  the 
protection of suspects in criminal proceedings, can be “decomposed” into these three 
requirements.212 Now that privacy contracts and datafcation give private companies 
capabilities similar to those of police, prosecutors or national security agencies when 
it  comes to data collection and  use,  these requirements  and  their  efects  on the 
underlying power dynamics have also become relevant in contractual relations.
Barnett and Duvall defne power as “the production, in and through social relations, 
of  efects that shape the capacities of  actors to determine their circumstances and 
fate”.213 They refne the concept further by qualifying the expression of power (either 
through interaction or constitution) and the specifcity of the social relations through 
which  it  works  (either  direct  or  difuse).  In  short:  Power  is  expressed  through 
interaction if it results from what actors do (like drawing a gun during an argument); 
it  is  expressed  through  constitution  if  it  results  from  what  they  are  (like  their 
authority or identity). Social relations are direct if parties to the relations are in direct 
communication with each other (like during negotiations); they are difuse if  their 
interaction  happens  as  a  result  of  previously  defned  rules  (like  when  parties’  
210 Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control 
Your World (1 edition, W W Norton & Company 2015) 227.
211 Citron (n 125) 1256–1257; Gutwirth and de Hert (n 125) paras 12–13.
212 For examples, see article 3(1) of the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention); article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data and articles 6(3) and 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
213 Barnett and Duvall (n 94) 39, 45–57.
74
3. Beyond Consent
behaviour is bound or prescribed by law).214 Using this conceptualisation of  power, 
this contribution examines the following research question:
Can consumer protection law assist in attenuating the shift in power from 
consumers to data controllers caused by big data?
The following sub-questions will help to answer the research question:
• How does big data cause power to shift?
• Are data protection and privacy law efective in preventing this shift?
• What opportunities does EU consumer protection law ofer for addressing the 
shift?
In answering the main question, this chapter considers only cases where a natural 
person is both a data subject and a consumer at the same time. The text references the 
fnal text of the GDPR unless otherwise specifed.
3.2 How big data shifts power towards data controllers
Data  controllers  use  their  existing  structural  power  over  data  subjects  in  the 
contracting phase to increase their institutional power after the contract is concluded. 
Structural power (expressed through constitution in direct social relations) follows 
directly from the roles actors play, i.e. the roles of  suppliers and consumers in the 
market, and enables the powerful party to limit the capacity of the less powerful party 
to act in their own best interest. Institutional power (expressed through interaction in 
difuse social  relations)  is the power diferential  resulting  from “constraint(s)  that 
human beings devise to share human interaction”.215
In the contracting phase, structural power expresses itself in the market as a lack of  
bargaining power on the consumer side,  resulting in non-negotiable terms.216 This 
reduces consumers’ party autonomy and therefore touches on a key element of private 
law in  Europe.217 The root  cause of  this  smaller bargaining  power is  asymmetric 
214 ibid 42–43.
215 ibid 51–55; North (n 92) 4.
216 Case 240/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero and others, [2000] I-
4963, para. 25.
217 Study Group on a European Civil Code and Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis 
Group), Principles, Defnitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR). Outline Edition (Sellier European Law Publishers 2009) 123.
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information. For consumers, the cost of information per contract is higher than it is 
for  data  controllers,  mainly  because  the  controllers  unilaterally  draft  the  privacy 
contracts and reuse them many times. This has led Gomez to state that the primary 
goal  of  consumer protection law is  to overcome information asymmetries.218 This 
higher cost of  information, in turn, can be explained by analysing the dynamics of 
market  participation.219 The uneven  distribution  of  the  costs  of  information  and 
organisation  favours  data  controllers  when  consumers  and  controllers  decide  on 
contract terms. Individual consumers usually lack expertise and have little to gain by 
pooling their resources to negotiate a better deal on privacy in each separate contract.
Data controllers then use this structural power to increase their institutional power. 
As noted before, collection and use of personal data is lawful insofar as a data subject  
has consented to it, or if the processing is necessary for the performance of a contract. 
If the consumers’ consent allows for their permanent observation, the data controller 
has obtained a method of exerting power over the consumer.220 Analysis and actual 
use of the data further increase this power. If  the consumer has agreed to contract 
terms allowing it, the controller can then grant this power to third parties by using his 
right  of  free movement of  data.  Some of  the largest  of  these third  parties,  data 
brokers,  are  not  dealing  with  consumers  directly;  this  makes  the  scale  of  the 
collection and use of their data less transparent to consumers.221
The increase in institutional power can express itself in many ways. Exposing a data 
subject to targeted  advertising  is  an example of  a  subtle form of  control:  a  data 
subjects’  deeply personal characteristics can be gleaned from seemingly innocuous 
data.  Such advertising  is  designed  to appeal  to personal  desires  which,  although 
deeply  and  individually  felt,  are  common  to  most  people  and  therefore  easily 
discovered.222 The time frame and context in which these desires come into play in a 
consumer’s  life  can  become  apparent  by  analysing  data  collected  under  privacy 
218 Fernando Gomez, ‘EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition Law: How Related 
Are They? A Law and Economics Perspective’ in Hugh Collins (ed), The Forthcoming EC 
Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices - Contract, Consumer and Competition law 
implications (Kluwer Law International 2004) 193 onward; W David Slawson, ‘Standard 
Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power’ (1970) 84 Harvard Law 
Review 529, 544.
219 Komesar, Law’s Limits (n 93) 30.
220 Bentham (n 50) 31; Schneier, ‘Metadata d Surveillance’ (n 49).
221 Federal Trade Commission, ‘Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ 
(2014) 46 <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-
report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014> accessed 13 February 2019.
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contracts and comparing it to previously determined patterns in a larger population 
(using  “machine  learning”).  For  example,  a  controller  may  determine  whether 
someone is pregnant by observing a change in their buying patterns.223
At least one possible efect of this increased institutional power is the further increase 
of  data controllers’  (already larger)  structural  power,  for example,  if  loans to data 
subjects living in certain neighbourhoods only become available at discriminatory 
rates. In this way, the power shift could worsen the existing marginalisation of groups 
of people.224 Outside the scope of any privacy contract, data controllers can cooperate 
with governments to further national security interests in a “surveillance-industrial 
complex”.225 Finally, the resulting power shift may allow controllers to leave consumers 
in the dark about the efectiveness of security measures against unlawful processing.
3.3 Data and privacy protection law do not prevent the power 
shift
EDRi (European Digital Rights), an EU-based advocacy group, asserts that the EU has 
a  “strong,  comprehensive  and  enforceable  privacy  protection  framework”.226 This 
framework consists of EU data protection law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of  
the European Union, Member States’ national human rights law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Article 5(1) of the GDPR establishes a number of frmly 
worded  principles  governing  the processing  of  personal  data such as:  lawfulness, 
fairness and transparency, purpose limitation, data minimisation, storage limitation 
222 Vance Packard and Mark Crispin Miller, The Hidden Persuaders (Reissue Ed, Ig Publishing 
2007) 86–93.
223 Duhigg (n 116) 194.
224 Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, ‘Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms’ (2014) 55 BCL Rev. 93, 99–101 
<http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?
handledhein.journals/bclr55&sectiond5> accessed 19 March 2019; Cynthia Dwork and 
Deirdre K Mulligan, ‘It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair’ (2013) 66 Stanford Law Review 
Online 35, 36–37 <http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/its-not-
privacy-and-its-not-fair> accessed 19 March 2019.
225 Committee on Legal Afairs and Human Rights and Pieter Omtzigt, ‘Mass Surveillance’ 
(Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe 2015) Doc. 13734 29 
<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileIDd21583&langden> 
accessed 13 February 2019.
226 EDRi - European Digital Rights, ‘EU: The Global Standard Setter for Privacy and Data 
Protection’ (EDRi - European Digital Rights 2013) Issue 2 1 <http://edri.org/fles/eudatap-
02.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019.
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and accountability. Article 6(1) limits the number of grounds for lawful processing. If  
performance of  a  contract  depends  on  consent,  article  7(4)  stresses  the need  to 
carefully consider whether consent was freely given. Data subjects have the right not 
to be subjected to profling  (art.  21(1)).  Controllers must use principles like “data 
protection by design and by default”  (art.  25).  And of  course,  the Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg courts guard over fundamental rights, including the right to privacy.
But the complex reality of  both data protection and privacy law makes these legal 
protections less efective. Privacy as a human right is a complex issue because every 
case is diferent; the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg can only decide 
individual  cases  based  on  all  relevant  facts,  in  complex  and  long  proceedings 
requiring  expensive  legal  representation  and  thus  being  not  very  accessible  to 
individuals. Data protection law seems more easily applicable on its face, because it 
regulates data controllers’  behaviour directly to ensure privacy.227 But these formal 
requirements  contain  very  complex  standards  aimed  at  specialised  operators, 
intended  to  be  enforced  by  specialised  government  agencies  (Data  Protection 
Authorities or DPAs). This is not necessarily a shortcoming of the GDPR: regulating 
controllers’  behaviour is  one way of  keeping the GDPR enforceable,  efective and 
relevant as technology progresses.
Even so, this complexity, combined with the increasing number of privacy contracts,  
makes consumer participation more difcult as it can make the efects of the GDPR 
unpredictable for consumers.228 A few examples:
• Fairness  means  that  data  is  not  collected  in  secret,  that  the  purpose  of  the 
collection is made clear and that data subjects have access to their data. 229 This 
requirement can improve transparency, but following it to the letter can in fact 
achieve quite the opposite efect. For example, if a controller provides exhaustive 
information and updates it several times a year, he efectively increases the cost of 
information  since  reading  privacy  statements  has  a  very  real  cost.230 As  an 
example,  Microsoft’s privacy statement amounted to 35 pages in 2016 and has 
been updated at least three times between June 2015 and January 2016; its length 
227 Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and 
Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation in Action’ in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), 
Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer Netherlands 2009) 44.
228 Komesar, Law’s Limits (n 93) 28.
229 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, European Court of Human Rights and 
Council of Europe (n 90) 76.
230 McDonald and Cranor (n 144).
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amounted to 52 pages in October 2018.231 If the costs become too high, consumers 
may choose not to inform themselves.
• Storage limitation only applies when identifable data is kept on hand for “longer 
than is necessary” (art. 5(1)(e), GDPR). However, the drafter of a privacy contract 
can  unilaterally  defne  the  purpose  and  the  necessity.  To  discover  what  this 
principle means in a specifc context,  consumers need to carefully examine all 
contracts they enter, which they often do not.232
• Purpose limitation itself  is limited: if  a controller wants to reuse personal data 
previously collected for a diferent purpose, he “shall” take into account a number 
of complex factors, including the terms of the privacy contract itself (art. 6(4)(b)).
• Opaque contextual parameters, such as “appropriate technical and organizational 
measures”  determine the accountability of  controllers  and  the “protection  by 
design and by default” requirement (art. 24(1) and 25(1)).
• Data  protection  impact  assessments  and  data  breach  notifcations  should  be 
carried out if there is a “high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”  
(articles 34(1), 35(1)) but what constitutes a high risk is left undefned.
• Consumers  enter into agreements  and  give consent  in  very simple or almost 
imperceivable ways. Ticking one of the ubiquitous “I agree” boxes on a website, 
and even the state of “technical settings for information society services”, such as 
arcane browser or device settings can constitute consent (recital 32). The right to 
object to profling may not apply in these cases (art. 21(1)).
• Finally, the complexity of  data protection law encourages consumers to rely on 
enforcement  by  DPAs.  But  that  DPAs  fall  short  in  enforcing  existing  data 
protection was apparently an “open secret” in 2014.233 If  consumers are unaware 
that enforcement is lacking, this reduces transparency for consumers as well as 
accountability for controllers.
231 Microsoft, ‘Privacy Statement’ <https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-us/privacystatement/> 
accessed 13 February 2019.
232 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and David R Trossen, ‘Does Anyone Read the 
Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts’ (2014) 43 Journal of Legal 
Studies 20–21, 31 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractd1443256> accessed 13 February 2019.
233 Moerel (n 87) 30.
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Another reason for privacy and data protection law’s reduced efectiveness for privacy 
contracts is the fact that the ECHR was originally drafted to protect citizens against 
their governments in the aftermath of World War II. That the ECHR governs relations 
between citizens, including contractual relations, has been established in case law but 
states  have  a  very  wide  margin  of  appreciation  –  wider  than  in  cases  against 
governments.234 Whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
applies to contractual relations seems doubtful at the moment.235
Finally, data protection and privacy are not the only fundamental rights recognised in 
Europe. Freedom of contract, party autonomy and freedom to conduct a business are 
covered by articles 12 and 16 fundamental rights.236 A consumer’s or controller’s appeal 
on  these  rights  may  be  used  to  make  permanent  observation  through  privacy 
contracts lawful.  For example,  if  a consumer enters into a loyalty programme,  he 
“performs” by allowing collection and analysis of personal data, whilst the controller 
performs by proposing “personalized ofers” by him and “selected partners” according 
to art.  6(1)(b).  Based on the term “personalized”,  a controller can arguably justify 
collecting data for as long as the contract exists, and on anything that can assist in  
further segmenting the market to further personalise his oferings.  Common (and 
legal)  business  practices  such  as  tying  (ofering  two  diferent  contracts  in  one 
transaction, e.g. one for a “regular” service and another for the processing of personal 
data) further expand these possibilities.
In short, any practical efect of  data and privacy protection law on the power shift 
associated  with big  data is  reduced  by the fact that both work through complex 
standards instead of  simpler rules.237 This complexity,  together with the increasing 
number  of  privacy  contracts,  reduces  transparency  and  the  opportunities  for 
participation for consumers as well as accountability for data controllers.
234 See section 2.10.1 supra.
235 Eleni Frantziou, ‘The Horizontal Efect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: 
Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 657, 671 
<http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/eulj.12137> accessed 19 March 2019.
236 See articles 12, 16, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
237 Pierre Schlag, ‘Rules and Standards’ (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 379, 381–390.
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3.4 Consumer protection law can help shift power from data 
collectors to consumers
If  a data subject is also a consumer,  the European Union aims for a “high level of  
protection”  of  his  economic  activities.238 The  object  of  protection  of  consumer 
protection law is similar to that of data and privacy protection law: they both aim to 
protect the autonomy of the natural person (in the market for consumer protection;  
in a moral sense for data and privacy protection).239 But the concept of protection for 
consumers is  more clear.  Where privacy and data protection law involve complex 
balancing  of  interests  in  an  endless  variety  of  contexts,  consumer  protection 
specifcally aims to address power diferentials based on information asymmetries in 
the market. Because of this specifc applicability, applying EU consumer protection 
law to privacy contracts  could  help shift  power back to consumers by improving 
participation  and  accountability.  This  follows  from two features  of  EU consumer 
protection law: the scope of the fairness criterion and opportunities for participation.
Firstly, the scope of the fairness criterion is wider in consumer protection law than in 
data protection law. Applying consumer protection law would therefore increase the 
accountability of data controllers. This follows from the legal texts themselves.
The GDPR,  as previously noted,  mainly considers the processing of  personal  data 
unfair if it happens in secret or if profling methods are faulty.240 This is the basis for 
the GDPR’s extensive disclosure requirements.241 And indeed, mandatory disclosure is 
also  an  important  regulatory  technique in  EU  consumer protection  law.  But  the 
resulting transparency is not enough to address substantive unfairness.242 Therefore, 
in consumer protection law, fairness instead applies to the terms of the contract and 
to  the  way  the  consumer is  persuaded  to  enter  into  it.  The Unfair  Commercial 
Practices Directive considers a practice unfair if it is “contrary to the requirements of 
professional  diligence and  materially  distorts  or is  likely materially  to distort  the 
economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product.”243 EU unfair 
commercial  practices  doctrine  shows  substantial  similarities  with  Unfair  and 
238 Article 38, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
239 Gomez (n 218) 193 f; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the 
Integrity of Social Life (Stanford Law Books 2009) 81–84.
240 See recitals 42 and 48 of the GDPR. For profling, where it concerns the use of adequate 
mathematical or statistical procedures to prevent errors, data breaches or discriminatory 
efects, see recital 71.
241 See for example: art. 5(1)(b), art. 12(1, 3, 5) and art. 13(1-2).
242 Weatherill (n 95) 92–93.
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Deceptive  Commercial  Practices  doctrine  in  the  United  States.244 The  possible 
usefulness  of  EU  unfair  commercial  practices  doctrine  for  data  protection  may 
therefore be derived from the fact that its US counterpart is the basis for a number of  
important data protection cases in the United States.245
The Unfair Terms Directive (UTD) regards a non-negotiated term in a contract or 
consent statement as unfair if “contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
signifcant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer.”246 This means that all rights and obligations are 
included in establishing unfairness,  not just those pertaining to the processing of 
personal  data.247 The original  proposal  for the  GDPR  hinted  in  this  direction:  it 
contained  a  clause  making  consent  invalid  if  there  was  a  “signifcant  imbalance 
between the position of the data subject and the controller”.248 However, the scope of 
the  fnal  provision  is  far  more  limited;  specifc  consideration  is  only  given  to 
performance of a contract that is depending on consent, and no longer on all cases 
where consent is given.
Admittedly, like the earlier examples from the GDPR, fairness in consumer protection 
law is  also  a  complex  standard.  However,  its  application  is  easier for consumers 
243 Article 5(2) and 6(1)(a), Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in 
the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 
98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive’), OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22–39
244 Nico van Eijk, Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Emilie Kannekens, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices: A 
Complementary Approach to Privacy Protection’ (2017) 3 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 325, 335.
245 ibid 329–332.
246 Article 3, Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts (‘Unfair Terms Directive’), OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29–34.
247 Commission des Clauses Abusives, ‘Recommandation n° 2014-02 relative aux contrats 
proposés par les fournisseurs de services de réseaux sociaux’ <http://www.clauses-
abusives.fr/recommandation/contrats-de-fourniture-de-services-de-reseaux-sociaux-
nouveau/> accessed 18 March 2019; Ellen Wauters, Eva Lievens and Peggy Valcke, ‘A Legal 
Analysis of Terms of Use of Social Networking Sites, Including a Practical Legal Guide for 
Users: “Rights & Obligations in a Social Media Environment”’ (iMinds-ICRI 2013) D1.2.4 64 
<https://limo.libis.be/primo-explore/fulldisplay?
dociddLIRIAS1709099&contextdL&viddLirias&search_scopedLirias&tabddefault_tab&lang
den_US> accessed 13 February 2019.




because it relates to circumstances that they participate in every day. Furthermore,  
annexes to both the Unfair Terms Directive and the Unfair Commercial  Practices 
Directive  give  concrete  examples.  Consumer  advocacy  groups  have  been  giving 
guidance on their application, and taking ofenders to court,  since they came into 
force.249
Applying  consumer  law’s  fairness  criterion  to  privacy  contracts  can  expand  the 
accountability  of  data  controllers  when  compared  to  only  applying  the  GDPR. 
Consider the hypothetical case of a provider of a smartphone app enabling the user to 
use his camera flash LED as a flashlight.250 The provider could present an agreement in 
which  he grants  the consumer a license  to use the  app in  return  for which  the 
consumer allows the provider, acting as a data controller, to collect location and usage 
data to provide advertising for as long as the app is installed.
In terms of data protection law, this case could arguably be made GDPR-compliant by 
presenting all the relevant clauses and obtaining agreement to them in exchange for a 
software  license.  Applying  article  7(4)  of  the  GDPR,  containing  a  criterion  for 
determining  whether  consent  is  freely  given,  may  not  improve  matters  for  the 
consumer. Because the data collected is not one of the special categories of data as  
defned  by  article  9(1),  explicit  consent  may  be  unnecessary.  “Necessary  for  the 
performance of  the contract” probably sufces to make the processing of  personal 
data lawful, because the criterion of necessity is interpreted in the light of the clauses 
in the contract. Party autonomy dictates that consumers are free to perform their part 
by ofering their personal data, even if this data is not necessary to turn a phone’s LED 
on or of.
However, such a case would almost certainly violate art. 3, UTD. Allowing a party the 
opportunity for constant surveillance in exchange for the ability to switch an LED on 
or of seems like such a bad deal, that the “requirement of good faith” has probably  
249 Drjur Friedrich Bultmann, ‘30 Jahre Praxis Der AGB-Verbandsklage: Kurzfassung Des 
Gutachtens Im Auftrag Des Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverbandes’ para 14 
<http://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/fles/mediapics/kurzfassung_gutachten_verbandsklage
_2008.pdf> accessed 19 March 2019; Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband, ‘Samsung App-
Store: Viele Klauseln Unzulässig’ (Samsung App-Store: Viele Klauseln unzulässig, 6 June 
2013) <https://www.vzbv.de/urteil/samsung-app-store-viele-klauseln-unzulaessig> 
accessed 13 February 2019.
250 Nicole Vincent Fleming, ‘Sharing Your Location… In a Flash’ (FTC Consumer information 
blog, 5 December 2013) <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/sharing-your-location-flash> 
accessed 21 March 2019.
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not been met.  Depending on how the app was advertised,  ofering the app under 
these conditions could also be called misleading according to article 6(1)(a) of  the 
Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive,  insofar  as  it  presents  an  ofer  with  data 
protection  relevance  as  a  standard  software  license  agreement  –  especially  since 
consumers hardly ever read software licenses.
Secondly,  consumer law ofers  better participation  options  than  the  GDPR  when 
seeking  a  remedy  in  court  or  before  an  administrative  authority.  This  is  often 
burdensome for  consumers,  especially  against  an  opponent  with  large  resources: 
usually, “the haves come out ahead”.251 Limited individual stakes in the outcome of 
costly proceedings may discourage consumers from bringing a matter to court. Article 
11(1)  of  the  Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive  and  7(2)  of  the  Unfair  Terms 
Directive  state  that  EU  member  states  “shall  ensure”  that  consumer  rights 
organisations can bring an action before the national courts. This allows consumers to 
pool  resources,  reducing  the cost of  information and participation;  it  also allows 
consumers  to  build  on  previous  organisation  eforts,  reducing  the  cost  of 
organisation.  This  improves  the  dynamics  of  participation  for  consumers.252 The 
GDPR does not require member states to allow complaints by advocacy groups,  it 
merely allows them to do so (art. 80(2)). Nonetheless, the GDPR does require that 
member states  allow these organisations  to represent  data  subjects  in  individual 
proceedings,  possibly lowering  the cost of  legal  representation (art.  80(1).  Forum 
choice is handled equally for consumers and data subjects: art. 79(2) of  the GDPR 
allows data subjects to bring proceedings before a court in their country of residence, 
like art. 16(1), Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 does for consumers.
A more indirect way in which consumer protection law ofers better participation 
options stems from the treaties establishing the EU and the levels of harmonisation 
within the EU that follow from them. EU data protection law is based on conferral of 
competence by the member states,  whereas consumer protection law is  based on 
shared  competence.253 As  a  result,  member  states  cannot  increase  the  level  of 
protection that EU data protection law provides unless it is expressly allowed, whereas 
for consumer protection law this is possible unless it is expressly forbidden.254 This 
251 Galanter (n 91).
252 Komesar, Law’s Limits (n 93) p.30.
253 Article 39, TEU; articles 2(f), 12, 16, 114 and 169, Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).
254 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation’ (n 81) 5–6; see 
also Case 101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12992, para. 66-67. See art. 9(5), GDPR for an 
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can help consumers: for them, participation in legislation eforts is much harder at 
the EU level than at the national level.255
Thus,  applying  consumer  protection  law  to  privacy  contracts  can  increase 
accountability  for  data  controllers  and  ofer  better  participation  options  for 
consumers. Both efects will decrease the institutional power of  data controllers in 
favour of consumers.
3.5 Conclusion: improve enforcement of consumer protection 
law
When compared to the GDPR, existing EU directives regarding unfair contract terms 
and unfair commercial practices can increase the accountability of  data controllers 
and ofer more efective participation options for consumers.  This is important in 
addressing the increase in institutional power that data controllers stand to gain from 
big data.
However, this possibility can only materialise if consumer protection law is efectively 
enforced.  Determining the efectiveness of  the current enforcement regime is not 
easy,  but  in  2012  the  Commission  claimed  that  “(r)edress  and  enforcement 
mechanisms need to be further improved” and launched the European Consumer 
Agenda,  partly  to  achieve  this.  The  commission  also  identifed  perceived  low 
individual stakes as one of the reasons why consumers often do not seek redress. 256 
Apparently, lack of efective enforcement and low individual stakes similarly afect the 
efectiveness  of  both  consumer protection  and  data  protection  law.  Under  these 
circumstances,  expecting benefcial  efects from applying consumer protection law 
without increasing enforcement eforts can only lead to disappointment.  Ensuring 
proper coordination between national and European authorities for data protection 
and consumer protection may also be needed. Having two or even more competent 
authorities in each member state on the subject of privacy contracts may not have any 
example where member states can increase the level of protection; See art. 8, 8a, UTD for 
an example of the greater freedom that consumer protection law allows. Recent EU 
consumer protection law tends to rule out this option. See art. 4, Consumer Rights 
Directive and art. 3(5), Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.
255 See section 2.9 supra.




benefcial efect if this joint competence leads to indecision, turf wars or other intra-
governmental inefciencies.
At the same time, very strict enforcement has its own risks and limits. The power 
shifts associated with big data are too complicated to be addressed only by applying 
consumer  protection  law  to  privacy  contracts.  Yes,  putting  consumers  under 
surveillance will become easier with time according to Zimmermann’s law. But big 
data is also driving important innovations and, in an important way, datafcation is 
the price we pay for automation. Billing, correction of errors and malfunctions, and 
detection of hacking and crime all rely on data generated by automated processes – 
“It’s impossible to overstate the importance of logging”.257 Any well-intentioned efort 
to suppress  the creation,  storage and  analysis  of  event logs  –  in  other words,  to 
suppress datafcation – could disempower both consumers and data controllers, as it 
takes  away  their  opportunity  to  construct  or  counter  evidence  of  mistakes  or 
wrongdoing.258 Data streams are also becoming a way of personal expression, e.g. in 
the “quantifed self” movement, which means that curtailing their creation and use 
can interfere with yet another fundamental right.259 Addressing big data’s power shifts 
by narrowly focusing on privacy contracts can cause unforeseen power shifts all by 
itself.
Nonetheless, spirited enforcement of consumer protection law for privacy contracts 
seems  like  the  way  forward.  Both  the  Unfair  Terms  Directive  and  the  Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive ofer open norms with ample possibilities to develop a 
nuanced approach. Controllers who necessarily have access to data streams on many 
aspects of  consumers’  lives,  like banks and telecommunications providers,  should 
probably be prevented from seducing consumers to allow permanent observation all 
too  easily.  On  the  other  hand,  consumers  should  have  a  reasonable  amount  of 
freedom to enter into contracts with providers of specialised data-intensive services. A 
nuanced approach has a lower risk of negatively afecting related fundamental rights 
257 Vassilis Prevelakis and Diomidis Spinellis, ‘The Athens Afair’ (2007) 44 Spectrum, IEEE 
26, 31.
258 This is closely related to the “legitimate interest” ground for lawful processing of personal 
data (art. 6(1)(f), GDPR).
259 Dawn Nafus and Jamie Sherman, ‘This One Does Not Go Up To 11: The Quantifed Self 
Movement as an Alternative Big Data Practice’ (2014) 8 International Journal of 




and halting innovation, than blanket bans on the generation, storage and use of data. 
Of course, improving the enforcement of data protection law will also help.
Increasing enforcement eforts will certainly have a cost. Member states will have to 
provide  additional  funding;  they  also  need  to  strengthen  co-ordination  between 
consumer- and data protection authorities, both at the national and the EU level. It  
may also be necessary to improve the dynamics of participation for consumers. For 
example, targeted subsidies for consumer and privacy advocacy groups at the national 
level, aimed at representation both in the lawmaking process, in civil society and in 
the  national  courts,  could  somewhat  ofset  consumers’  costs  of  information  and 
organisation. This would complement similar subsidies at the EU level in member 
states that do not currently subsidise these eforts.260
But the benefts may very well  outweigh the costs. The more consumers feel their 
privacy really  is  protected  and  enforceable,  the faster industrialised  societies  can 
collectively beneft from datafcation. Addressing the power shift associated with big 
data will therefore be an important part of Europe’s economic future.
260 Art. 3(1)(b), European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 254/2014 of 26 February 
2014 on a multiannual consumer programme for the years 2014-20 and repealing Decision 
No 1926/2006/EC, [2014] OJ L84/42.
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4 Rear view mirror, crystal ball
Exploring the future of data protection through recent developments of  
environmental protection law
Prelude
The following chapter originated as a conference paper. My education and expertise as 
a fre ofcer and risk management policy advisor from 1996 until the present day have 
served  as  the  basis  for  the  approach  in  this  chapter.  A  preliminary  version  was 
presented at the 2015 Amsterdam Privacy Conference on 25 October as “Privacy: The 
cost of doing business” in the “Commercial value of Privacy” track. The call for papers 
for  this  conference  was  published  February  2015  and  is  archived  at 
http://apc2015.net/content/call-papers-0. 
The proposal for my contribution was submitted 11 March. The proposal was accepted 
on 1 May 2015. The conference paper was submitted 14 July.
Acting on the advice of  my supervisors and after consulting with the Editor of  the 
Computer Law and Security Review, the conference paper was extensively rewritten to 
make it suitable for publication in a peer-reviewed journal. 
Timeline and citation
The frst version of  the revised paper was submitted to the Editor-in-Chief  of  the 
Computer  Law  and  Security  Review  (CLSR)  16  December  2016.  The  paper  was 
conditionally accepted January 17, 2017. The revised version was submitted 15 March 
2017. It was accepted 24 March and published online on 30 May 2017. It appeared in 
print in the October 2017 edition of  CLSR. The article was not published under an 
open access license.
The OSCOLA reference to the original article is.
Rhoen M, ‘Rear View Mirror, Crystal Ball: Predictions for the Future of 
Data Protection Law Based on the History of Environmental Protection 
Law’ (2017) 33 Computer Law & Security Review 603
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4.1 Introduction: Looking into a rear view mirror
Data  protection  law  and  environmental  protection  law  are  both  a  response  to 
technological development. Environmental law aims to mitigate the adverse efects of 
industrialisation and its  origins can be traced back to nuisance law from Roman 
times.261 These efects can manifest themselves at diferent levels, from the immediate 
surroundings of industrial activity, to the entire world. Similarly, data protection law 
is  societies’  response to automation.  The frst legal  response to the processing  of 
personal data stems from the 1970s and 1980s.262 Until now, data protection appears to 
have  been  treated  mainly  as  an  individual  fundamental  human  right,  whereas 
environmental law originated as a means for protecting communities and societies.
Environmental  law has been expanding towards human rights law.  Environmental 
protection has been added to the EU catalog of fundamental rights in 2010. It is now 
not  only  a  duty  of  care  for  societies  but  also  an  individual  right.263 In  contrast, 
expansion of the scope of data protection law towards protecting entire societies is 
not so easily visible.  In the recently adopted  General  Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), the right to data protection is still mainly seen as an individual right, even 
though the advent of “big data” (resulting from the seemingly unstoppable trend of 
“datafcation”)264 can be expected to have a serious impact on entire societies.  An 
explanation may be that the risk to individual privacy is easily visible. Many of these 
risks  occur  when  data  subjects  act  as  consumers:  the  permanent  collection  of 
metadata on telecommunications, shopping, media streaming and social networks all 
rely  on  consumer contracts  for lawfulness,  and  can  reveal  many deeply  personal 
aspects of one’s life.265 But the risk of large-scale surveillance to a free and democratic 
society may be equally or even more important. Datafcation has been called “the 
pollution problem of the digital age.”266 Big data will cause power to shift from data 
261 Ulpianus 17 ad edictum, D. 8,5,8,5-7.
262 See, for example, the Hessische Datenschutzgesetz of 7 October, 1970, the Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, done 
at Strasbourg (Strasbourg Convention), 28 January 1981 (articles 1 and 8) and the German 
Volkszählungsurteil [1983] BVerfGE 65,1 (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
263 Article 37, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2010] OJ C 83/02 (“the 
Charter”). Note that this right is stated in general terms and not in individual terms.
264 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 115) 29.
265 Richards and King (n 118) 44.
266 Bruce Schneier, ‘The Battle for Power on the Internet’ [2013] Internet and Security 19 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-battle-for-power-on-the-
internet/280824/> accessed 13 February 2019.
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subjects to data controllers, regardless of whether the controller is a government or a 
private  party.267 Big  data  can  increase  or  cement  social  inequalities.268 It  risks 
reintroducing the chilling efects on personal freedoms historically associated with 
police states.
According to Baldwin, regulation can be seen as “being inherently about the control 
of  risks”.269 Social theories about risk appear to have influenced environmental law 
much more than data protection law.  The EU’s recent data protection legislation 
eforts  were  almost  completely  focused  on  individual  rights.270 But  to  achieve  a 
balanced data protection policy, considering the risks and benefts of datafcation to 
society is just as necessary. Like in environmental law, the rights of data subjects will  
always  necessarily  be  weighed  against  the  rights  of  other  data  subjects,  data 
controllers and the interests of society as a whole.271 Already in 2006, Hirsch indicated 
a number of analogies between environmental law and data protection law, mainly 
focusing on regulatory strategies.272
This chapter focuses on two theories from the social sciences that have discernibly 
influenced  environmental  law  and  policy:  Beck’s  theory  of  the  risk  society  and 
Perrow’s  theory  of  normal  accidents.  Because  the  risks  of  datafcation  and 
industrialisation both result from technological progress and both pose risks at the 
267 See article 3(1), Strasbourg Convention; Bruce Schneier, ‘The Myth of the “Transparent 
Society”’ (WIRED, 3 June 2008) <https://www.wired.com/2008/03/securitymatters-0306/> 
accessed 20 March 2019 and section 3.3 supra.
268 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Threatens Democracy (Crown 2016) (passim); FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Improving Privacy 
Protection in the Area of Behavioural Targeting’ (Universiteit van Amsterdam 2014) 118 
<http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.434236>.
269 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (n 82) 83.
270 See, for example, European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment, Accompanying the 
Document “Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation)” and “Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, 
Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Ofences or the Execution of Criminal 
Penalties, and the Free Movement of Such Data”’ (European Commission 2012) 
Accompanying document SEC(2012) 72 fnal 29: “In a free and democratic society, the 
individual must have reassurance that fundamental rights are respected.”
271 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Volkszählungsurteil [1983] BVerfGE 65,1 para C II 1 a.
272 Dennis D Hirsch, ‘Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn 
from Environmental Law’ (2006) 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1.
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societal level, considering the application of these social theories to data protection 
seems appropriate.  In this context,  this contribution aims to answer the following 
question.
What avenues for the future development of consumer data protection law can 
be gleaned from the application of  risk society theory and normal accident 
theory in environmental protection law?
This question will be approached through the following sub-questions.
• How is risk society theory relevant to data protection law and policy?
• How is normal accident theory relevant to data protection law and policy?
• To what extent does the General Data Protection Regulation apply both theories 
in its risk management model?
• What does this analysis indicate for the future of the consumer data protection 
debate?
The discussion will  be limited to the jurisdiction of  the European Union and will 
consider the text of  the General  Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),  which shall 
apply from May 25, 2018. This chapter deals only with consent and performance of a 
contract (article 6(1)(1–2)) as the basis for lawfulness of processing, excluding consent 
and  contracting  by min0rs.  The risks  associated  with  the processing  of  sensitive 
personal data as defned in article 9(1), or profling based on sensitive data (article  
22(4)), will be considered in chapter 5 below.
4.2 Big data and the risk society
4.2.1 Risk society theory
The essence of  risk society theory is  best summed up by Beck himself.  The frst 
sentences of his seminal work read:
“In advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically 
accompanied by the social production of risks. Accordingly, the 
problems and conflicts relating to distribution in a society of scarcity 
overlap with the problems and conflicts that arise from the production, 
defnition and distribution of techno-scientifcally produced risks.”273
273 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage Publications 1992) 19.
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Beck describes how,  starting somewhere around the 1970s,  society has progressed 
from the so-called  “frst  modernity”  into  “second  modernity”.  In  frst  modernity,  
scientifc innovations were mainly aimed at removing natural hazards; in the current 
second modernity (or “advanced modernity”), risks are mainly the result of scientifc 
progress itself (“reflexive modernisation”). Environmental risks such as the depletion 
of the ozone layer, mass extinction of species and anthropogenic climate change fnd 
their origins in scientifc successes resulting from, for example,  attempts to defeat 
hunger or to protect humans from the elements. Beck calls these risks “modern risks”. 
These  risks  carry  extreme  catastrophic  potential,  but  they  cannot  be  measured 
accurately. The place of their origin is not always exactly known. These characteristics 
can make traditional risk coping mechanisms like insurance less suitable.274 Not all 
reflexive risks are created equal: Klinke and Renn have distinguished six “risk classes”, 
based on the diferent degrees to which the probability and the efects of a risk can be 
known or estimated. All of their risk classes are applicable to modern risks. They are 
named  after fgures  from Greek  mythology,  asserting  that  many  of  these  stories 
illustrate  the  transition  from an  economy  of  hunter-gatherers  to  an  agricultural 
economy, and that this transition had similar efects on the perception of risk as our 
transition to an industrialised society.275
The second, and (at least according to Beck) often overlooked aspect of risk society 
theory is institutionalised individualism.276 Beck asserts that in second modernity, 
social groupings like class, gender and family have gradually become less important in 
the exercise of fundamental rights, paid employment and education. The individual is 
increasingly detached from social groups. But because inequalities do not disappear, 
the individual is forced into shifting alliances for each particular issue.277 The advent 
of the second modernity therefore entails a “profound systemic transformation of the 
political.” Centralised political culture will lose its power in the enforcement of civil 
rights, and the organisation of social structure will increasingly happen through sub-
274 ibid 22.
275 Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn, ‘A New Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management: 
Risk-Based, Precaution-Based, and Discourse-Based Strategies’ (2002) 22 Risk Analysis 
1071, s 3.4 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1539-6924.00274/full> accessed 13 
February 2019.
276 Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization: Institutionalized 
Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences (1st edition, SAGE Publications Ltd 
2002) xxi; Beck, Risk Society (n 273) 85–150.
277 Beck, Risk Society (n 273) 100.
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politics.278 This means that decisions afecting civil rights will increasingly take place 
outside the institutions of democracy. Beck sees this not so much as an undermining 
of the individual’s participation opportunities, but as an enhancement — a view that 
appears to be at odds with (for example) Galanter’s analysis of how decision-making 
processes tend to favour repeat players with large resources.279
From this, two of Beck’s conclusions are relevant. Firstly, science alone can no longer 
sufciently decide on the acceptability of  risk.280 Because science is not capable of 
providing accurate insights in the risks that science itself  generates,  Beck suggests 
that science itself  must install  “brakes and a steering  wheel”  into its  processes.281 
Secondly,  political  acceptance becomes essential  in deciding about modern risk.282 
Because  of  the  lack  of  enduring  social  cohesion  in  the  risk  society,  political 
acceptance means that the individual must have the right to have his say in which 
risks are acceptable and which are not.
4.2.2 Risk society and environmental law
Three environmental  law instruments  show distinctive features  derived  from risk 
society theory: the Rio Declaration of 1992, the Aarhus Convention of 1998 and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2010.283
Principles 9 and 10  of  the Rio Declaration encapsulate both elements of  the risk 
society  thesis.  Principle  9  states  that  improving  and  sharing  of  scientifc 
understanding  and  technology  is  essential  for  endogenous  capacity-building; 
principle  10  states  that  environmental  protection  issues  are  best  dealt  with,  not 
merely by applying science and technology, but “with participation of all concerned 
278 ibid 190.
279 Galanter (n 91) 125.
280 Beck, Risk Society (n 273) 156.
281 ibid 180. This suggestion may not be achievable in the context of the scientifc method as it 
is currently being practiced. The scientifc method does, however, seem suitable to 
investigate the possible efectiveness of enforcement mechanisms for political decisions.
282 ibid 168.
283 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, ‘Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development’ <http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/RIO_E.PDF> 
accessed 13 February 2019; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ‘Convention 
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters Done At Aarhus, Denmark, On 25 June 1998’; Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2010] OJ C 83/02.
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citizens”. This participation should be facilitated by access to information concerning 
the environment, and “efective access to justice.”
The Aarhus Convention, mentioning principle 10 in its second recital, provides for 
public access to environmental information in general (article 5), public participation 
in  decisions  on  specifc  activities  (article  6);  public  participation  in  policy 
development  and  “generally  applicable  legally  binding  normative  instruments” 
(articles  7-8)  and  individual  access  to justice (article  9).  The Convention  reflects 
individualisation: the right to access to justice applies to every member of the public 
or to “the public concerned”, with the status of non-governmental organisations and 
pressure groups derived from the status of individuals. The Aarhus Convention links 
“scientifc, industrial and governmental elites and the ordinary public/citizen afected 
by scientifc, industrial and/or economic change.”284
The  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  has  incorporated 
environmental protection in its catalog (under title IV, “Solidarity”), as a duty of care 
of the institutions of the EU (article 37). This makes determining whether article 47 of 
the Charter (granting the right to an efective remedy and a fair trial) applies, a bit less 
straightforward. However, the EU is a signatory to the Aarhus Convention, making it 
clear that the EU must provide access to justice in the case of any individual decision 
or policy decision on environmental protection in accordance with article 9 of  the 
Convention.285
The  adoption  of  requirements  for  transparency,  participation  and  accountability 
(access to justice) for environmental decisions underscores the development of the 
right to environmental protection towards an individual, fundamental right. Applying 
these requirements is frmly entrenched legal practice in western societies in matters 
where fundamental rights are subject to interference.286 It is also a way to prevent the 
possibility that individuals have to rely on sub-politics as their primary means of 
participation — an approach that Beck seemed to have been in favour of, considering 
it  a  “more  direct  route  to  political  engagement”.287 In  the  case  of  the  Aarhus 
284 Deiniol Jones, ‘Solidarity and Public Participation: The Role of the Aarhus Convention in 
Containing Environmentally Induced Social Conflict’ (2008) 20 Global Change, Peace & 
Security 151, 151, 154 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14781150802079706> accessed 13 February 
2019.
285 [2005] OJ L124/4.
286 See, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights. articles 6, 8 and 13. See also 
Gutwirth and de Hert (n 125) paras 12-13; Citron (n 125) 1256–1257.
287 See Mythen (n 100) 160–161.
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Convention,  their  application  empowers  individuals:  it  reduces  the  possible 
subversion of democracy’s decision-making processes by expanding sub-politics with 
access to the institutions of the Rechtsstaat.
4.2.3 Refexive modernisation in action  The Seveso III-Directive
A clear example of  the EU applying the Aarhus Convention, and thus of  reflexive 
modernisation is discernible in the directive named after the Seveso environmental 
disaster of July 10, 1976, aimed at the prevention of major accidents.
Like its predecessor from 1996,  the Seveso III  Directive aims for a high degree of 
transparency regarding the operation of chemical plants where major accidents can 
occur. It specifes a generous minimum of information that must be made available to 
the public. Public participation is required whenever government decisions are given 
on either zoning or plant operation,  regardless who initiates the decision making 
process. Every government decision can be brought before a judge for review (article 
23(b)).  Requirements for public participation and transparency can be found with 
respect t.
• the drafting of an emergency response plan (article 12(5)).
• the establishment’s major accident prevention plans and policies (article 14(2)
(b)).
• the keeping of records by the competent authority (article 14 and annex V),
• decisions regarding permits and land use for these establishments (article 15),
• disclosing the occurrence of a major accident (article 17(e)).
Assuming that knowledge of  the risks of  major accidents and the possibilities for 
emergency response gives citizens a sense of personal control, the Seveso III Directive 
can  help  increase  society’s  trust  in  institutions:  Ter  Huurne  and  Gutteling  have 
established  that  “institutional  trust  and  perceived  personal  control  are  strongly 
correlated.”288 Nevertheless,  the Directive appears not to have completely satisfed 
society’s  need  for  participation.  Although  access  to  relevant  information  for  the 
public is deemed sufcient, experts outside industry and government have stated that 
288 Ellen FJ ter Huurne and Jan M Gutteling, ‘How to Trust? The Importance of Self-efcacy 
and Social Trust in Public Responses to Industrial Risks’ (2009) 12 Journal of Risk Research 
809, 819 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13669870902726091> accessed 13 February 2019.
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the quality of the dialogue between members of the public, their organisations, and 
the establishments and public authorities must still be improved. Still, many actors in 
the chemical  industry and competent authorities seem to agree that the Directive 
(actually, its predecessor, the Seveso II-Directive) has had a positive efect on safety in 
the afected establishments.289
4.2.4 Big data and the risk society
There seems to be consensus among scholars that big data is a possible source of risk. 
Among many others, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, Schermer and O’Neil have given 
examples each with their own emphasis.290 Kerr and Earle qualify the use of sorting 
algorithms as a way for data controllers to reduce risk for themselves, but this sorting 
can  introduce  new  risks  for  data  subjects.  Citron  and  Pasquale  identify  three 
problems with social sorting based on the processing of personal data: opacity to data 
subjects,  arbitrary  assessments  of  data  subjects  and  a  disparate  impact  on 
traditionally disadvantaged groups.291 Using advanced algorithms for the analysis of 
large datasets can reveal more than individual behaviour or personal thoughts.292 It 
can also reveal “special categories of data” without processing them directly, thereby 
weakening the protection that data protection law aims to ofer.293 As an example, 
grouping people with similar shopping habits or observing shifts in buying patterns 
can  easily  reveal  special  categories  of  personal  data  like  religious  observance  or 
289 O Salvi and others, ‘F-Seveso: Study of the Efectiveness of the Seveso II Directive (Final 
Report)’ (European Virtual Institute for Integrated Risk Management (EU-VRi) 2008) 
Contract n°070307/2007/476000/MAR/A3 37, 41 and 54 
<https://relevant.nl/download/attachments/4096340/seveso_report.pdf> accessed 13 
February 2019.
290 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 1) ch 8; Bart Willem Schermer, ‘Risks of Profling and 
the Limits of Data Protection Law’ in Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimination and 
Privacy in the Information Society (Springer-Verlag 2013); O’Neil (n 268) (passim).
291 Ian Kerr and Jessica Earle, ‘Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens 
Big Picture Privacy’ (2013) 66 Stanford Law Review Online 65, 69 
<http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/prediction-preemption-
presumption> accessed 13 February 2019; Danielle Keats Citron and Frank A Pasquale, ‘The 
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions’ (2014) 89 Wash. UL Rev. 1, 10–16 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractd2376209> accessed 19 March 2019.
292 Zeeshan Aleem, ‘All the Secret Ways You’re Being Tracked That You Don’t Even Realize’ 
(Mic, 23 March 2015) <https://mic.com/articles/113078/all-the-secret-ways-you-re-being-
tracked-that-you-don-t-even-realize> accessed 13 February 2019.
293 Article 9(1), GDPR.
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pregnancy.294 Permanent observation of  large parts of  the populace can therefore 
afect entire societies: it could deter eccentric behaviour, lead to social domination 
and limit free expression.295
The  risks  associated  with  permanent  and  ubiquitous  surveillance  are  hardly 
catastrophic  in  the  physical  sense.  But  pervasive  and  permanent  surveillance 
accompanied by social sorting based on datafcation would still pose a severe threat to 
a democratic society. Kerr and Earle have indeed linked big data to Beck’s notion of 
modern  risk,  especially  when  the  prediction  potential  of  algorithms  is  used  for 
“various  new  forms  of  social  preemption”,  possibly  resulting  in  discriminatory 
presumption.296 Seen in this way, the risks of datafcation ft Beck’s description of a 
modern risk: they are a by-product of the highly successful digital revolution, but they 
come hand-in-hand with risks for entire societies.
As is typical for modern risks, the risks of datafcation do not have a clear point of 
origin.  In essence,  datafcation is merely the keeping track of  events occurring in 
automated processes. Not keeping track of automated processes is not an option: “It’s 
impossible to overstate the importance of logging”:297 without it, billing, correction of 
errors  and  malfunctions,  and  detection  of  hacking  and  crime  become  almost 
impossible. The possibility of surveillance is essentially a side-efect. The qualifcation 
of this side-efect as a modern risk is underscored by the fact that the efects of these 
risks  are  not  easily  quantifable  and  that  they  amount  to  a  new  kind  of 
individualisation  of  society.  It  is  no  longer  necessary  to  rely  on  “average”  or 
approximate qualifcations of data subjects if access to their personal data can reveal a 
person’s exact properties.298
Assuming that datafcation poses modern risks, Klinke and Renn then ofer additional 
insights for categorisation. Applying their catalog of risk classes, the risks of big data 
could fall in several categories. If one considers both the probability and the extent of 
damage that big  data can cause to be uncertain,  it  would  be an example of  the 
“Pythia”-class. If one would rate the disaster potential as high, but the probability of 
disaster actually occurring as uncertain, big data poses a risk of the Cyclops-class. If, 
294 Duhigg (n 116) ch 7; René Bogaarts and Wilco Dekker, ‘De Dagelijkse Volkstelling’ De 
Volkskrant (21 February 1998) 50.
295 Neil M Richards, ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1934; 
Bentham (n 50) 35–37.
296 Kerr and Earle (n 291) 69.
297 Prevelakis and Spinellis (n 257) 31.
298 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 115) 30–31.
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like the CJEU’s Advocate General Cruz Villalón has asserted, the adverse efects of 
datafcation are inherent in the collection and storing of data per se, this may increase 
the probability of adverse efects to “certain”; datafcation could then be an example of 
a “Cassandra”-class risk, where the delay between trigger and efect is very long so that 
the risks are being downplayed.299
Consistent with Beck’s primary assertion, the distribution of these risks then becomes 
an important question. At least in the European Union since the invalidation of the 
Data Retention Directive, the general principles relating to the processing of personal 
data  appear  quite  equitable  and  adhering  to  them  will  arguably  result  in  a  fair 
distribution of  risk.300 The principles of  lawfulness, fairness,  transparency,  purpose 
limitation,  data  minimisation,  accuracy,  storage  limitation,  integrity  and 
confdentiality, and accountability provide useful guidelines in situations where the 
distribution of power and limits to institutional behaviour are already clearly defned, 
as is the case in employment law, administrative law and criminal law.
However,  in  settings  where  legal  constraints  on  actors  are  less  prominent,  data 
subjects may not enjoy the same level  of  protection.  In the consumer market for 
example, European data protection law appears to shift the risk of  data processing 
towards the data subject. Specifcally, personal data regarding consumers tends to be 
processed based on the necessity for the performance of a contract to which the data 
subject, acting as a consumer, is a party.301 As a result of the cost of information and 
organisation  working  in  favour  of  producers,  consumers  only  have  very  limited 
bargaining power when they enter into these “privacy contracts”.302 Data controllers 
can therefore unilaterally set the terms of  these contracts,  undermining the party 
autonomy of consumers despite the EU’s extensive consumer protection framework.303 
Avoiding privacy contracts is difcult. They are linked to enjoying the ownership of a 
“smart”  or connected modern device (a personal  computer,  a mobile telephone,  a 
television set or a car)  and to using modern services like social  networks,  instant 
299 Joined Cases C-293 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister of Communications and 
Kärntner Landesregierung v Seitlinger and others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, opinion of 
AG Cruz Villalòn paras 65-66; Klinke and Renn (n 275) 1080–1081.
300 The use of data sets by police and national security services is a possible exception. See 
Joined Cases C-293 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister of Communications and 
Kärntner Landesregierung v Seitlinger and others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 [51]
301 Art. 6(1)(a-b), GDPR. A consumer is “any natural person who is acting for purposes which 
are outside his trade, business or profession” (Art. 2(b), Directive 93/13/EC).
302 Verhelst (n 119) ch 3.
303 See section 3.2 supra.
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messaging, streaming entertainment or retail loyalty programs. Consistent with both 
Beck’s prediction and Galanter’s analysis, decision-making on important civil rights is 
efectively relegated to sub-politics — i.e. the market — where consumers have little  
power and few opportunities for participation.
The  general  principles  of  data  protection  law  are  therefore  less  efective  in  the 
consumer market.  Privacy contracts are usually drafted “by lawyers for lawyers”,304 
either in very wide terms, or in very lengthy detailed terms. In both cases, it is difcult  
to imagine any form of  primary or secondary use of  personal data that would fall  
outside of the scope of such an agreement, even if explains the rights of the consumer 
in “clear and plain language” (art. 12 GDPR).305 Thus, the principle of  lawfulness is 
easily  met.306 The  principles  of  purpose  limitation,  data  minimisation,  storage 
limitation  and  accountability  may  be  less  efective,  because  they  are  heavily 
influenced by the terms of the agreement. The efectiveness of one’s right to erasure 
(article 17, GDPR) may also be limited. Firstly, asking for erasure can be a difcult task 
because personal data is typically stored in hundreds of databases;307 secondly, now 
304 Fred H Cate and Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, ‘Notice and Consent in a World of Big Data’ 
(2013) 3 International Data Privacy Law 67, 67 
<http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/2/67> accessed 19 March 2019.
305 For example, Microsoft’s “Privacy statement”, linked to the license agreement of all their 
commercial software, consists of more than 23.000 words. See also Brendan van Alsenoy 
and others, ‘From Social Media Service to Advertising Network: A Critical Analysis of 
Facebook’s Revised Policies and Terms, v.1.3’ (ICRI - The Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & 
ICT, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 2015) 
<https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/en/news/item/facebooks-revised-policies-and-terms-
v1-3.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019 for a 100-page analysis of Facebook’s terms and 
conditions.
306 Lawfulness, in this example, should follow article 6(1)(b) GDPR, which is based on the 
freedom to associate in civil matters and the freedom to conduct a business (articles 12 and 
16, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). Judicial review of such 
contracts could involve a collision between fundamental rights. Assuming the absence of 
precedence among fundamental rights, a fair balance must be struck in each individual 
case: Axel Springer AG v. Germany (2012), ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:0207JUD003995408, para 
84. In this balance, the right to data protection does not automatically trump the right of a 
natural person or a business to contract for services that are based on the processing of 
personal data and knowledge creation. Opinions of Independent Supervisory Authorities, 
the Board or its closest predecessor, the Article 29 Working Party, do not meet the criteria 
for judicial review of article 47, Charter or article 13, ECHR. This does, of course, not imply 
that the terms of the contract or the commercial practice through which it was concluded 
are therefore fair.
307 In 2009 in the Netherlands, Schermer and Wagemans estimated that natural persons were 
represented in 250 to 500 databases ‘Onze Digitale Schaduw. Een Verkennend Onderzoek 
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that datafcation covers wide areas of daily life, a consumer will generate a signifcant 
amount of data again soon after the original data is erased.
The combined efect of  these factors will make it difcult for consumers to escape 
surveillance, social sorting or profling; where data processing is based on a consumer 
agreement, the right to object against profling may not even apply. The scope of the 
important principle of “data protection by design and by default” (article 25) will be 
determined to a large extent by the terms of  the agreement.  If,  for example,  this 
agreement specifes that a consumer ‘performs’ by giving access to personal data,308 
this is usually to enable efective profling for targeted advertising and personalisation 
of  commercial  ofers.  In  this  context,  efcient segmentation of  the market could 
preclude data minimisation or pseudonymisation;  the reasonable expectation that 
newer algorithms could make better use of older data would make long-term storage 
of  personal  data  “appropriate”,  and  a  sufciently  wide  defnition  of  “commercial 
ofers” would make this storage appropriate for “each specifc purpose”. Stating that 
profling data would only be shared with “selected commercial partners” could satisfy 
the  requirement  that  the  personal  data  is  not  made  accessible  to  an  “indefnite 
number of natural persons”.309
4.3 Big data and normal accident theory
4.3.1 Normal accident theory
Perrow’s  Normal  Accident  Theory  (NAT)  characterises  systems  along  two  axes: 
whether their interactions are linear or complex,  and whether they are loosely or 
tightly  coupled.310 Even  though  the  emphasis  of  Perrow’s  original  book  was  on 
Naar Het Aantal Databases Waarin de Gemiddelde Nederlander Geregistreerd Staat.’ 
(Considerati 2009) 40 
<https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/fles/downloads/rapporten/rap_2009
_onze_digitale_schaduw.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019.
308 Recital 13, European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content’ 
(European Commission 2015) COM(2015) 634 fnal; 2015/0287 (COD) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-634-EN-F1-1.PDF>.
309 A more optimistic view can be found with Georgia Skouma and Laura Léonard, ‘On-Line 
Behavioral Tracking: What May Change After the Legal Reform on Personal Data 
Protection’ in Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes and Paul de Hert (eds), Reforming European 
Data Protection Law (2015 edition, Springer 2014) 56.
310 Perrow, ‘Accidents, Normal’ (n 103) 33–34.
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technological  hazards (risks,  as Beck would call  them),  he made it clear that the 
categorisation of  systems along these two axes is applicable to “the organisational 
world” in its entirety: his examples included universities and the post ofce as well as 
nuclear and chemical plants and space missions.311
Chemical and nuclear plants are examples of complex, tightly coupled systems. They 
entail a great number of interactions that are not easily visible (complexity); due to 
this complexity, designers of these systems have to expect that operators follow very 
strict rules to prevent anomalous behaviour. Deviation from these rules can quickly 
lead to uncontrollable escalation with little chance of  correction: they are strongly 
time-dependent  (tightly  coupled).312 This  is  not  necessarily  a  design  flaw.  Perrow 
concludes  that  it  is  in  the  nature  of  tightly  coupled,  complex  systems  to  have 
incidents escalate to accidents with catastrophic potential: they are “system accidents” 
(in contrast, if systems are more linear or less tightly coupled, they typically display 
“component failures”.)  Perrow asserts that,  even though system accidents are rare 
events,  they are nevertheless  inherent  and  unpreventable in  complex  and  tightly 
coupled systems. Therefore, system accidents are normal accidents.313
Many accident investigations may conclude that an accident is caused by “operator 
error”, but Perrow ofers a diferent view. Operators are usually more directly exposed 
to the risk of a system than anyone else and they are often under pressure to ignore  
safety precautions to work faster — but if this causes injury or an accident, this may 
be considered “their own fault.” In complex, tightly coupled systems, operators are 
rarely the root cause of accidents. Much more likely, they are the frst-party victims.314
Perrow also  asserts  that  personal  control  over our environment is  being  steadily 
eroded by systems that we participate in,  or are passively afected by.315 Similar to 
Beck, he concludes that social decision-making on risks posed tends to be determined 
by “the power to impose risks on the many for the beneft of the few.”316 In response to 
the increase of industrial and technological risks, risk assessment has emerged as a 
311 Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (n 101) 96–100 and fgure 3.1; 
see also Karl E Weick, ‘Normal Accident Theory As Frame, Link, and Provocation’ (2004) 17 
Organization & Environment 27, 29.
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science mainly to “legitimise the decisions of elites in private and public sectors.”317 To 
make risks  acceptable  to  the  authorities,  to  the  public  and  to  the  employees  of 
hazardous systems, risk assessors produce “fantasy documents” detailing how high-
risk systems are safe because layers and layers of safety measures are in place to avert  
or mitigate accidents.318 Fantasy documents “are designed to be maximally persuasive”, 
and never conclude that the efects of an accident will be unrecoverable.
Society can choose diferent strategies for dealing  with high-risk systems.  Perrow 
distinguishes  absolute  rationality,  bounded  rationality  and  social  and  cultural 
rationality,  with the third as his strategy of  choice. He proposes a form of  limited 
rationality where fears of the public are taken into account, even if these fears may be 
less well-informed than scientifc knowledge or statistics.319 He suggests that societies 
could choose to abandon the riskiest systems with high catastrophic potential, restrict 
technologies where benefts are such that some risk is acceptable,  or tolerate and 
improve  less  risky  technologies.320 In  this  respect,  Perrow  arrives  at  the  same 
conclusion as Beck: the acceptance of certain types of technology is based at least in 
part on political decision-making.321
Seventeen  years  after  his  initial  publication  of  Normal  Accident  Theory,  Perrow 
concluded that — contrary to his original predictions — system accidents in high-risk 
systems  remain  rare  events,  although  the  frequency  of  the  more  preventable 
component failures appears to be increasing even in high-risk systems. For this he 
proposes  a  number of  explanations.  Firstly,  it  is  very hard  to have a catastrophe 
because so many elements need to fall into place — apparently, “the world is not as 
tightly coupled as many of us thought.”322 Secondly, even though component failures 
can be prevented, they continue to happen in high risk systems because of economic 
pressures, lack of government enforcement, biased accident investigations and new 
mechanisms to let the public at large sufer the costs of these accidents for the beneft 
of a small number of decision-makers.323 However, where Beck imagines these to be 
317 ibid 307 Compare also Beck (1992), p. 64-69.
318 Lee Clarke and Charles Perrow, ‘Prosaic Organizational Failure’ (1996) 39 American 
Behavioral Scientist 1040, 1053 <http://abs.sagepub.com/content/39/8/1040.short> 
accessed 13 February 2019.
319 Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (n 101) 315–324. See also 
Klinke and Renn (n 275).
320 Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (n 101) 349.
321 Beck, Risk Society (n 273) 168.
322 Perrow, ‘Accidents, Normal’ (n 103) 37.
323 ibid 36.
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implemented in science itself, Perrow expects societies’ institutions to brake and steer 
the course of technology — as becomes apparent from his proposed choice between 
abandon, restrict, and tolerate/improve.
Perrow  underscores  that  in  human  history,  many  systems  started  in  the 
complex/coupled quadrant, but societies have found ways to make most risky systems 
more linear and less tightly coupled over time. This may explain why system accidents 
remain extremely rare, even though Normal Accident Theory predicts that they are 
inevitable. Indeed, the apparent absence of large numbers of normal accidents is a 
weakness  of  Perrow’s  theory.324 Nevertheless,  Normal  Accident  Theory  provides 
important  insights  that  can  be  used  at  all  levels  —  individual  operators,  plant 
supervisors as well as public authorities — to reduce risk and meaningfully investigate 
accidents.  He explicitly sees a role for government to play,  stating that regulatory 
eforts remain necessary to provide for a fair distribution of technological risk.
4.3.2 Normal accidents and Environmental law
Environmental  regulation  predates  Normal  Accident  Theory  by  many  years. 
Nevertheless, NAT can help to increase insight into a large number of provisions that 
have  found  their  way  into  many  environmental  law  instruments  over  the  years. 
Choosing between banning, restricting and tolerating (and improving) technology is 
at the essence of environmental law.
Abandoning entire technologies is usually the result of  a society-wide debate and 
political discourse. The best example, already indicated by Perrow, is the decision to 
phase out nuclear power in several countries in response to the nuclear disasters in 
Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011).325 Persistent chemicals are another example: 
as per 2016, at least 605 chemical compounds have been banned from use and trade in 
the European Union.326 Interactions in ecosystems are of course complex, and because 
emissions of persistent chemicals may be irreversible, events are also tightly coupled. 
This is especially true if the release is gradual, if it can remain unnoticed for a long 
324 Nancy Leveson and others, ‘Moving beyond Normal Accidents and High Reliability 
Organizations: A Systems Approach to Safety in Complex Systems’ (2009) 30 Organization 
Studies 227, 229 <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0170840608101478> 
accessed 20 March 2019.
325 A nuclear power phase-out has been decided in Belgium and Switzerland and is under 
discussion in Germany and Spain.
326 See https://echa.europa.eu/information-on-chemicals/pic/chemicals (retrieved on 12 
October 2016).
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time, or if it has taken many years to establish the harmfulness of a substance. A third 
example is the phasing out of incandescent bulbs in the European Union.327
Restriction usually happens by means of administrative decisions. Examples at the EU 
level are prior authorisation of pesticides and plant protection products, maximum 
residue levels of pesticides on agricultural products, measures against the release of 
genetically modifed organisms, and a “prior informed consent” regime for a large 
number of chemicals.
“Tolerate and improve” is a strategy usually reserved for technologies that have been 
in  use  for  a  long  time  or  whose  risks  are  clearly  understood.  Environmental 
regulations use the term “best available techniques” to indicate that risks that are 
acceptable now, may be considered excessive in the future.328 “Tolerate” is used for 
technology that is  not only well  understood,  but whose risks are also considered 
almost universally acceptable when balanced against other interests of  society.  In 
those cases, explicitly stating the hazards by means of labelling and giving explicit 
instructions  for  safety  is  often  considered  sufcient.  Specifcally  for  the 
environmental protection context, this approach is visible on almost every household 
container for chemical products.329 Another policy area where the EU legislator has 
chosen a “tolerate and improve” approach to an environmental risk is with the Energy 
Label  Directive,330 introducing  labels  to inform buyers  of  the energy-efciency of 
many “energy-related products”. Verplanken and Weenig have suggested that these 
labels can have a positive efect when consumers are not under time pressure during 
selection of household appliances.331
327 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-368_en.htm.
328 Article 2(12), Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
January 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, [2008] OJ L 24 of 29 
January 2008, p. 8-29
329 Regulation (EC) no 1272/2008 (CLP Regulation), [2008] OJ L353/1.
330 Recital 15 and article 2(a), Directive 2010/30/EU (Energy Label Directive), [2010] OJ L 153/1.
331 Bas Verplanken and Mieneke WH Weenig, ‘Graphical Energy Labels and Consumers’ 
Decisions about Home Appliances: A Process Tracing Approach’ (1993) 14 Journal of 
Economic Psychology 739, 749 
<http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/016748709390019H> accessed 13 February 
2019; Labels appear to be less efective for home buyers, who may take more than energy 
efciency into account: Kirsten Gram-Hanssen and others, ‘Do Homeowners Use Energy 
Labels? A Comparison between Denmark and Belgium’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 2879, 2887 
<http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0301421506004071> accessed 13 February 
2019.
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4.3.3 Normal accident theory in action  again, the Seveso III-Directive
The aforementioned Seveso III Directive contains several methods compatible with 
Normal Accident Theory, although there is no clear evidence on whether the Directive 
was  drafted  with  Perrow’s  theory  in  mind.  A  strong  example  is  article  9  of  the 
Directive,  stating  that  competent  authorities  must  investigate  whether  diferent 
establishments where major accidents can occur are tightly coupled through “Domino 
efects”.
Furthermore,  the  Directive  reflects  Perrow’s  assertion  that  blaming  accidents  on 
operator errors diverts attention from underlying causes and that continuous eforts 
are necessary to move systems away from the tightly coupled/complex quadrant. The 
“Safety management system” described in Annex III to the Directive must consist of 
technical as well as organisational elements. The system is part of a mandatory major-
accident prevention policy which must be reviewed and, if necessary, updated at least 
every fve years, creating a Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle (“Deming circle”) for technical, 
organisational  and managerial systems. The category of  the largest establishments 
must maintain a “safety report” that has to be renewed every fve years, or sooner if a 
major accident has occurred or if “new facts or new technological knowledge” justify a 
re-evaluation.  This  mandatory  Deming  cycle  helps  moving  systems  out  of  the 
complex/tightly  coupled  quadrant  by  requiring  continuous  improvements  and 
codifying the ever-increasing knowledge and expertise that is accrued by scientifc 
development,  accident  investigation  and  regular  operation  of  the  establishment. 
Taking  the process  one step further,  article  12  of  the Directive also requires  that 
Member States’  competent  authorities  provide  for  emergency  response  plans  for 
measures  to  be  taken  outside  of  the  establishment.  Emergency  plans  must  be 
reviewed every three years.
Seveso  III  aims  to  prevent  fantasy  documents  by  requiring  several  cycles  of 
verifcation,  control  and  enforcement  at  diferent  levels  of  authority.  During 
inspection of the establishment, the competent authorities must examine technical, 
organisational  as  well  as  managerial  systems  to  verify  whether  the  operator  can 
demonstrate that the appropriate measures are taken to prevent major accidents.332 
Competent authorities are required to perform their inspections according to a plan 
that must be drafted  based  on a systematical  appraisal  of  the hazards in all  the 
establishments over which a competent authority has jurisdiction; the inspection plan 
332 Article 20, Seveso III Directive.
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must be reviewed and updated regularly.  Member States must provide reports on 
their  activities  to  the  European  Commission.  The  Commission  has  several 
enforcement mechanisms at its disposal, mainly based on articles 258 and 260 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
4.3.4 Big data and normal accidents
In a sense, data protection law aims to reduce the risks of complex, tightly coupled 
systems. The big data ecosystem consists of millions of devices, each generating or 
processing  hundreds  of  transactions  every  day;  every  transaction  can  generate 
personal data. This data is then transmitted, stored, analysed, sorted, queried and 
delivered for reuse over numerous pathways, relayed through many diferent nodes, to 
large numbers of endpoints. Every pathway, node and endpoint is an avenue for the 
introduction  of  risk  where  errors  can  occur,  or  where  data  can  be  intercepted, 
corrupted or abused. Protection mechanisms are “brittle”: a single failure, sometimes 
in another area of a system, may expose large quantities of data. These failures are not 
always  accidental:  many  data  leaks  are  a  result  of  targeted  hacking  attempts  or 
calculated  “leaks  from the  inside.”  Indeed,  especially  in  the  big  data  ecosystem, 
protection mechanisms can introduce new pathways for error.333
“Normal  accidents”  concerning  personal  data  appear  to  occur  frequently.  A  very 
concrete example of complexity and tight coupling is the Diginotar case, where the 
hacking of  a root certifcate authority in the Netherlands resulted not only in the 
supposed spying on individual Gmail users in Iran and the potential spying on all 
Gmail users, but also to the revocation of  security credentials for almost all Dutch 
government  servers.334 In  another  case,  a  vendor of  PC  hardware  intercepted  all 
network  trafc  from  new  laptops  to  serve  personalised  advertisements  to  its 
customers,  exposing  all  data  sent  to  and  from  the  computer  to  third  parties.  
Consumers  had  actually  “agreed”  to  this  practice  by  clicking  through  a  license 
333 Daniel Nunan and Marialaura di Domenico, ‘Big Data: A Normal Accident Waiting to 
Happen?’ [2015] Journal of Business Ethics 1, 5.
334 Axel Arnbak and others, ‘Security Collapse in the HTTPS Market’ (2014) 57 
Communications of the ACM 47, 48–49 <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
doidd2661061.2660574> accessed 19 March 2019; Hans Hoogstraaten and others, ‘Black 
Tulip: Report of the Investigation into the DigiNotar Certifcate Authority Breach’ (Fox-IT 
BV 2012) 45 <https://roselabs.nl/fles/audit_reports/Fox-IT_-_DigiNotar.pdf> accessed 13 
February 2019.
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agreement  for  the  software  that  provided  this  function.335 Other  possibilities  for 
attacking data security, confdentiality or integrity are deep packet inspection (at the 
network  level)  or  the  leaking  of  sensitive  login  information,  like  in  the  Ashley 
Madison server hack.336 Nunan and Di Domenico give more examples of these “data 
accidents” and call  them “normal accidents waiting to happen”.337 The information 
processing industry appears to agree on the necessity of systematically applying “best 
practices” to prevent these incidents: information security is the subject of a series of 
ISO standards, describing best known practices for information security management 
systems.338
Besides providing a framework for accident analysis, NAT provides a vocabulary that 
can be used for preventive analysis at all levels, possibly including the level of entire  
societies,  for example to analyse whether free speech,  equality  and  a democratic 
culture  may  be  afected  by  permanent  surveillance.339 Seen  in  Perrow’s  terms, 
datafcation is causing data subjects to increasingly live in a complex, tightly coupled 
environment: it can “bring classifcation to an increasing range of human activity.” 340 
Especially through profling, it can have efects in seemingly unrelated areas: Havard 
and O’Neil have indicated education, advertising, predictive policing, employment, 
credit, insurance and the efects on civil society as areas of concern.341 In this way, it 
can cement or exacerbate the discrimination of marginalised groups. Peppet is wary 
about the onset of a “signalling economy”, where citizens feel pressure to reveal ever 
more details about their personal lives to avoid giving the impression that they are 
335 Tim Ring, ‘Keeping Tabs on Tracking Technology’ (2015) 2015 Network Security 5, 6 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1353485815300477> accessed 13 
February 2019; Perlroth (n 204).
336 Christopher Mele, ‘No Anonymity for Plaintifs Suing Ashley Madison Over Hack, Judge 
Rules’ The New York Times (21 April 2016) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/technology/no-anonymity-ashley-madison-hack-
case.html> accessed 20 March 2019.
337 Nunan and di Domenico (n 333).
338 See, for example, NEN-ISO/IEC 27001:2013 en: Information technology – Security 
techniques – Information security management systems – Requirements and the standards 
referred therein.
339 Weick (n 311) 29; Neil M Richards, Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the 
Digital Age (Oxford University Press 2015) 153.
340 Dwork and Mulligan (n 224) 35.
341 Cassandra Havard, ‘“On the Take”: The Black Box of Credit Scoring and Mortgage 
Discrimination’ (2011) 20 Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 241, 287 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_idd1710063> accessed 13 February 2019; 
O’Neil (n 268) chapters 3-10.
108
4. Rear view mirror, crystal ball
hiding embarrassing or disqualifying information.342 “Scores can become self-fulflling 
prophecies, creating the fnancial distress they claim merely to indicate” or they could 
“trap us in patterns that perpetuate the basest or narrowest versions of ourselves.”343
Complexity is further increased due to the fact that many data controllers, especially 
operators of online platforms like social media and search engines, operate in two-
sided markets: a data controller can ofer a service or product to consumers for free or 
at a reduced price,  making a proft from selling user information to third parties.  
Individual behaviours having efects in unrelated areas of life is a clear indicator of 
complexity, and — like in the case of ongoing release of persistent pollutants — the 
permanent “emission” of personal data in the context of datafcation means that there 
may be no real possibility to “recover” from profling, indicating tight coupling. This 
complexity and  tight coupling  and  the possibility  of  large-scale accidents  can be 
fertile grounds for fantasy documents to persuade lawmakers, data subjects and data 
controllers that the risks are acceptable.
4.4 Application of Risk Society Theory and Normal Accident 
Theory in the GDPR
Due to environmental  law’s  long  and  convoluted  history,  national  and  European 
legislation is interspersed with examples of  both Risk Society Theory and Normal 
Accident Theory. In contrast, the General Data Protection Regulation forms a single 
body  of  law  addressing  the  risks  of  the  processing  of  personal  data  as 
comprehensively as possible.344 This afords an opportunity to evaluate the degree in 
which EU data protection law incorporates concepts of both sociological theories. A 
brief  outline of  the risk  management framework of  the GDPR will  illustrate this 
evaluation.
342 Scott R Peppet, ‘Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus & the Threat of a Full 
Disclosure Future’ [2010] Northwestern University Law Review 28 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractd1678634> accessed 3 November 2015.
343 Citron and Pasquale (n 291) 18 and note 106; Dwork and Mulligan (n 224) 40.
344 The GDPR frequently requires that certain aspects of processing (such as processing 
special data or for journalistic purposes, or in the context of employment relations) are 
allowed or required by Union or Member State law (see also section 2.3 supra). Apart from 
that, delegated acts and Member state law authorized by the GDPR is relatively scarce. See 
Chapter X and articles 6(2), 8(1), 9(4), 84(1), 85, 87-88 and 90, GDPR.
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4.4.1 Risk management model of the GDPR
The GDPR intends to address the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms of data 
subjects  associated  with  the processing  of  personal  data.  It  recognizes  that  data 
subjects may perceive these risks diferently than the EU legislator.345 Fundamental 
rights and freedoms are defned broadly to prevent accidental exclusion of protections 
under new technologies or policies.346
The risk management model  of  the Regulation  is  not stated  explicitly.  From the 
structure and content of the Regulation, the following model becomes visible:
• Primarily, the GDPR empowers data subjects to manage their own risks through 
the lawfulness requirement of  article 5(1)(a). This covers both sub-politics and 
politics. By entering into agreements or consenting to processing, data subjects 
can determine the risks they are willing to take. As citizens of a Member State, 
they can participate in decision-making on whether a legal obligation, a public 
interest,  or  an  ofcial  authority  for  processing  should  exist.  Without  their 
participation, lawfulness has to meet stricter criteria: the controller should then 
demonstrate his own legitimate interest or the vital interest of the data subject.
• Many aspects of processing are not visible to data subjects. To reduce the risks of 
these aspects, the GDPR assigns accountability for compliance to controllers and 
sets rules for data transfers outside the EU. It relies on independent oversight by 
specialised supervisory authorities for verifcation and enforcement.
• Article 5 provides technologically neutral, broadly worded underlying principles 
and recital 4 states the principle of proportionality. These principles serve as fnal 
touchstones for the acceptability of risk.
• The European Data Protection Board (article 68 GDPR) may publish guidelines, 
recommendations and best practices indicating what constitutes the “state of the 
art” of acceptable risk.
345 See recitals 9 and 51 for examples. See also Paul Schwartz, ‘Risk and High Risk: Walking the 
GDPR Tightrope’ (Privacy Perspectives - Ideas and Insights on Data Protection, 29 March 
2016) <https://iapp.org/news/a/risk-and-high-risk-walking-the-gdpr-tightrope/> accessed 
13 February 2019.
346 See, for example, recital 75 and article 1(2)). The GDPR also identifes “risks of 
circumvention” of data protection provisions, which it addresses by giving rules that are 
technologically neutral (recital 15) and the risk of data being insufciently secure or 
confdential (recital 83 and article 32), which is addressed by (among others) a breach 
notifcation obligation (article 33).
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In  addition  to  the  application  of  proportionality  for  evaluating  the  necessary 
measures that controllers need to implement,  a limited number of  obligations is 
triggered if  the processing of  personal data is likely to result in a “high risk to the  
rights and freedoms” of data subjects:
• In the case of data breaches, a high risk triggers an “undue delay”-requirement in 
notifying the data subjects of the breach (article 34(1));
• A data protection impact assessment is necessary for types of  processing that 
cause a high risk;  the assessment must be completed  prior to the processing 
(article 35(1)).347
4.4.2 Identifying the underlying assumptions of the risk management 
model
A look at Klinke and Renn’s fgure 3 indicates that the EU lawmaker appears to have 
evaluated the risks associated with the processing of personal data as a Cassandra-
type  risk.  The  damage  potential  is  considered  to  be  well  known,  and  both  the 
probability of  adverse efects  and  delay efects  are high.  This  assumption can be 
derived from the chosen risk management method, “strengthening of responsibility” 
(articles 5(2), 83(4-5)). The implied GDPR risk management model may reveal some 
weaknesses  when  applied  to  consumer  contracts,  because  some  underlying 
assumptions may not be valid.
• It assumes that data subjects can assess the risks of processing. Whether this is 
true is far from certain.348
• It assumes that data subjects have bargaining power as consumers in the market 
and  that  the  legislative  process  will  ensure  compliance  with  data  protection 
principles, lowering the risk of processing. Both assumptions merit skepticism.349
347 The GDPR gives three cases that always pose a high risk in article 35(3).The “high risk”-
threshold also triggers obligations for supervisory authorities. See the useful explanation 
and enumeration in Gabriel Maldof, ‘The Risk-Based Approach in the GDPR: 
Interpretation and Implications’ 
<https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/GDPR_Study_Maldof.pdf> accessed 13 
February 2019.
348 McDonald and Cranor (n 144).
349 TNS Opinion and Social, ‘Special Eurobarometer 431: Report’ (European Commission 2015) 
DS-02-15-415-EN-N 30–32 
<https://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOfce/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/
DocumentKy/66372> accessed 13 February 2019; see also: Joined Cases C-293 and C-594/12 
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• It assumes that managing risks for individual data subjects is sufcient to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms, whereas datafcation can have emergent efects 
at the societal level (e.g., discriminatory efects on marginalised groups). These 
risks have not been evaluated, which means their probability is unknown. This 
would  indicate  another  risk  classifcation  and  another  management  strategy 
(Cyclops-type and ascertaining probability, respectively).
• It assumes efective enforcement, where this efectiveness is uncertain, possibly 
due to a lack of funding for supervisory authorities.350
The  remaining  part  of  this  section  examines  the  extent  to  which  the  GDPR 
implements Risk Society and Normal Accident theories.
4.4.3 Risk society theory in the GDPR
Comparing the risks of industrialisation and datafcation shows that both qualify as 
modern risks. This tentatively points to the conclusion that Beck’s statements about 
decision-making in the risk society can also be applied to the data protection context. 
This  paragraph  aims  to  identify  articles  of  the  GDPR  that  reveal  a  degree  of 
compatibility with three elements of Beck’s ideas: identifcation of the processing of 
personal  data  as  a  modern  risk,  institutionalised  individualism  and  political 
acceptance of risk.
Identifcation of processing as a modern risk
Like the Rio Declaration and the Aarhus Convention, the GDPR contains provisions 
indicating that the processing of personal data poses modern risks, originating from 
unknown sources and causing unquantifable efects:
Digital Rights Ireland v Minister of Communications and Kärntner Landesregierung v 
Seitlinger and others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, which invalidated the Data Retention 
Directive. The Dutch national government proposed to reinstate the efects of the Data 
Retention Directive through national law, arguing that it cannot be known in advance who 
will become a suspect later. KST II 2014-2015, 33542, nr. 16, p. 8 (Dutch parliamentary 
documents).
350 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Fundamental Rights Report 2016’ (European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2016) 129 
<http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/fundamental-rights-report-2016> accessed 19 
March 2019.
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• The GDPR aims to provide rules that are technologically neutral. This indicates 
that no particular (use of) technology has been isolated as the source of  these 
risks;351
• The GDPR aims to address broadly defned “threats to fundamental rights and 
freedoms”, indicating that the EU legislator does not venture to predict where the 
adverse efects of processing can materialize;
• In  a  more  abstract  sense,  the  high  administrative  fnes  that  independent 
supervisory authorities can impose (10 million Euros or 2% of annual turnover, 
see article 83(4)), indicate that the damage that the processing of personal data 
can  impose  is  ill-suited  to  private  compensation.  This  corroborates  with  the 
difculties associated with attaching a monetary value to privacy.352
Individualism and sub-politics
Unlike  the  Seveso  III-Directive,  which  has  exclusively  organized  individual 
participation through traditional government institutions, the GDPR partially relies 
on  individualisation  and  sub-politics.  Controllers  can  achieve lawfulness  of  their 
processing by directly contracting with data subjects in the market (article 6(1)(a-b)) 
and controllers shall  seek the views of  data subjects or their representatives when 
conducting a data protection impact assessment “where appropriate” (art. 35(9)).
But the GDPR does not completely rely on sub-politics. Several mechanisms are in 
place to compensate for power diferences  between controllers  and data subjects.  
Independent supervisory authorities subject controllers to more traditional oversight 
and enforcement mechanisms to ensure their compliance with specifc obligations 
(art. 51(1)). Consumers may indeed be ill-equipped to evaluate the extent to which 
controllers adhere to e.g. the “by design and by default”-requirement or the general 
and  specifc  requirements  for  data  protection  impact  assessments.  Likewise,  the 
GDPR  relies  on  judicial  authorities  to  resolve  disputes  between  data  subjects, 
supervisory authorities and controllers (articles and 77-80 and 83(8)).353
351 See paragraph 2.1 supra.
352 “(c)ourts have been reluctant to fnd a value in privacy, because people willingly give it 
away in exchange for so little.” Schneier, Data and Goliath (n 210) 227.
353 Already under the DPD, individual access to justice was proven to be of signifcance. Case 
362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
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Political acceptance of risk
Unlike  several  examples  of  environmental  law,  the  GDPR  does  not  preemptively 
abandon any type of processing, does not explicitly forbid any adverse efects for data 
subjects, nor does it specify an acceptable level of  risk for these efects. Instead, it 
aims for proportionality between risk and protection measures. See, for example, art. 
35(7)(d), requiring that a controller describes measures to “address the risks” (and 
presumably, reducing them to acceptable levels) instead of eliminating them.
In a more general sense, the measures in the GDPR are aimed almost exclusively at  
the rights and freedoms of individual data subjects. Precaution-based or discourse-
based decision-making on whether pervasive surveillance is compatible with a free 
society was not applied, casting doubt on whether the residual risks of datafcation for 
a democratic society have been politically accepted.354
4.4.4 Normal accident theory
EU data protection law does not yet explicitly display a systems approach to data 
protection.  Instead,  it focuses on the activity of  processing (article 2.1  juncto 4(2) 
GDPR).  Still,  from a controller standpoint,  a systems approach is probably useful: 
well-chosen defnitions of processing (sub-)systems permit e.g. the reuse of previous 
impact assessments if only certain parts of processing systems are modifed (article 
35(1) GDPR). Additionally, datafcation is a possible source of system accidents. This 
paragraph aims to identify articles of the GDPR that reveal a degree of compatibility 
with three elements of  Perrow’s ideas:  moving out of  the complex/tightly coupled 
quadrant, fantasy documents and social and cultural rationality.
Moving out of the Complex/Tightly coupled quadrant
As was proposed in section 4.3.4 above, the processing of personal data can have the 
characteristics of a complex, tightly coupled system for data subjects. Contrary to the 
example of  the Seveso III-Directive, the GDPR does not contain provisions for the 
mandatory  performance of  periodical  risk  analysis;  contrary  to  the Energy Label 
Directive, it does not contain provisions for the mandatory labelling of products or 
services. The GDPR does, however, charge public authorities with “encouraging” the 
use of  data protection seals and marks and empowers the Commission to develop 
standardised icons and determine the information they should represent (arts.  43, 
12(7-8) GDPR). The European Parliament proposed a number of icons after the vote 
354 Klinke and Renn (n 275).
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on the original Commission proposal, but these icons did not make it into the fnal 
version of the GDPR.355
The principles of  fairness and transparency may fail  to reduce tight coupling and 
perceived complexity, not only because taking in all the relevant information requires 
signifcant  eforts  from  data  subjects,356 but  also  because  transparency  must  be 
balanced against the right to protect intellectual property and trade secrets (recital 
63).
Fantasy documents
Measures to prevent the creation of fantasy documents in the GDPR are possibly not 
as thorough as in the Seveso III-Directive.  Fantasy documents emanate from new 
systems lacking a verifable track record, they cover a large array of possible accidents, 
are designed to persuade, and they never doubt that any crisis can be resolved.357 The 
following documents could eventually turn out to be fantasy documents:
• Agreements  and  consent  statements  providing  lawfulness  of  processing  and 
enumerating authorised forms of  processing, in cases where consumers can be 
expected not to read them;358
• Data protection impact assessments, where controllers may have large amounts of 
leeway in interpreting whether the assessment is necessary. Even when they are 
necessary, they may not be very useful: according to Moerel, the large number of 
requirements for impact assessments may result in a “tick box list for compliance 
measures  regardless  of  their  actual  impact  on  compliance.”359 Hempel  and 
Lammerant conclude that the drafters of impact assessments tend to assume that 
their  purpose  is  mainly  to  increase  knowledge  and  much  less  to  ofer 
opportunities  to  discuss  issues  of  power,  indicating  the  potentially  limited 
efectiveness of the intended sub-politics;360
355 Jan Philipp Albrecht, ‘GDPR Inofcial Consolidated Version after LIBE Committee Vote 
Provided by the Rapporteur’ (2013) Annex I <http://www.janalbrecht.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/DPR-Regulation-inofcial-consolidated-LIBE.pdf> accessed 13 
February 2019.
356 McDonald and Cranor (n 144) 562.
357 as explained in Clarke and Perrow (n 318) 1053.
358 McDonald and Cranor (n 144) 562.
359 Moerel (n 87) 52 and note 200.
360 Leon Hempel and Hans Lammerant, ‘Impact Assessments as Negotiated Knowledge’ in 
Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes and Paul de Hert (eds), Reforming European Data 
Protection Law (2015 edition, Springer 2014) s. 5.2.
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• Binding corporate rules governing data transfers, where the “enforceable rights” 
that they confer to data subjects may be expected not to be efectively known or 
understood by data subjects;
• Certifcation  mechanisms  and  data  protection  seals  and  marks  signalling 
compliance with the GDPR, where it is uncertain that data subjects can fully grasp 
what this compliance, in conjunction with their privacy contracts, actually entails;
• The GDPR itself, especially when it states that it respects all fundamental rights 
and therefore implies that the same is true for all processing of personal data that 
complies with it (recital 4), where knowledge of the risks of datafcation and of 
the  processing  of  personal  data  may be incomplete  and  where  there  can  be 
reasonable uncertainty regarding the efectiveness of enforcement.361
Mechanisms against fantasy documents in the GDPR are not yet formally embedded 
in  plan-do-check-act  cycles,362 nor  are  they designed  in  the form of  interlocking 
systems  of  oversight.  The  supervisory  authorities  are  expressly  intended  to  be 
completely independent,  which makes “watching  the watchers”  difcult;  only the 
European Data Protection Board – consisting of  members of  national  supervisory 
authorities and one EU appointee363 – has the authority to monitor the efectiveness of 
enforcement  activities.  This  independence  is  useful  to  shield  Independent 
Supervisory  Authorities  from  political  influence,  which  is  certainly  appropriate: 
supervising  the  processing  of  personal  data  by  government  bodies  may  not  be 
efective if  it  is  politically influenced or motivated.  However,  the GDPR does not 
require a planned,  risk-based,  cyclic execution of  the authorities’  duties and tasks 
aimed at continuous improvement, nor does it empower the Board to impose such a 
system.364
361 Omer Tene, ‘For Privacy, European Commission Must Be Innovative | Center for 
Democracy & Technology’ (Center for Democracy & Technology, 28 February 2011) 
<https://cdt.org/blog/for-privacy-european-commission-must-be-innovative/> accessed 13 
February 2019; European Agency for Fundamental Rights (n 350) 129; European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, ‘Data Protection in the European Union: The Role of National Data 
Protection Authorities. Strengthening the Fundamental Rights Architecture in the EU II’ 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010) 42–43 <doi:10.2811/47216>.
362 The GDPR does not require data protection impact assessments to be periodically 
reviewed; only the processing needs to be reviewed to verify accordance with the existing 
assessment (art. 35(11)).
363 Art. 68(3), GDPR; art. 42(1), Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.
364 The Board is authorized to issue “guidelines, recommendations and best practices” (art. 
70(1)).
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Social and Cultural rationality
Perrow  suggests  that  societies  “abandon,  restrict  or  tolerate  and  improve”  risky 
technology.  The GDPR contains  no provisions that aim to abandon any forms of 
processing. It does, however, impose restrictions, for example on the processing of 
special categories of  data. As was noted before,  the recitals consider the efects of  
datafcation on entire societies only very briefly; even when discussing the necessity to 
prevent social disadvantage, this is aimed at individual data subjects (recitals 75, 85). 
However,  through  its  technologically  neutral  approach,  the  GDPR  holds  some 
promise to improve currently tolerated forms of  processing, especially through the 
general principles in article 5(1). Technological progress has a tendency to raise the 
bar  for  technologies  to  be  politically  acceptable.365 Similarly,  the  publishing  of 
guidelines, recommendations and best practices (art. 70) could reflect changing social 
norms  and  codify  technological  progress.  However,  the  GDPR  ofers  no  strict 
mechanism to ensure compliance with these instruments.
4.5 Looking into the crystal ball
Contrary to the European Commission’s stated intention, it appears safe to say that 
the General Data Protection Regulation is not yet “future proof  for the decades to 
come”.366 Looking into a rear view mirror, it is clear that Beck’s and Perrow’s theories 
have played a signifcant role in addressing the risks of technology for industrialised 
societies  through environmental  law.  Although datafcation poses  similar risks  to 
societies, data protection law appears to not yet have considered these risks beyond 
the scope of  individual  rights.  Risk Society Theory and  Normal  Accident Theory 
therefore ofer an opportunity to transfer insights from environmental law to the data 
protection law domain. Looking into a crystal ball,  I expect that opportunities for 
useful  application  of  both  theories  can  be found  when addressing  the  following 
issues:
Better understanding of the risks of big data
During the last few decades, fundamental research has increased our insights in the 
efects of human activity on ecosystems, reducing the “modern risk”-qualities of these 
efects.  Likewise,  for  data  protection  law  to  efectively  address  the  risks  that 
datafcation and big data can pose to individuals and societies, our understanding of 
the efects of the processing of personal data needs to improve. Stated in Beck’s terms, 
365 See the reference to “best available techniques” in section 3.2 supra.
366 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation’ (n 81) 104.
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brakes  and  a  steering  wheel  will  be  more  efective  if  we have  a  speedometer,  a  
roadmap and a compass. Research eforts into algorithms and modelling, psychology 
and the social sciences could hopefully ofer useful insights and reduce the probability 
that the risks of big data are obscured by fantasy documents. A better understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms is essential to increasing the efectiveness of regulation 
and enforcement. The European Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 
could play a part in the funding of relevant research eforts.367
Better implementation of sub-politics
A free market is arguably one of the better suited mechanisms to fnd big data’s best  
applications, both for the common good and for private enterprise. The GDPR relies 
on  the  participation  of  data  subjects  in  the  market  and  in  the  drafting  of  data 
protection impact assessments. But Galanter’s warning still holds: usually, the “haves” 
come out ahead. Consumers face high costs of information and organisation, which 
could stand in the way of efective participation. Without additional protections and 
incentives for consumers engaging in privacy contracts, the GDPR’s implementation 
of sub-politics may not achieve its goals. Consumer protection law may have a part to 
play  in  addressing  these  matters.  It  may  also  be  necessary  to  create  formal 
participation  options  for  consumers,  for  example  vis-a-vis  national  Independent 
Supervisory Authorities and the European Data Protection Board.
Better transparency
For better sub-politics to have a positive efect, data subjects need better insight into 
the efects  of  their privacy contracts.  The GDPR’s seals  and  marks could  provide 
insights to consumers, but only if they signal meaningful information. Demonstrating 
compliance with the GDPR may not help to move the processing of personal data out 
of  the  complex/tightly  coupled  quadrant,  because  data  subjects  would  need  to 
understand the GDPR itself (counting over 50.000 words) as well as their own privacy 
contracts, to know what this compliance does or does not accomplish. Like energy 
labels classifying appliances on a scale from A to E, seals and marks could encourage 
comparison between controllers.  Especially  for consumer contracts,  the EU could 
consider programs empowering  and subsidising  consumer organisations to collect 
and publish meaningful comparisons between diferent controllers and data-relevant 
367 Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 – the Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation (2014-2020) and repealing Decision No 1982/2006/EC, OJ L 347/104.
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products  and  services,  like  it  already  subsidises  consumer  participation  in  the 
standardisation and lawmaking process.368
Improving social and cultural rationality
If  we acknowledge the possibility of  a “surveillance market” coming about through 
consumer contracts, an open discussion about whether its efects are desirable needs 
to take place. The GDPR’s articles 6(1)(1–2) ofer no opportunities for the discourse-
based or precaution-based risk management strategies proposed by Klinke and Renn 
for the Pythia-, Cyclops-, or Cassandra-type risks that several authors associate with 
datafcation. The collection of census data resulting in the Volkszählungsurteil was 
enough to trigger a far-reaching court case in 1983;369 it is therefore remarkable that 
the risks of  datafcation appear to have escaped public or political deliberation on 
whether – and how – society should “abandon, restrict or tolerate and improve” this 
technology.
This omission is understandable to some extent: as was stated earlier, datafcation is  
the result of, and an indispensable by-product of, automation. Over the past decades, 
iteratively computerising an ever-increasing number of ordinary tasks may not have 
been cause for public  concern.  But  now,  as  almost  all  daily  activity  is  facilitated 
through automated platforms,  big  data has  altered the landscape.  The impact of 
datafcation is by no means smaller than the impact of a census. All the information 
that citizens refused to provide to their government is now easily discerned from the 
analysis of all the data points that they provide, as consumers, to data controllers.
Therefore,  society  still  needs  to  discuss  the  future  of  datafcation  in  terms  of 
acceptable  risk,  regulation,  compliance  and  especially  the  desired  level  of 
enforcement. Such a discussion will be of a political nature. Considering the scale of  
the EU internal  market or even a worldwide economy,  the efects of  having these 
discussions at the national level may be limited. Determining where this discussion 
should take place is therefore not easy. All options have signifcant imperfections.370 In 
accordance  with  Perrow’s  notion  of  “tolerate  and  improve”,  the  results  of  these 
discussions may need periodical re-evaluation for the foreseeable future.
368 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 254/2014 of 26 February 2014 on a 
multiannual consumer programme for the years 2014-20 and repealing Decision No 
1926/2006/EC, [2014] OJ L 84/42, art 3(1)(b).
369 Volkszählungsurteil [1983] BVerfGE 65,1 para C II 1 a.
370 Komesar, Law’s Limits (n 93) 30–31; see also section 2.1.4 supra.
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4.6 In conclusion
Big  data and  the associated  social  risks  have been said  to be an example of  the 
Collingridge dilemma: the need to regulate technology sometimes becomes apparent 
only after the point of no return has been passed.371 The current EU data protection 
framework, supposedly among the strongest in the world, is proof that this dilemma 
is not a universal truth. But technology tends to outpace legislation, and it is probably 
unwise to assume that the GDPR will be an exception. This chapter aims to illustrate 
that Risk Society Theory and Normal Accident Theory have contributed signifcantly 
to  environmental  law  and  that  they  similarly  have  a  lot  to  ofer  to  the  future 
development  of  EU  data  protection  law.  These  theories  indicate  some  areas  of 
research,  social  discourse  and  legal  development  that  can  help  to  keep  the  EU 
framework efective and future-proof.
371 “Regulators having to regulate emerging technologies face a double-bind problem: the 
efects of new technology cannot be easily predicted until the technology is extensively 
deployed. Yet once deployed they become entrenched and are then difcult to change.” 
David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Frances Pinter 1980); quoted in 
Moerel (n 87) 4.
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Illustrating  big  data's  discrimination  risk  through  complex  systems  
science
Prelude
Like Chapter 4  before it,  this  chapter also started  as  a  conference paper.  On 20 
September 2016 I presented a paper called “Decomposing contractual privacy: using 
complexity  theory  for  preventing  indirect  discrimination”  during  the  Law  and 
Complexity  satellite  session  of  the  2016  Conference  on  Complex  Systems  in 
Amsterdam.
In the aftermath of the conference, I was introduced to dr. Qing Yi Feng of Utrecht 
University.  She could  see  the  points  I  made in  the  paper,  but  ofered  insightful 
comments on the efects that applying complex systems science could achieve. She 
accepted my proposal to rewrite the conference paper and submit it to a scholarly 
journal in the legal feld. Dr. Feng wrote section 5.2. Dr. Feng and I co-wrote sections 
5.7 and 5.8, for which I provided the frst drafts.
This paper builds on chapter 4 in the way that it also deals with risk. However, this 
paper is  more specifcally focused  on the risks  associated  with the processing  of 
sensitive personal data.
Timeline and citation
The frst version of this paper was submitted to International Data Privacy Law on 29 
November 2017. It was conditionally accepted 10 February 2018. A new version was 
submitted 22 March;  this version was accepted 22 April  2018.  The article was not 
published under an open access license. IDPL recommends the following citation.
Michiel Rhoen, Qing Yi Feng; Why the ‘Computer says no’: Illustrating 
big data’s discrimination risk through complex systems science, 
International Data Privacy Law, Volume 8, Issue 2, 1 May 2018, Pages 
140–159, https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipy005.
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5.1 Introduction
Due to the nature of  human society as a complex system,372 big data threatens to 
undercut the anti-discrimination eforts in the EU data protection framework. This is 
especially relevant in the contexts of  the processing of  sensitive personal data and 
profling.  It  is  far  from certain  whether  the  General  Data  Protection  Regulation 
(GDPR)373 can efectively reduce this risk.
In this chapter, we aim to present some of the insights that complex systems science 
has to ofer to the study of EU data protection law. A settled defnition of a complex 
system is not yet available, nor do we aim to propose such a defnition here. We will 
follow  the  analysis  of  Ladyman  et  al:  complex  systems  are  ensembles  of  many 
elements that have the possibility to engage in interactions with other elements with a 
certain degree of disorder (or non-predictability); furthermore we assume that these 
interactions can lead to ordered patterns (“robust order”) and that these patterns can 
persist for a relevant period of time (“memory”).374 Natural persons, and the groups, 
communities  and societies  that they form,  all  qualify as  complex systems in this 
context.
We use the term “big data” to refer to the high volume, variety and velocity of data 
streams demanding cost-efective and innovative means of processing for enhanced 
insight  and  decision-making,  especially  proft-seeking.375 Big  data  results  from 
datafcation – “the ability to render into data many aspects of  the world that have 
never been quantifed before.”376 Datafcation has afected many previously ephemeral 
behaviours.  For  example,  private  communication,  reading  the  news,  listening  to 
372 For an example of a defnition of “complex system”, see Yaneer Bar-Yam, Dynamics of 
Complex Systems (Addison-Wesley 1997) 12.
373 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1.
374 James Ladyman, James Lambert and Karoline Wiesner, ‘What Is a Complex System?’ (2013) 
3 European Journal for Philosophy of Science 33, s 6.1 
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13194-012-0056-8> accessed 20 March 2019.
375 Lemi Baruh and Mihaela Popescu, ‘Big Data Analytics and the Limits of Privacy Self-
Management’ (2017) 19 New Media & Society 579 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461444815614001> accessed 19 March 2019; Jacques Bughin, ‘Big 
Data, Big Bang?’ (2016) 3 Journal of Big Data 2, 9–10 
<https://journalofigdata.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40537-015-0014-3> accessed 
19 March 2019.
376 Zikopoulos and Eaton (n 7) 5; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 115) 30.
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music, watching video, consuming electrical power in the home, and moving about in 
physical  space are now continuously generating personal  data.  Datafcation shares 
many features with surveillance or permanent observation. Log fles of infrastructure 
“choke points”377 enable anyone with  suitable access  to put  almost  anyone under 
surveillance through “big data analytics”.378
This opportunity for individual surveillance on a massive scale introduces new types 
of  risk,  or “modern risks”,  to industrialised  societies,  as  Beck predicted  when he 
proposed his theory of the Risk Society.379 According to Baldwin et al, regulation “can 
be seen as being inherently about the control of risks”.380 One of  the risks that the 
GDPR expressly addresses is discrimination (recital 75). Discrimination – and other 
risks – are addressed in a technologically neutral fashion (recital 15). To this end, the 
GDPR  uses  criteria  like  “appropriate  safeguards”  (article  6(4)(e))  or  “appropriate 
technical  and  organisational  measures”  (art.  24(1)).  These  are  examples  of  the 
principle of proportionality (recital 4) and, indeed, a “risk-based” approach.
The  GDPR  is  not  the  only  European  legislative  efort  aimed  at  preventing 
discrimination. In the Council of Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)  prohibits  discrimination  in  the  exercise  of  the  rights  and  freedoms  it 
guarantees “on any ground” (art. 14).381 In EU law, non-discrimination eforts difer in 
377 A “choke point” is a network node connected to many other nodes. For example, a 
Facebook server is a choke point for a large number of Facebook users, a cell tower is a 
choke point for all its connected mobile telephones and a mobile switch is a choke point 
for a large number of cell towers. See Assane Gueye and others, ‘Defensive Resource 
Allocations with Security Chokepoints in IPv6 Networks’ in Pierangela Samarati (ed), Data 
and Applications Security and Privacy XXIX (Springer, Cham 2015) 262 
<https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-20810-7_19> accessed 20 March 2019.
378 Zikopoulos and Eaton (n 7) 48.
379 Beck, Risk Society (n 273) 19–20; 88, see also Dwayne Winseck, ‘Netscapes of Power: 
Convergence, Network Design, Walled Gardens, and Other Strategies of Control in the 
Information Age’ in David Lyon (ed), Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk and digital  
discrimination (Routledge 2003) 176, 188. Surveillance concerns were also instrumental to 
invalidation of the Data Retention Directive and the EU-U.S. safe harbor agreement: see 
Joined Cases C-293 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister of Communications and 
Kärntner Landesregierung v Seitlinger and others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 paras 32, 37 
and 56-57; C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
380 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (n 82) 83.
381 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Sept. 3, 1953, ETS 5, 213 UNTS 221.
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scope.382 This text focuses on discrimination based on individual attributes that the 
GDPR qualifes as “special categories of personal data” or “sensitive data (in relation to 
fundamental  rights  and freedoms)”  (recitals  10  and 51).  Article 9(1)  of  the GDPR 
applies this moniker to the following types of information: “racial or ethnic origin, 
political  opinions,  religious or philosophical  beliefs,  (…) trade union membership, 
genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, 
data  concerning  health  or  data  concerning  a  natural  person's  sex  life  or  sexual 
orientation”. Article 22(4) refers to article 9(1) in relation to profling.
Many individuals sufering social, political or economic discrimination share one or 
more protected traits from the categories listed in article 9(1). Because these traits are 
deeply  personal,  they  can  be  expected  to  drive  individual  behaviour.  Therefore,  
pervasive  datafcation  could  result  in  data  sets  that  can  reveal  these  traits  for 
individual  data subjects  if  the data is  analysed.  For example,  it  has  been proven 
possible to discover expectant mothers by analysing shopping behaviour;383 ethnicity, 
religion  and  sexual  preference  can  be  inferred  from  what  individuals  “like”  on 
Facebook.384 Several authors have underscored the possible discriminatory efects of 
big data through automated decision-making or profling.385 New examples seem to 
appear regularly.386 These developments have given rise to the notion that algorithms 
can be biased and engage in discrimination against protected groups, cementing or 
382 Raphael Gellert and others, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Discrimination and Data 
Protection Legislations’ in Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimination and Privacy in the  
Information Society - Data Mining and Profling in Large Databases (Springer 2013) s 4.3.
383 Duhigg (n 116) chap. 8; Eric Siegel, Predictive Analytics: The Power to Predict Who Will 
Click, Buy, Lie, or Die (2 edition, Wiley 2016) 38–40.
384 Michal Kosinski, D Stillwell and T Graepel, ‘Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable 
from Digital Records of Human Behavior’ (2013) 110 Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 5802, 5803 <http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1218772110> accessed 20 
March 2019.
385 Richards (n 295) 1956–1958; Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, ‘Big Data for All: Privacy and 
User Control in the Age of Analytics’ (2013) 11 Northwestern Journal of Technology and 
Intellectual Property 239, 251–252 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractd2149364> accessed 21 
March 2019; Bart Willem Schermer, ‘The Limits of Privacy in Automated Profling and 
Data Mining’ (2011) 27 Computer Law & Security Review 45, 47 
<http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0267364910001767> accessed 20 March 2019; 
Brent Daniel Mittelstadt and others, ‘The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate’ 
(2016) 3 Big Data & Society 2053951716679679, 8–9 
<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2053951716679679> accessed 20 March 2019.
386 Siegel (n 383) ch 3.
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increasing their marginalisation: “(it) (t)urns out algorithms are racist”, but also sexist 
or a vector for homophobia, and more dangerous than killer robots.387
The GDPR was originally proposed in 2012. The EC intends it to be future proof for  
the decades to come.388 However, it was largely drafted before the efects and risks of 
datafcation became prominent in public consciousness.389 Since discrimination is one 
of these risks, this contribution aims to answer the following question:
How can complex systems science increase the understanding of the risks and 
remedies associated with datafcation for the efcacy of  anti-discrimination 
eforts in the GDPR?
This question is answered by addressing the following sub-questions:
• How does complex systems science help explain that datafcation enables the 
discerning of sensitive data?
• How does the processing of special categories of data pose a risk?
• How  can  datafcation  adversely  afect  the  GDPR  protections  against  the 
processing of sensitive data?
• How does datafcation undermine the GDPR protections against discriminatory 
profling?
• How could possible adverse efects of datafcation be mitigated or remedied?
387 Committee of Experts on Internet Intermediaries (MSI-NET), ‘Study on the Human Rights 
Dimensions of Algorithms (Second Draft)’ (Council of Europe 2017) MSI-NET(2016)06 rev 
17 <https://rm.coe.int/16806fe644> accessed 19 March 2019; Navneet Alang, ‘Turns Out 
Algorithms Are Racist’ [2017] The New Republic 
<https://newrepublic.com/article/144644/turns-algorithms-racist> accessed 19 March 
2019; Julia Angwin and others, ‘Machine Bias’ (ProPublica, 23 May 2016) 
<https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing> accessed 19 March 2019; Yilun Wang and Michal Kosinski, ‘Deep Neural 
Networks Are More Accurate than Humans at Detecting Sexual Orientation from Facial 
Images’ (2017) (in press) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
<https://osf.io/f3xr/> accessed 21 March 2019; Will Knight, ‘Google’s AI Chief Says Forget 
Elon Musk’s Killer Robots, and Worry about Bias in AI Systems Instead’ (MIT Technology 
Review, 3 October 2017) <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608986/forget-killer-
robotsbias-is-the-real-ai-danger/> accessed 20 March 2019.
388 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation’ (n 81) 104.
389 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 115).
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This chapter focuses primarily on the efects of datafcation for data subjects who are 
also consumers.390 The issue of  discrimination is  limited  to the grounds listed  as 
“special  categories of  personal  data”  in the GDPR.  Since this analysis is primarily 
focused on the legal aspects of  big data, theorems and terminology from complex 
systems  theory  are  presented  colloquially;  their  defnitions,  theoretical 
underpinnings, formal proofs or experimental results are provided as references.
5.2 Emergence as a fundamental property of complex systems
Our society is a typical complex system composed of many components, interacting 
on diferent scales and levels.391 For example, human beings, the main components of 
our society,  are complex systems themselves.392 They communicate with others in 
diferent forms of conversations, such as calling and emailing. Humans form larger-
scale  composites  (organizations,  communities  and  societies)  with  specifc 
complexities; these composites then associate and communicate with each other and 
with humans for both fun and proft.393 As a result of  datafcation, more and more 
such interactions are recorded and digitized by ubiquitous sensors (e.g.,  in smart 
phones), log fles of internet infrastructure elements, commercial transactions etc., 
basically turning many aspects of the lives of people and societies into big data. This  
data provides near real-time measures of  the aforementioned complex systems.  It  
contains patterns that can be used to fnd attributes that were previously difcult to 
detect.394
Many complex systems display so-called emergent properties. An emergent property 
is a property displayed by a complex system, that is not directly predictable from the 
390 “(A)ny natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes 
which are outside his trade, business or profession”: article 2(b), Council Directive 
93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Unfair Terms Directive), [1993] OJ L 95, 
p. 29-34.
391 Claudio J Tessone, ‘The Complex Nature of Social Systems’ in Bernardo Alves Furtado, 
Patricia AM Sakowski and Marina H Tóvolli (eds), Modeling Complex Systems for Public 
Policies (IPEA 2015); John H Holland, Complexity: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 
University Press 2014) ch 3.
392 Simon A Levin, ‘Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive Systems’ (1998) 1 
Ecosystems 431, 432.
393 Orlando Gomes, ‘The Economy as a Complex Object’ in Bernardo Alves Furtado, Patricia 
AM Sakowski and Marina H Tóvolli (eds), Modeling Complex Systems for Public Policies 
(IPEA 2015).
394 Bar-Yam (n 372) 11–12.
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properties  of  that  systems’  elements.395 In  the  context  of  this  chapter,  relevant 
examples of  an emergent property are distinguishable patterns  like a behavioural 
convention among members of a group, the response of the human body to illness 
that resembles other individuals’  responses,  or the segregation of  individuals into 
groups. Emergent properties of a complex system can become apparent by observing 
the entire system or by observing interactions between the elements in the system. 
The interactions within human societies are carried out through the behaviour of its 
individual elements: human beings. Human behaviour in turn is based on both our 
cognition and our biology.396 Human cognition perceives our environment, including 
others’ behaviour, values, beliefs, attitudes and intentions, and then to a large extent 
shapes our traits and social conventions, mainly through implicit or even automated 
processes; our biology guides other responses to our environment.397 Evidence shows 
that our cognition works “efortlessly, and even unintentionally”.398 Human behaviour 
is an emergent property of the human organism as a complex system; it lies at the root 
of conventions and segregation just as human biology lies at the root of our response 
to temperature changes or illness. Therefore, as datafcation covers more and more 
aspects of  our lives and society,  behavioural patterns of  cognition and biology are 
encoded in data.
One  of  the  fastest-developing  techniques  for  the  processing  of  data  is  Artifcial  
Intelligence  (AI).399 The performance of  AI  has  increasingly  been  proven to  beat 
human performance in certain felds, like playing Go and poker, making predictions, 
395 Holland (n 391) ch 6; Here, “emergence” is used as shorthand for “higher-level order”. Note 
that emergence has been called a “notoriously murky notion”. It is undecided whether it is 
related purely to human understanding or to underlying causality. Still, “If a system doesn’t 
exhibit higher-level order (…), it is not complex.” Ladyman, Lambert and Wiesner (n 374) 
40–41, 58–59.
396 Biological and psychosocial systems of humans count as complex systems. Bar-Yam (n 372) 
2–4.
397 James S Uleman, S Adil Saribay and Celia M Gonzalez, ‘Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit 
Impressions, and Implicit Theories’ (2008) 59 Annual Review of Psychology 329, 330 
<http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093707> accessed 21 
March 2019 and the referenced literature.
398 James S Uleman, Leonard S Newman and Gordon B Moskowitz, ‘People as Flexible 
Interpreters: Evidence and Issues from Spontaneous Trait Inference’ (1996) 28 Advances in 
experimental social psychology 211, 211 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065260108602397> accessed 5 
August 2017.
399 Nils J Nilsson, The Quest for Artifcial Intelligence (1 edition, Cambridge University Press 
2009).
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and judging human character.400 Machine learning, a major subfeld of AI, provides a 
number  of  cost-efective  algorithms  aiming  to  make  sense  of  big  data.401 Such 
algorithms are roughly divided into three diferent categories:  supervised learning, 
unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning.402 Supervised learning comprises 
techniques that predict the value of  a target variable given an input variable.  An 
example is the automated recognition of  handwriting in US ZIP codes: since each 
element of a ZIP code is a digit, predictions for each digit can be limited to an integer  
with a target value between 0 and 9. In unsupervised learning,  the aim is to fnd 
patterns in the data such that certain variables can be identifed. An example is the 
analysis  of  a  large  customer  database  to  fnd  groups  of  “similar”  customers  for 
achieving  market  segmentation,  without  identifying  those  segments  in  advance. 
Finally,  in reinforcement learning,  a certain goal  is  pursued in a dynamic process 
without knowing beforehand whether or not the approach will lead to reaching the 
goal,  and  the  learning  process  is  driven  by  feedbacks.  An  example  would  be 
developing an algorithm predicting the best possible next move in a turn-based game 
like Go by playing a large number of games to their conclusion.
Just  like  the  complex  systems  they  analyse  and  represent,  machine  learning 
algorithms can exhibit emergent properties in their output. This appears to be the 
underlying cause of algorithms’ perceived bias: if an algorithm is trained using biased 
400 AR Guess, ‘Artifcial Intelligence Had a Breakthrough Year in 2015’ (DATAVERSITY, 9 
December 2015) <http://www.dataversity.net/artifcial-intelligence-had-a-breakthrough-
year-in-2015/> accessed 20 March 2019; Tonya Riley, ‘Artifcial Intelligence Goes Deep to 
Beat Humans at Poker’ (Science, 3 March 2017) 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/artifcial-intelligence-goes-deep-beat-
humans-poker>; BBC News, ‘Artifcial Intelligence: Google’s AlphaGo Beats Go Master Lee 
Se-Dol’ (BBC News, 12 March 2016) <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35785875> 
accessed 19 March 2019; Navin Sharma and others, ‘Predicting Solar Generation from 
Weather Forecasts Using Machine Learning’, Smart Grid Communications 
(SmartGridComm), 2011 IEEE International Conference on (IEEE 2011) 551 
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6102379/> accessed 20 March 2019; 
Stephen F Weng and others, ‘Can Machine-Learning Improve Cardiovascular Risk 
Prediction Using Routine Clinical Data?’ (2017) 12 PLOS ONE e0174944, 9 
<http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?idd10.1371/journal.pone.0174944> accessed 21 
March 2019; Wu Youyou, Michal Kosinski and David Stillwell, ‘Computer-Based 
Personality Judgments Are More Accurate than Those Made by Humans’ (2015) 112 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 1036, 1039 
<http://www.pnas.org/content/112/4/1036> accessed 21 March 2019.
401 Peter Flach, Machine Learning: The Art and Science of Algorithms That Make Sense of Data 
(1 edition, Cambridge University Press 2012).
402 Christopher M Bishop, Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning (Springer 2006) 3.
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data, this bias can be reflected in its output.403 This can be understood as follows. 
Human behaviour is  characterised by traits  and views at the scale of  individuals, 
groups  and  entire  societies.  Shared  traits  lead  people  to  associations,  or  the 
presumption of  attributes,  in accordance with those traits.  These associations can 
develop conventions that are, in turn, expressed in individual and collective human 
behaviour. When applied to data sets resulting from datafcation, machine learning 
algorithms can build a mathematical representation of these traits, conventions and 
behaviours. Therefore, if these algorithms are then used to assign attributes to data 
subjects,  these attributes  may reflect these traits,  conventions and  behaviours.  If 
controllers  use  the  assigned  attributes  in  such  a  way  that  data  subjects  sharing 
protected traits are treated diferently, this can have discriminatory efects. In those 
cases, algorithms can be said to be “racist”, “sexist”, or otherwise biased against groups 
of  data subjects sharing  protected traits  in the sense that these data subjects are 
treated diferently when compared to other data subjects with otherwise similar traits. 
For example, extending special rebates to consumers who have bought alcohol but not 
to  others,  could  be  seen  as  discrimination  against  consumers  who do not  drink 
alcohol for religious reasons.
Thus, we propose that the concept of emergence can provide insights relevant to the 
subject of EU anti-discrimination law in relation to data processing algorithms. These 
insights are especially relevant to data subjects: being unaware of the information that 
controllers can obtain through algorithms can make it difcult to detect or escape 
discriminatory efects. Several instances of the successful deduction of sensitive traits 
from non-sensitive data have been published. For example, Kosinski et al. found that 
gender, racial origin, sexual orientation, political opinions and religious beliefs can be 
predicted by Facebook “likes” with more than 80% accuracy.404 Seneviratne et al. show 
that they can predict users’ religion (and some non-sensitive traits) with over 90% 
precision in some cases by taking a snapshot of  the apps that data subjects have 
downloaded to their smartphones.405
403 Jieyu Zhao and others, ‘Men Also Like Shopping: Reducing Gender Bias Amplifcation 
Using Corpus-Level Constraints’, arXiv:1707.09457 [cs, stat] (2017) s 3 
<http://arxiv.org/abs/1707.09457> accessed 21 March 2019.
404 Kosinski, Stillwell and Graepel (n 384) 5803.
405 Suranga Seneviratne and others, ‘Predicting User Traits from a Snapshot of Apps Installed 
on a Smartphone’ (2014) 18 Mobile Computing and Communications Review 1, 6 
<http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?idd2636244> accessed 20 March 2019.
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Avoiding  possibly  discriminatory  efects  of  algorithms  is  difcult  for  both  data 
subjects and controllers because emergence is a fundamental property of  complex 
systems. It is virtually impossible to eliminate all possible emergent properties from a 
data set because these properties may not be known in advance and they are captured 
in  innocuous  individual  data  points.  External  triggers  are  not  necessary  for 
emergence.406 Extensive eforts have been made to understand emergence, resulting 
in theories and tools for complex systems such as nonlinear dynamics, fractal theory, 
and  agent-based  modelling.407 Based  on  these  eforts,  Feng  et  al.  proposed  a 
theoretical  framework  to  understand  why  machine  learning  algorithms  can 
successfully  identify  patterns  from  the  data  containing  the  information  of 
interactions within the complex system. They argue that by introducing non-linear 
interactions and optimization, machine learning algorithms themselves are complex 
systems, assimilating the dynamics of  pattern formation from the complex system 
they represent.408 They also pointed out that the more exhaustive the available data, 
the  more  accurately  the  patterns  will  be  identifed:  increasing  datafcation  will  
therefore increase the risk of the discovery of patterns coinciding with sensitive traits.
Thus in the era of datafcation, it may be unavoidable that large data sets will contain 
patterns coinciding with sensitive traits because they cover “activities resulting from 
(protected) opinions or beliefs”.409 If these patterns can be found in collections of non-
sensitive data, the safeguards against the processing of sensitive data may become less 
efective.
406 Damon Centola and Andrea Baronchelli, ‘The Spontaneous Emergence of Conventions: An 
Experimental Study of Cultural Evolution’ (2015) 112 Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 1989, 1989 <http://www.pnas.org/content/112/7/1989> accessed 19 March 2019 
and S5 in the Supporting Information.
407 For examples, see Stephen H Kellert, In the Wake of Chaos: Unpredictable Order in 
Dynamical Systems (University of Chicago press 1994); Jean-Francois Gouyet and B 
Mandelbrot, Physics and Fractal Structures (1 edition, Springer 1996); Volker Grimm and 
others, ‘Pattern-Oriented Modeling of Agent-Based Complex Systems: Lessons from 
Ecology’ (2005) 310 Science 987 <http://science.sciencemag.org/content/310/5750/987> 
accessed 20 March 2019.
408 Qing Yi Feng and others, ‘An Exploratory Statistical Approach to Depression Pattern 
Identifcation’ (2013) 392 Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 889, 894 
<http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0378437112009211> accessed 19 March 2019. 
For a formal treatment of the same thesis: Bar-Yam (n 372) ch 2 (especially pages 296-297).
409 Council of Europe (n 72) para 44.
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5.3 Exploring the risk of sensitive data
The French “Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fchiers et aux 
libertés” is likely the frst instance where special  categories of  personal  data were 
codifed in Europe. Article 31 requires consent for the processing of  personal data 
regarding “racial origin, political,  philosophical or religious opinion or trade union 
membership”. The preparatory report accompanying the legislative proposal ofered 
the following rationale: “The essential idea is not so much to prohibit the processing 
of [sensitive data], as to open a right to direct control to the citizen on the use of the 
data he has provided.”410 From this,  it  seems reasonable to infer that the consent 
requirement was introduced to reduce the risk that data subjects lose control over 
their sensitive data.
Article 6 of the 1980 Council of Europe Convention no. 108 (“Strasbourg Convention”) 
added  data regarding  health and  sexual  life to this list.411 The explanatory report 
associated with the Convention states that “there are exceptional  cases where the 
processing of certain categories of data is as such likely to lead to encroachments on 
individual rights and interests” (emphasis added). The COE Member States agreed 
that this was true for all the characteristics listed in article 6.412 This agreement is 
likely based on the persecution of religious and ethnic minorities, disabled persons 
and trade union members in Europe during the period 1933-1945. Even though the 
COE Member States agreed on the types of data of which processing could lead to 
encroachments on individual  rights,  they did apparently not agree on the risk,  as 
article 6 contains no remedy. It leaves the choice of the appropriate safeguards to the 
Member States.
Article 8 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive harmonised the special categories of 
data for all EU member states and codifed a number of exceptions and safeguards 
regarding its processing.413 Article 8 allows processing sensitive data based on the data 
subject’s  consent  (art.  8(2)(a)).  Additionally,  the  directive  provides  a  number  of 
410 M Foyer, ‘Projet de Loi (No 2516) et Propositions de Loi (Nos 1004 et 3092)’ (Assemblé 
Nationale 1977) 3125 13 <http://www.senat.fr/rap/l77-3125/l77-31251.pdf> accessed 19 March 
2019.
411 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, done at Strasbourg 28 January 1981, ETS 108.
412 Council of Europe (n 72) 9.
413 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ 1995 L 281/31.
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possible cases where the benefts may outweigh the risks, like the processing of health 
data for public health purposes (art. 8(3)). It also provides common-sense exceptions, 
like  the  processing  of  membership  information  by  trade  unions  and  religious 
institutions (8(2)(d)) and the processing of information that data subjects themselves 
have “manifestly made public” (8(2)(e)). It also opens an avenue for member states to 
codify exceptions in national  law “for reasons of  substantial  public interest”  (art.  
8(4)).  Article  9  of  the  GDPR  is  essentially  equivalent,  with  a  small  number  of 
additions. In EU law, the processing of sensitive data is generally forbidden, unless it  
is specifcally allowed; at the same time, the “substantial public interest” provision 
ofers considerable discretion to Member States.
Article 9 of the GDPR and its predecessors ofer a typically European view on what  
kinds  of  personal  data  count  as  sensitive.  The  1980  OECD  Recommendation 
“Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows 
of  Personal Data” does not contain a similar provision. Instead, it states: “[…] it is  
debatable  to  what  extent  people  belonging  to  a  particular  group  (i.e.  mentally 
disabled persons, immigrants, ethnic minorities) need additional protection against 
the dissemination of information relating to that group.”414 Similarly, the 2013 revised 
OECD  recommendation  does  not  contain  a  provision  resembling  art.  6  of  the 
Strasbourg  Convention.415 The United  States,  for example,  does  not proscribe the 
processing of data regarding ethnicity or religious beliefs.416
If  Baldwin is right that regulation is “inherently about the control  of  risks”417,  the 
open-ended number of possible exceptions makes it difcult to pinpoint the risk that 
article 9(1) GDPR aims to control. One risk easily associated with the processing of  
sensitive data is that of discrimination and unfair treatment. However, discrimination 
is  already  directly  addressed  in  European  (EU  and  COE)  and  national  non-
414 Council of the OECD (n 69) para 32.
415 Council of the OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data - C(80)58/FINAL, as Amended on 11 July 2013 by 
C(2013)79’ (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013) 17 
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf> accessed 19 March 
2019.
416 ‘The US has no special category of “sensitive data” but US privacy law does protect certain 
forms of data more stringently (health, fnancial).’ Daniel J Solove, ‘What Is Sensitive Data? 
Diferent Defnitions in Privacy Law’ (Privacy + Security Blog, 31 July 2014) 
<https://teachprivacy.com/sensitive-data-diferent-defnitions-privacy-law/> accessed 20 
March 2019.
417 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (n 82) 83.
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discrimination legislation with its own doctrine and an associated body of  human 
rights case-law in the area of  administrative,  commercial  and criminal  law.418 The 
original rationale for article 21 of the aforementioned “Law n° 78-17” was to ofer an 
opportunity for control to the data subject; this indicates that the perceived risk was 
inherent  in  collection,  processing  and  dissemination  of  sensitive  personal  data 
unbeknownst to the data subject.419 In circumstances where information asymmetries 
are relatively small, for example where a limited number of controllers process simple 
lists of  names and attributes,  consent arguably ofers an adequate opportunity for 
control. But in the era of  datafcation, individual data subjects have to deal with a 
large number of controllers420 processing large volumes of data, which is processed by 
algorithms unknown to the data subject.  Furthermore,  data subjects  may not be 
aware that algorithmic processing of non-sensitive personal data can reveal sensitive 
traits. This information asymmetry may limit the efectiveness of the “opportunity of 
control” that consent can provide. Data subjects face high costs of information if they 
want to carefully assess all the situations where they want to specifcally allow the 
processing of their data.421
The risk assessment behind the general  prohibition of  art.  9(1)  GDPR appears to 
embody some ambiguity. It seems unlikely that the EU legislator intended to allow 
discrimination based on ethnic origin, religious beliefs or health status, if only a data 
subject  had  “direct  control”  over  this  use  of  personal  data.  At  the  same  time, 
compliance with the GDPR (for example by obtaining consent) is considered to ofer 
enough protection to allow the free movement of sensitive data within the EU and 
towards a number of other jurisdictions where the European Commission fnds data 
protection  law  “adequate”  (articles  1(3)  and  45(1)).422 This  seems  to  represent  a 
justifable trade-of. The processing of sensitive data may have risks, but it also has 
useful  public  and  private  sector  applications.  This  indicates  that  datafcation  is 
another example of the risks associated with Beck’s notion of the Risk Society:
418 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and European Court of Human Rights (n 
90).
419 Foyer (n 410) 13. See also Daniel J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 U. Pa. L. Rev 
477, 483–558.
420 Schermer and Wagemans (n 307) 40.
421 McDonald and Cranor (n 144) 562.
422 European Commission, ‘Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Non-EU 
Countries’ (n 208).
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“a central contradiction of risk society results from the fact that the 
world is confronted with large-scale threats whose origin lies in the 
triumphs of modern society (more industry, new technologies), threats 
which, in view of the institutionalized state promise of security, can 
nevertheless neither be adequately confrmed nor attributed, nor 
compensated, nor (preventively) managed in accordance with prevailing 
legal, scientifc and political principles.”423
On point as Beck’s analysis is, it ofers no concrete perspective on risk management. 
To this end, Klinke and Renn have proposed a classifcation method for the evaluation 
and management of  modern risks.424 This method is useful  to assess whether the 
GDPR’s management methods relating to sensitive data are in line with the risk. From 
the fact that sensitive data are treated more strictly than other data, we can assume 
that the EU legislator estimated the risks emanating from the processing of this data 
to be higher than those from the processing of other types of personal data. But from 
the trade-of visible in the strategy associated with sensitive data, it seems reasonable 
to presume that the EU legislator has no clear view of the damage potential. For those 
risk  types,  Klinke and Renn have chosen the name “Pythia”  after the ambiguous 
prophecies of  the Oracle at Delphi in ancient Greece.425 This risk class requires a 
precaution-based management strategy, consisting of:
“Containment of application in space and time, constant monitoring of 
potential side efects, development of functional equivalents, promoting 
diversity and flexibility and capacity building for organizational 
competence (…)”426
However, the consent requirement of article 9 GDPR suggests that the EU legislator 
also  aims  to  enable  data  subjects  to  participate  in  the  decision-making  process 
regarding the processing of  their sensitive data. This strategy corresponds with the 
“Medusa” risk class, where the damage potential is known, the disaster potential is  
low,  but  social  mobilisation  is  high.  This  risk  class  requires  a  discourse-based 
management strategy, consisting of:
423 Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (Polity Press 2009) 30.
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“building up consciousness, building confdence, strengthening 
trustworthiness in regulatory bodies, and initiating collective eforts of 
institutions for taking responsibility.”427
When dealing with the risks of the processing of sensitive data, the GDPR appears to 
incorporate a majority of the elements of a precautionary strategy, consistent with a 
Pythia-type risk, although some elements have a stronger presence than others.428 The 
principle of data minimisation (art. 5(1)(c)) promotes containment in space and time. 
Independent supervisory authorities (arts. 51-59) provide constant monitoring. The 
less stringent criteria for non-sensitive data could be construed as an incentive for 
controllers  to  fnd  alternatives  for  the  processing  of  sensitive  data  because  it 
encourages the development of functional equivalents. The pressures of competition 
in  the free market  can be seen as  an incentive for “investments  in  diversity and 
flexibility” and the obligation in specifc cases to employ a data protection ofcer (art.  
37-39 GDPR) aims to promote organisational competence.
Elements of  a discourse-based strategy are less prominently visible in the GDPR. 
“Building up consciousness” for data subjects appears to be limited to giving consent.  
The  GDPR  aims  to  achieve  the  trustworthiness  of  regulatory  bodies  mainly  by 
requiring independence for the Independent Supervisory Authorities and avoiding 
discourse:  these  Authorities  need  not  consult  data  subjects  for  policy  decisions. 
Similarly, the introduction of seals and marks (article 42-43 GDPR) does not require 
controllers or supervisory authorities to involve data subjects; data protection impact 
assessments could involve the participation of data subjects or their representatives, 
but only “where appropriate” and “without prejudice to the protection of commercial 
or public interests or the security of processing operations” (art. 36(9)). Supervisory 
authorities have no obligation to engage in collective eforts with other regulatory 
bodies in the feld of anti-discrimination law or consumer law.
In conclusion, the GDPR appears to see the processing of sensitive data as posing a 
higher risk than the processing of other personal data. The associated management 
strategy  is  both  precaution-based  and  –  in  a  limited  way,  through  the  consent 
requirement – discourse-based. Applying Klinke and Renn’s model does therefore not 
lead  to  an  unambiguous  risk  classifcation  and  the  rationale  for  the  proposed 
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GDPR appears to be incomplete: it does not account for the fact that the risks that 
article 9 aims to address can also occur as a result of the processing of non-sensitive  
data. The next sections will ofer two examples.
5.4 First example: Discovering protected traits in complex 
systems
As a frst example, three scenarios serve to illustrate the possibility that non-sensitive 
data can reveal sensitive traits.
Firstly,  a  number of  explicit  conventions  associated  with  protected  traits  can  be 
detected by comparing consumer behaviour to publicly observable features.  As an 
example,  if  consumers  observe religious  food  and  drink  prohibitions or religious 
holidays, their shopping patterns will reflect this convention through the presence or 
absence of  certain products,  and  through peaks or dips  in  acquired  quantities  at 
predefned intervals. More short-lived conventions are also known to coincide with 
protected traits: retail brands can acquire temporary popularity among certain ethnic 
groups.429 A data set containing dates and timestamps for retail  transactions with 
product codes (and quantities, where applicable) linked to unique personal identifers 
sufces  to  extract  the  protected  traits  of  “religious  or  philosophical  beliefs”  and 
“ethnic origin” whenever the customer can be linked to the identifer.
In a second scenario, a controller can ask a limited number of consumers to consent 
with the processing of sensitive data. Based on their consent, the controller can search 
for emergent patterns coinciding with known sensitive traits. If a pattern is found, a 
controller can then induce sensitive information about other data subjects without 
processing their sensitive data. As an example, Duhigg documented how analysis of 
buying patterns revealed that consumers who voluntarily shared information on their 
429 Center for Disease Control, ‘Cigarette Brand Preference Among Middle and High School 
Students Who Are Established Smokers - United States, 2004 and 2006’ (2009) 58 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 112, 112–113 
<https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5805a3.htm> accessed 19 March 
2019; quoting Ofce of Applied Studies, ‘Cigarette Brand Preferences in 2005’ (United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Administration 2007) Short reports <https://www.datafles.samhsa.gov/study-
publication/cigarette-brand-preferences-2005-nid15156> accessed 20 March 2019; Jennifer 
Cullen and others, ‘Seven-Year Patterns in US Cigar Use Epidemiology Among Young 
Adults Aged 18–25 Years: A Focus on Race/Ethnicity and Brand’ (2011) 101 American Journal 
of Public Health 1955 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3222378/> 
accessed 19 March 2019.
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pregnancy and  due date,  bought  “unusually  large  quantities  of  unscented  lotion 
around the beginning of their second trimester”. This information was then used to 
single out other consumers, who had also started buying unscented lotion at a certain 
time, and target them with advertising for products related to pregnancy and new-
borns. Special care was taken to hide the fact that the controller had discovered an 
indicator for pregnancy.430
A third scenario entails observing emergent patterns from direct interactions between 
humans. Especially where people use automated platforms for communication, these 
interactions can be observed and analysed because many events on the network are 
logged by the software controlling the network choke points. This often happens for 
billing  purposes  and  to  detect  errors  and  fraud.431 Madan et  al.  have  found  that 
analysis of the number of interactions between mobile phones and choke points can 
reveal  patterns  that  coincide  with  depression  and  influenza;  knowledge  of  the 
contents of the interactions is not necessary. For this analysis, they again processed 
sensitive data for a limited number of data subjects to match the interaction patterns 
with sensitive information.432
5.4.1 Complex systems theory and the observation of emergence from 
non-sensitive personal data
This example of discovering sensitive traits in complex systems concerns supervised 
learning: a controller uses the input data to predict any number of known attributes 
of data subjects to identify a correspondence with a known (emergent) property. In 
the scenarios resembling those mentioned at the beginning of this section, fnding 
emergent  properties  usually  happens  in  three  stages.  In  the  training  stage,  an 
algorithm is designed or optimised using  part of  an existing  data set to discover 
relevant  patterns  that  correspond  to  known properties.  In  the  testing  stage,  the 
resulting  algorithm  is  used  on  the  remainder  of  the  existing  data  to  verify  its 
efciency. In the deployment stage, “new” personal data is mined for occurrence of 
430 Duhigg (n 116) 194–195; 209–210. The technique is known as pattern mining following 
feature extraction: Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimination and Privacy in the 
Information Society - Data Mining and Profling in Large Databases (Springer 2013) 36–39.
431 “It’s impossible to overstate the importance of logging.” Prevelakis and Spinellis (n 257) 31.
432 Anmol Madan and others, ‘Sensing the “Health State” of a Community’ (2012) 11 IEEE 
Pervasive Computing 36, 38–39 <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6072198/> accessed 
20 March 2019.
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the pattern identifed in the training stage.433 Assuming that the pattern identifes a 
single property, recognition of the pattern in personal data is equivalent to assigning 
the property to an identifable natural person, with bias as a possible result.434
However, during the training stage, the processing of sensitive data is often necessary 
because the emergent property can be known to be sensitive. In such cases, a valid 
procedural safeguard from art. 9(2) GDPR is required to lawfully process the data. 
Note that if the patterns coinciding with sensitive traits are public knowledge, as is 
the case with published scientifc results or well-known conventions, discovery may 
not trigger this prohibition. For example, instead of asking shoppers to disclose their 
pregnancy status, a controller could be inspired by scientifc knowledge to look for 
shifts  in  buying  patterns  toward  unscented  lotions  in  order  to  fnd  pregnant 
customers.435 In  the testing  and  deployment stages,  recognising  these patterns  in 
subsequently acquired data no longer directly requires the processing  of  sensitive 
data.
5.4.2 Lawfulness of pattern recognition under the prohibition of 
article 9(1) GDPR
If  controllers use pattern recognition algorithms to directly compile a list of  data 
subjects with their associated protected traits, this constitutes a violation of art. 9(1)  
GDPR. However, if no such list is compiled, the lawfulness of the processing of such 
data is less clear. Art. 9(1) reads:
“Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, 
and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of 
uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data 
concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited.”
433 Toon Calders and Indrė Žliobaitė, ‘Why Unbiased Computational Processes Can Lead to 
Discriminative Decision Procedures’ in Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimination and 
Privacy in the Information Society - Data Mining and Profling in Large Databases (Springer 
2013) 43–45. Some processes include validation and/or testing stages; in those cases, the 
training data is subdivided in several sets.
434 Zhao and others (n 403); Wang and Kosinski (n 387).
435 Steven Nordin and others, ‘A Longitudinal Descriptive Study of Self-Reported Abnormal 
Smell and Taste Perception in Pregnant Women’ (2004) 29 Chemical Senses 391 
<https://academic.oup.com/chemse/article/29/5/391/368321/A-Longitudinal-Descriptive-
Study-of-Self-reported> accessed 13 February 2019.
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However,  it  is unclear from this text whether “revealing”  refers to “processing”,  to 
“personal  data”,  or to both. If  it refers to “processing” or to both “processing” and 
“personal  data”,  the  GDPR’s  wide  defnition  of  processing  would  bring  pattern 
recognition in big data under the ambit of the prohibition. After all, “processing” is  
defned as “any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or 
on sets of personal data (…) (art. 4(2)). Only if “revealing” refers to “personal data”,  
the data itself would need to explicitly enumerate sensitive traits for the prohibition 
to be directly applicable.
Recital 51 could help to resolve this ambiguity. It appears to indicate that “revealing” 
in article 9(1) should be interpreted as referring only to “personal data”:
“Personal data which are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in 
relation to fundamental rights and freedoms merit specifc protection as 
the context of their processing could create signifcant risks to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Those personal data should include 
personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, …”
However, according to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Nilsson and 
others case, a non-binding text such as a recital “cannot be relied on as a ground for 
derogating  from  the  actual  provisions  of  the  act  in  question”.436 A  data  subject 
claiming  that  revealing  a  sensitive  trait  through  pattern  recognition  triggers  the 
prohibition of art. 9(1) will experience an infringement of his data protection rights if 
a court uses the recitals to allow the practice under art. 9(1).
A controller or data subject profcient in other languages than English might study 
other versions to resolve the ambiguity. But it turns out that not all language versions 
of the GDPR convey the same message. The French text of art. 9(1) is clear: pattern 
recognition falls under article 9(1). In the sentence:
“Le traitement des données à caractère personnel qui révèle l'origine 
raciale ou ethnique, (…)”,
“qui révèle” agrees in number with “traitement” and not with “des données à caractère 
personnel”, indicating that the prohibition applies if the processing reveals sensitive 
traits, and not just if the data enumerates them. The German text of article 9(1) is also 
unambiguous, but it states the opposite. In the sentence:
436 Case 162/97 Nilsson and Others [1998] ECR I-07477, para 54.
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“Die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten, aus denen die rassische 
und ethnische Herkunft (…) hervorgehen (…)”
“denen” agrees in number with “Daten” and not with “Verarbeitung”, indicating that 
the prohibition only applies if the data themselves enumerate sensitive traits.
To be fair, in English, French as well as German, recital 51 of the GDPR indicates that 
the concept of sensitivity applies to the quality of the data. But this may be of little 
help in the light of the Nilsson and others decision. Moreover, no EU language takes 
precedence over any other. English, French and German are all ofcial languages of 
the European Union, but they share this status with all other ofcial languages of the 
EU  Member  States.437 Therefore,  inconsistencies  cannot  be  resolved  by  merely 
comparing diferent language versions.
Article 9 is the successor of article 8 in the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD). This 
text contains similar – yet diferent – inconsistencies across the diferent language 
versions. Like recital 51 of the GDPR, recital 33 of the DPD indicates that only data – 
not processing – can have a sensitive nature in English, French and German, but once 
more the English version of article 8(1) DPD is ambiguous. The German and French 
version both link “revealing” to sensitive data.  This means that the French text of 
article 8(1) DPD has a diferent meaning from that of article 9(1) of the GDPR in the 
same language.
Despite this possible confusion, the case law of the European Court of Justice provides 
conclusive evidence supporting the thesis that “revealing” refers to “personal data” 
and not to “processing”, at least as indicated by the 1995 Directive. In Bodil Lindqvist, 
the Court considered that the expression “data concerning health” must be given a 
wide interpretation; it then refers to “the fact that an individual has injured her foot 
(…)” constitutes medical data. This information was published on a web page, which 
means that it was also “processed” in the terms of art. 2(b) of the Directive, but this 
processing was not considered in determining whether art. 8(1) applied.438 The Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party has interpreted article 8 in a similar vein.439 Until 
437 Art. 1, Regulation no. 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community, [1958] OJ L17/385, as most recently amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 
1791/2006, [2006] OJ L363/1.
438 Case 101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12992, paras 50-51, see also Case T-190/10 Egan and  
Hackett v European Parliament [2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:165, para 101.
439 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on Online Behavioural 
Advertising’ (2010) 00909/10/EN WP 171 19.
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the ECJ adopts a new interpretation for the GDPR, we can therefore conclude that the 
test whether sensitive traits are revealed, should be applied to properties enumerated 
in the personal data, and not to forms of processing.
Mining data for sensitive traits may violate the principles of fairness, transparency, 
purpose limitation and minimisation in article 5(1) GDPR, and controllers who fail to 
disclose that they are mining personal data for sensitive traits violate data subjects’ 
right to access and information as described in art. 15(1) GDPR. We explore these risks 
in more detail in section 5.6, because they also apply to the discriminatory efects of 
profling, which we discuss in the next section.
5.5 Second example: Discriminatory profling in complex 
systems
The GDPR defnes profling as “any form of automated processing of personal data 
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a 
natural  person,  in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural 
person's  performance  at  work,  economic  situation,  health,  personal  preferences, 
interests,  reliability,  behaviour,  location  or  movements”  (article  4(4)).  The  term 
therefore applies both to creating profles relating to natural persons and creating 
profling information based on anonymous data and subsequently matching natural 
persons to those profles.440
Profling serves many useful and legitimate purposes. In education, profling based on 
datafcation  of  interactions  between students,  materials  and  teachers  could  help 
optimise remedial teaching eforts, identify the most efective training materials or 
methods, and generally ofer a learning environment more focused on the individual 
student  without  the  need  to  increase  the  number  of  educators.  In  medicine, 
datafcation of vital signs and treatments could help identify patterns that are both 
relevant  to  diagnosis  or  treatment,  and  non-obvious  when  observing  a  single 
440 This defnition matches that of Wim Schreurs, Mireille Hildebrandt and MichaMl 
Vanfleteren, ‘Cogitas, Ergo Sum. The Role of Data Protection Law and Non-Discrimination 
Law in Group Profling in the Private Sector’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth 
(eds), Profling the European Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Softcover reprint of 
hardcover 1st ed 2008 edition, Springer 2008) 241: “Profling is the process of ‘discovering’ 
correlations between data in databases that can be used to identify and represent a subject 
and/or the application of profles (sets of correlated data) to individuate and represent a 
subject or to identify a subject as a member of a group or category.”
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patient.441 In  social  security settings,  analysis  could  help assess  the right  support 
mechanisms  for  people  in  need,  whilst  reducing  the  risk  of  free-riding.  In 
employment settings, datafcation could increase productivity. All these opportunities 
could  represent  signifcant  reductions  in  collective  expenses  or  increased  private 
proft. However, profling could also lead to discrimination based on sensitive traits. 
Two classes of scenarios serve to illustrate this possibility.
For  the  frst  class  of  scenarios,  consider  Cathy  O’Neil’s  example  of  St.  George’s 
Hospital Medical School. The screening of applications for eligibility was originally 
performed by specialised screening staf. In the 1970s, the school wished to partly 
automate the selection or rejection of applications in order to both increase efciency 
and remove some of the capriciousness inherent in human judgment. A large volume 
of applications and corresponding admission/rejection decisions from previous years 
was  used  as  training  data.  This  resulted  in  a  number of  patterns  that  could  be 
recognised through automated processing.  A new batch of  applications was then 
matched  against  these  patterns.  The  resulting  algorithm  was  partially  based  on 
screeners’ tendency to reject applications that contained many grammatical mistakes. 
As  it  turned  out,  “birthplaces  and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  surnames”  could  predict 
grammatical  correctness  to  a  useful  extent  –  they turned  out  to  be features  for 
grammatical  correctness.442 Therefore,  these  features  were  used  in  the  decision 
making process. This led to a signifcantly lower chance of acceptance for applicants 
born abroad or living in immigrant neighbourhoods – two features correlated with 
sensitive traits like religion or ethnicity. In 1988, St. George’s Hospital Medical School 
was fned for racial and gender discrimination as a result of using the algorithm.443
For the second class of scenarios, consider a bank performing risk analysis for loans 
and mortgages based not on previous risk assessments, but on past performance for 
previously issued similar loans. Based on geographical similarity, for example, a bank 
could decide not to ofer mortgages based on area codes (ZIP codes), or only ofer 
them under less  favourable conditions,  because the default rate in those areas  is 
higher. This rule would not be based on the processing of sensitive data. But if  the 
441 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 1) ch 4; C McGregor, ‘Big Data in Neonatal Intensive 
Care’ (2013) 46 IEEE Computer 54.
442 See Flach (n 401) ch 10 on features and feature selection methods.
443 This scenario is described in O’Neil (n 268) 115–117; See also: Great Britain Commission for 
Racial Equality, Medical School Admissions: Report of a Formal Investigation Into St. 
George’s Hospital Medical School (Commission for Racial Equality 1988).
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afected areas include racially segregated neighbourhoods,444 such a decision making 
process can be a source of indirect discrimination based on a sensitive trait. Similar 
examples could be applicable in the context of education, health care, employment 
and other areas.445
5.5.1 Complex systems theory and discrimination through profling
Profling  with  non-obvious  discriminatory  efects  is  an  example  of  unsupervised 
learning: the controller does not necessarily know in advance by which traits data 
subjects will be grouped, but only that the members of each group will have some 
undetermined  similarity.  In  the two classes  of  scenarios  above,  the  cause of  the 
discriminatory outcome is diferent.
In  the  example  of  St.  George’s,  the  algorithm  that  was  built  on  previous 
acceptance/rejection data reflected human decision-making processes whose results 
coincided with an emergent property, namely that immigrants and people born in an 
immigrant community not only have more difculty writing grammatically correct 
English, but also tend to live near each other.446 The algorithm therefore introduced 
bias  in  the automated  selection process.  In  the example of  assessing  the risk  of 
mortgages based on area code, the data itself is not biased but the algorithms used to 
generate profling parameters may lead to outcomes indirectly representing protected 
traits: an emergent property is represented in data capture. If a controller then uses 
the data for profling under the assumption the data ofers a neutral representation of 
the relevant properties of data subjects, biased decisions may be the result.
In  cases  where  data  is  obtained  through  datafcation  of  a  complex  system,  a 
sufciently sophisticated algorithm can present itself  to us as a complex system.447 
444 In terms of complex systems, segregation can be an emergent property of a city. Thomas C 
Schelling, ‘Dynamic Models of Segregation’ (1971) 1 Journal of mathematical sociology 143, 
181.
445 Executive Ofce of the President, ‘Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems, 
Opportunity, and Civil Rights’ (Executive Ofce of the President 2016) 10–22 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/fles/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_dat
a_discrimination.pdf> accessed 13 February 2019.
446 Dino Pedreschi, Salvatore Ruggieri and Franco Turini, ‘The Discovery of Discrimination’ in 
Bart Custers and others (eds), Discrimination and Privacy in the Information Society - Data  
Mining and Profling in Large Databases (Springer 2013) 95–96; O’Neil (n 268) ch 6.
447 Bar-Yam (n 372) ch 2; Hema R Madala and Aleksei Grigoevich Ivakhnenko, Inductive 
Learning Algorithms for Complex Systems Modeling (CRC Press 1994) 285–287; Ladyman, 
Lambert and Wiesner (n 374).
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This can cause emergence in the results of the algorithm that mirrors properties of 
the system under datafcation, including emergence resulting from behaviour that is 
induced  by sensitive traits.448 A data controller may not  be aware of  bias  in  the 
resulting  profling  decisions  because  the  processing  of  sensitive  data  would  be 
required for their verifcation, and such processing could be unlawful. Ironically, the 
prohibition in article 9(1) GDPR may therefore prevent the discovery of the resulting 
indirect discrimination.449
Discovering discriminatory efects of algorithms without direct verifcation is largely 
an  unsolved  problem.  The  opacity  of  artifcial  neural  networks,  a  widely  used 
classifcation  method,  is  well-documented.450 Datafcation  results  in  data  sets 
sufering from the “Curse of  dimensionality”.451 This curse makes classifcation (an 
important goal  of  big  data analytics)  difcult;  overcoming this difculty within a 
reasonable amount of computing time can involve methods that increase the opacity 
of  the algorithm even further.452 This makes it almost impossible for humans (data 
subjects,  data  controllers  and  independent  supervisory  authorities)  to  detect 
unintentional indirect discrimination through profling without directly processing 
sensitive data of the profled data subjects. The fact that profling algorithms deserve 
protection  as  intellectual  property  or  trade  secrets  (recital  63  GDPR)  can  make 
discovery by data subjects or their representatives even more difcult.
5.5.2 Lawfulness of profling based on emergent properties under 
article 22 GDPR
Data subjects have the right “not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
processing, including profling, which produces legal efects concerning him or her or 
similarly signifcantly afects him or her” (Art.  22(1)).  In the two sets of  scenarios 
448 Schermer (n 290) 138.
449 Similarly: Dwork and Mulligan (n 224) 37.
450 AM Wildberger, ‘Alleviating the Opacity of Neural Networks’, 1994 IEEE International 
Conference on Neural Networks, 1994 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence 
(1994).
451 Flach (n 401) 243; Bernhard Anrig, Will Browne and Mark Gasson, ‘The Role of Algorithms 
in Profling’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Profling the European 
Citizen: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed 2008 edition, 
Springer 2008) 83.
452 Jenna Burrell, ‘How the Machine “Thinks”: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning 
Algorithms’ (2016) 3 Big Data & Society 2053951715622512, 9 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2053951715622512> accessed 19 March 2019; Flach (n 401) 227.
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illustrated above, we assume that a decision based on profling that mirrors sensitive 
traits signifcantly afects the relevant data subjects, because discriminatory efects 
coinciding with sensitive traits are relevant to their rights and freedoms. Therefore, 
the scenarios must be tested for lawfulness against the other provisions of article 22.
The right not to be subject to profling does not apply if such a decision is necessary 
for entering into, or performance of, a contract; if the profling is authorised by law, or 
if  decision-making  is  based  on the consent of  the data subject.  (Art.  22(2)(a-c)). 
Limiting  the  analysis  to  consumers,  service  providers  and  retailers  can  become 
controllers  when  they  ofer  consumers  personalised  services  such  as 
recommendations and other ofers based on prior behaviour.  This could sufce to 
justify profling,  especially considering  the fact that such a contract also provides 
lawfulness in the sense of  article 6(1)(b).  Obtaining consent from a consumer can 
similarly provide a basis for profling as well as a basis for lawfulness.
In cases where contract or consent form the basis for profling, “suitable measures” 
should be implemented to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject (Art. 
22(3));  if  profling  is  authorised  by  law,  of  course  the  law  should  provide  such 
measures. Suitability is an open norm.453 Considering that art. 22 addresses the risk 
that automated decision making traps us ‘in patterns that perpetuate the basest or 
narrowest versions of ourselves’454 or replaces human contact and the opportunity to 
enter into negotiations, suitable measures could consist of an opportunity to oppose 
the decision, and to request a revised decision from an authorised human agent who 
will  meaningfully reconsider the proposed automated decision,  possibly based on 
additional information455 – instead of merely reiterating that “Computer says no.”456 
However,  in  the  scenarios  presented  above,  such  measures  would  require  that 
consumers be aware of the fact that they are being treated unfairly. This is far from 
certain: it would require the possession of sensitive data of a signifcant part of the 
profled population as well as the output of the algorithm for those individuals. In 
scenarios  where profling  results  in  the inadvertent creation  of  “flter bubbles”  – 
453 European Digital Rights, ‘Proceed with Caution: Flexibilities in the General Data 
Protection Regulation’ (EDRi - European Digital Rights 2016) 19 
<https://edri.org/fles/GDPR_analysis/EDRi_analysis_gdpr_flexibilities.pdf> accessed 19 
March 2019.
454 Dwork and Mulligan (n 224) 40.
455 ibid; Arnoud Engelfriet and others, De algemene verordening gegevensbescherming: 
artikelsgewijs commentaar (Ius mentis 2017) 107–108.
456 Computer Says No, ‘Computer Says No’, Wikipedia (2017) 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_says_no> accessed 19 March 2019.
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limiting the amount of information that data subjects can easily fnd – recognising 
unfairness is even harder.457
Article 22(4) prohibits automated decision-making and profling based on sensitive 
data, unless it is based on explicit consent of the data subject or a substantial public 
interest is served (art. 22(4) and 9(2)(a, g)). It is not sure whether this prohibition 
applies in the above classes of  scenarios,  because discriminatory efects can occur 
even when the data used for profling is not sensitive in and of itself. Furthermore, the 
discovery of discriminatory efects of profling requires verifcation through the use of 
sensitive data. Conclusive evidence of discriminatory efects may not be obtainable in 
cases  where  the  output  of  a  machine  learning  algorithms  does  not  completely 
correspond to the presence or absence of a sensitive trait.
The next section tests the two examples against the principles of processing.
5.6 Pattern recognition, profling and the principles of 
processing
The examples above illustrate that pattern recognition and profling could introduce a 
risk in the sense that the GDPR’s measures do not result in the achievement of  its 
goals – respect for fundamental rights, observation of freedoms, and possibly ofering 
a form of control to data subjects458 – even if  the letter of  the law is followed. The 
Regulation  aims to prevent  the creation  of  this  risk  by imposing  technologically 
neutral  principles  on  the  processing  of  personal  data:  lawfulness,  fairness, 
transparency,  purpose  limitation,  data  minimisation,  accuracy,  storage  limitation, 
integrity,  confdentiality and accountability.  The importance of  these principles is 
stressed by the fact that their infringement carries the highest penalty that the GDPR 
can impose (up to 20 million Euros or 4% of worldwide annual turnover, art. 83(5)
(a)).  We will  not  review the  principles  of  accuracy,  integrity  and  confdentiality, 
because we assume adherence to these principles to be in the self-interest of  the  
controller,  either  because  they  are  essential  for  the  efectiveness  of  processing 
(accuracy  and  integrity)  or  because  they  could  serve  to  maintain  a  competitive 
advantage  (confdentiality).  However,  it  is  relevant  to  consider  whether  pattern 
recognition  and  profling  as  described  in  the  above  examples  would  violate  the 
principles  of  lawfulness,  fairness,  transparency,  purpose  limitation,  data 
457 Pariser (n 59) ch 8.
458 Recital 4, GDPR.
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minimisation, and accountability, because these principles mainly serve to protect the 
interests of data subjects.
For  most  consumers,  lawfulness  for  the  processing  of  personal  data  related  to 
economic activities is based on art. 6(1)(b), making processing lawful if it is necessary 
for the performance of  a contract.  Arguably,  this provision enables  controllers to 
lawfully store and analyse logs of customer transactions for billing and “personalised 
ofers”, either through case-by-case pattern recognition or profling. This is a lawful 
exercise of the fundamental rights of freedom of contract and freedom to conduct a 
business: consumers are free to enter into contracts ofering personalised services and 
commercial enterprises are free to customise their services if they believe it is good for 
business.459 In a legal sense, a controller can provide for fairness and transparency as 
required by article 13,  particularly 13(2)(f),  by ofering general  contract terms and 
conditions,  and/or  privacy  statements.  Verhelst  has  coined  the  term  “privacy 
contracts” for these types of contracts.460 Data subjects are not necessarily aware of 
the contents of their privacy contracts: terms, conditions and their associated privacy 
policies take very long to read and many consumers do not bother reading them.461 
Even if  data subjects  do read  them,  it takes signifcant efort to evaluate privacy 
contracts for lawfulness. This is also true for supervisory authorities. For example, the 
Windows 10 operating system terms and conditions had been in use for two years, 
governing  more than 4  million  agreements  in  the Netherlands alone,  before the 
Dutch supervisory authority examined them in 2017 and opined that the processing of 
personal data by Microsoft was not in agreement with applicable law.462 Even if the 
459 For another view on this matter, including an analysis of this class of cases regarding 
purpose limitation, see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on 
Purpose Limitation’ (2013) 00569 /13/EN WP 203 21–27 
<https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/fles/2013/wp203_en.pdf> accessed 20 March 2019.
460 Verhelst (n 119) chap 3.
461 Robert P Bartlett III and Victoria C Plaut, ‘Blind Consent? A Social Psychological 
Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-through Agreements.’ (2012) 36 Law and human 
behavior 293, 297 <http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/lhb/36/4/293/> accessed 19 March 
2019; Rich Parris, ‘Online T&Cs Longer than Shakespeare Plays – Who Reads Them? - 
Online T&Cs Word Counts Compared to Famous Books’ (Which? Conversation, 23 March 
2012) <https://conversation.which.co.uk/technology/length-of-website-terms-and-
conditions/> accessed 20 March 2019.
462 Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, ‘Microsoft Windows 10 - De Verwerking van 
Persoonsgegevens via Telemetrie’ (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens 2017) Rapport defnitieve 
bevindingen met correcties 148–160 
<https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/fles/01_onderzoek_microsoft_windo
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terms comply with the law, the efects of algorithms may remain hidden due to the  
right to consider pattern recognition algorithms as a trade secret.  This should not 
result in “a refusal to provide all information to the data subject” (recital 63), but the  
extent of this provision has not been tested; Wachter et al. concluded that the GDPR 
does not legislate a right to a full explanation of how algorithms work.463 If a controller 
wishes  to  transfer  personal  data  to  third  parties  according  to  art.  13(1)(e),  the 
recipients  need  not  necessarily  be  disclosed  if  the  “categories  of  recipients”  are 
indicated, which can make the use of algorithms even less transparent.
The processing of  special categories of  data is lawful only if  it is based on explicit  
consent; similarly, profling based on sensitive data requires explicit consent. Asking a 
data subject for explicit consent is a means to ofer data subjects an opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process; the associated information is meant to 
reduce  information  asymmetries  between  the  controller  and  the  data  subject.464 
Requesting consent can indeed serve this purpose, but data subjects may not easily  
distinguish  terms  and  conditions  from  consent  statements.  Consequently,  data 
subjects can often be expected to consent to processing without knowing the contents 
of  their  consent  statement.  They  may  choose  to  use  “technical  settings  for 
information society services” based on considerations of  convenience, especially in 
cases where “smart” devices like their mobile phone or tablet promise the best user 
experience if settings are such that consent is automatically given in the future (recital 
32). Furthermore, pattern recognition or profling may not require the processing of 
sensitive data even though the results may coincide with special traits. In those cases, 
consent is not required but the risk associated with the processing of sensitive data is 
still present. Data subjects may therefore be unaware of processing that can introduce 
discriminatory efects. The legal concepts and provisions associated with “sensitive 
data” (that can also difer between diferent languages) are therefore not necessarily 
sufcient to prevent discrimination based on sensitive traits.
The same may be true for the remaining principles of processing. For example, data 
minimisation  and  accountability  in  the  context  of  pattern  recognition  ofer  a 
conundrum for controllers  and  supervisory authorities.  In  theory,  applying  these 
principles  could  reduce  the  risks  associated  with  pattern  recognition  and 
discriminatory profling. Data minimisation could require controllers to discard data 
ws_10_okt_2017.pdf> accessed 19 March 2019.
463 Wachter, Mittelstadt and Floridi (n 135) 90–91.
464 Foyer (n 410) 13; See also Gomez (n 218) 198–207.
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before  emergent  patterns  become  recognisable,  and  accountability  could  require 
controllers to prove that their processing does not introduce discriminatory efects. 
But this may not be straightforward. For controllers, minimisation can undermine the 
efectiveness of algorithms. “More data beats a cleverer algorithm”465 – retaining data 
sets for recalibration or refnement in the future may be a legitimate reason to store 
them for a longer time, for example, to reduce discriminatory efects once they are 
discovered, or to provide proof  of  compliance with other provisions in the GDPR. 
Retaining this data is therefore in accordance with the principle of accountability (art. 
5(2)),  which makes this form of  processing lawful  “because it is necessary for the 
purposes  of  the  legitimate  interests  pursued  by  the  controller”  or  a  supervisory 
authority (article 6(1)(f) GDPR). Furthermore, minimisation may not meaningfully 
beneft data subjects: in a world characterised by datafcation, they will soon generate 
new data to be analysed. Finally, both pattern recognition and profling may also be 
driven  by  features  derived  from  anonymised  data  sets,  which  could  remove  the 
training stage of  the machine learning algorithm from the purview of  supervisory 
authorities if the anonymisation were performed efectively. The resulting algorithm 
could  have  discriminatory  outcomes  without  ofering  any possibility  to  verify  its 
efects.  This  may  make  it  difcult  for  supervisory  authorities  hold  controllers 
accountable for their adherence to the principles of art. 5.
To increase  transparency regarding  the risks  of  processing,  article  15  grants  data 
subjects the right to access to their personal data and additional information on how 
it is processed. Arguably, pattern recognition would be a part of “the purpose of the 
processing” (art. 15(1)(a)). Regarding the risks of profling, article 15(1)(h) requires that 
data  subjects  are  informed  “about  the  existence  of  automated  decision-making, 
including profling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, 
meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the signifcance and the 
envisaged  consequences  of  such  processing  for  the  data  subject.”  From  this,  a 
controller could  conclude that “meaningful  information about the logic involved” 
need  not  be  disclosed  in  all  cases.  For example,  a  retailer may not  believe that  
personalised ofers “signifcantly afect” a data subject, which would mean that the 
processing is not “profling” in the sense of art. 22. The right to obtain “meaningful 
information  about  the  logic  involved”  is  once  again  moderated  by  recital  63. 
Furthermore,  it is not clear what information should  be disclosed in cases where 
465 Pedro Domingos, ‘A Few Useful Things to Know about Machine Learning’ (2012) 55 
Communications of the ACM 78, 84 <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?idd2347755> accessed 
19 March 2019.
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profling is based on patterns built with anonymised datasets. No case law appears to 
yet exist on what constitutes “meaningful information” about logic, signifcance and 
envisaged  consequences,  even  though  the  Data  Protection  Directive  contained  a 
similar provision (article 12(a), third element).
But discrimination based on sensitive traits  –  deliberately or not,  either direct or 
indirect466 –  tends  to  be  harmful,  unlawful  and  unfair,  even  if  the  discovery  of 
sensitive traits does not infringe art. 9(1) directly and the processing of personal data 
happens lawfully and transparently:
• Diferential treatment accidentally coinciding with a sensitive trait could result in 
indirect discrimination if it has an adverse efect on “a far greater number” of data 
subjects sharing the protected trait467 than other data subjects, or if “in percentage 
terms considerably less” data subjects sharing such traits enjoy some benefcial 
efect when compared to data subjects not sharing that trait.468 This efect can 
occur if  the controller uses  unsupervised  learning  algorithms.  Discrimination 
against data subjects sharing a certain race or ethnic origin in ofering access to 
goods and services violates the principle of equal treatment required by the Racial 
Equality  Directive,  unless  there  is  a  justifcation  of  diferential  treatment (or 
incidentally, a defence to discrimination).469
• Any other forms of discrimination on sensitive traits may result in a violation of 
article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights470 if this discrimination 
afects  the rights  and  freedoms protected  in  the Convention.  In  the cases  of 
discovery of sensitive traits and profling, this regards the right to personal and 
family life (art. 8, ECHR) since this right has horizontal application.471 Protocol 12 
466 See art. 2(2) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle 
of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (Racial Equality 
Directive), [2000] OJ L180/22; see also European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
and European Court of Human Rights (n 90) 22–31.
467 ECtHR D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic 2007-IV 241 para. 87, quoting the European 
Court of Justice Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR I-
1620, para. 31.
468 Case C-171/88 Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung, [1989] ECR I-2743, para. 11-
12.
469 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and European Court of Human Rights (n 
90) s 2.6.
470 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Sept. 3, 1953, ETS 5, 213 UNTS 221.
471 Akandji-Kombe (n 188) 14–16.
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to the Convention extends this prohibition to “any right set forth by law’, but not 
all EU Member States are signatories to this Protocol.472
• There  may  be  some extreme cases  where  controllers  could  expressly  aim  to 
discern  sensitive  traits  in  order  to  discriminate  against  data  subjects.  Such 
processing is not in accordance with the principle of purpose limitation (art. 5(1)
(b)) because the intent to discriminate based on sensitive traits is not a legitimate 
purpose,  unless it meets the specifc criteria of  articles 4 or 5, Racial  Equality 
Directive.473 In all other cases, such processing can be expected to be contrary to 
public policy or to accepted principles of morality in all EU Member States.
In spite of all that, these legal protections could lose their strength in the context of 
datafcation. Especially in the course of profling, discrimination could happen as an 
unintended side-efect of  providing personalised ofers or credit risk management. 
Furthermore,  controllers  with  no  intention  to  discriminate  could  at  any  time 
unwittingly  collect  or otherwise  obtain  biased  data  sets  or have their  algorithms 
stumble  upon  an  emergent  property  coinciding  with  a  sensitive  trait.  Those 
controllers  can  only  detect  discrimination  by  processing  sensitive  data,  which  – 
according to the Strasbourg Convention – introduces new risks of  discrimination. 
Discriminatory efects may be inadvertently obfuscated by code or in biased data sets. 
Additionally, the nature of human society as a complex system guarantees that new 
ways  to  stumble upon sensitive traits  will  continuously  become available as  new 
patterns emerge.
This  makes  enforcement  difcult  for  supervisory  authorities:  without  specialised 
knowledge of the data set and the algorithms, it will be hard to distinguish neutral 
processing from accidental discrimination. Indirect discrimination may be difcult to 
distinguish from legitimate market segmentation or risk management; it may also be 
difcult to provide conclusive evidence for the use of sensitive data in intermediate 
steps of processing. The free movement of personal data within the EU (art. 1(3)) and 
472 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, done at Rome on 4 November 2000, ETS no. 177; List of signatories found at 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/177/signatures.
473 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and European Court of Human Rights (n 
90) 43.
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between the EU and other jurisdictions can complicate matters further.474 Data can be 
transmitted to other controllers whose algorithms may have unknown properties.
This undermines the principle of accountability: unless supervisory authorities can 
detect  such processing  and  enforce  the corresponding  penalty  provisions  –  Tene 
seemed hesitant to assume this in 2011475 – articles 9(1) and 22(4) may prove to be dead 
letters.
5.7 Potential remedies
The  fact  that  the  risk  of  processing  sensitive  data  is  not  clearly  defned  makes 
choosing a remedy more difcult. Still, a number of possible measures could reduce 
the risks, but they all will have only limited efect.
Strengthening the consent requirement
A frst suggestion for a possible measure could be to increase the number of situations 
where  consent  is  required  for  processing,  through a  reinterpretation  of  art.  9(1). 
Requiring  consent  for  all  forms  of  processing  revealing  sensitive  traits  increases 
transparency  and  could  improve  informed  decision-making  before  entering  into 
privacy contracts. But efectiveness of this measure may well be limited. An important 
reason for this  is  that a consent requirement shifts  the burden towards the data 
subject. Most consumers do not read their contracts.476 Given the large number of 
privacy contracts that consumers engage in and the pervasiveness of  datafcation, 
data subjects might be asked for their consent so many times per year that they could 
eventually stop distinguishing between low-risk and high-risk situations. Sheer lack 
of  time to evaluate all the associated privacy contracts and the desire to enjoy the 
benefts of new products and services built on datafcation could lead to the erosion 
of consent statements until they are no longer distinguishable from general terms and 
conditions,  which need not always be read to be applicable.  This would defy the 
474 See: Commission decisions on the adequacy of the protection of personal data in third 
countries and the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-
protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacy-protection-personal-data-non-eu-
countries_en and https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-
outside-eu/eu-us-privacy-shield_en, respectively, accessed 13 February 2019.
475 Tene (n 361).
476 Nili Steinfeld, ‘“I Agree to the Terms and Conditions”: (How) Do Users Read Privacy 
Policies Online? An Eye-Tracking Experiment’ (2016) 55 Computers in Human Behavior 
992, 995 <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0747563215301692> accessed 20 
March 2019; McDonald and Cranor (n 144) 562.
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purpose of the consent requirement. Ofering consent as a way to open an avenue for 
control becomes less efective in the context of datafcation: information asymmetry 
makes efective control difcult for data subjects, and they have to deal with large 
numbers of  controllers. If  we agree with Klinke and Renn that “act[ing] prudently 
under the condition of uncertainty”477 is advisable for Pythia-class risks, the burden of 
acting prudently should be carried by controllers.
Anonymisation
If  personal data is anonymised, it no longer counts as personal data (recital 26). In 
theory,  anonymisation  could  therefore  limit  the  possibilities  to  discover sensitive 
traits from non-sensitive data. In an opinion issued in 2014, the Article 29 Working 
Party identifed three risks of insufcient anonymisation:
• “Singling out: […] the possibility to isolate some or all records which identify an 
individual in the dataset;
• Linkability: […] the ability to link, at least, two records concerning the same data 
subject or a group of data subjects (either in the same database or in two diferent 
databases)
• Inference: […] the possibility to deduce, with signifcant probability, the value of 
an attribute from the values of a set of other attributes.”478
When  dealing  with  anonymised  data,  associating  an  emergent  property  with  a 
sensitive trait relates to the risks of linkability (a known sensitive trait of a particular 
data subject or group of subjects can be linked to supposedly anonymised data from 
another context) or inference.
Avoiding the risks of  de-anonymisation is a hard problem for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, Mascetti et al. point out that “providing data utility and data subject's privacy 
are  contrasting  objectives.”479 Controllers  may  lack  incentives  to  achieve  efective 
anonymisation if it prevents them from fully reaping the benefts from the data they 
477 Klinke and Renn (n 275) 1086.
478 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ 
(2014) 0829/14/EN WP216 11–12 <https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/fles/2014/wp216_en.pdf> accessed 13 
February 2019.
479 Sergio Mascetti and others, ‘Anonymity: A Comparison Between the Legal and Computer 
Science Perspectives’ in Serge Gutwirth and others (eds), European Data Protection: In 
good health? (Springer 2013) 95.
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collected.  Brickell  and  Shmatikov analysed  a number of  data sets  for the risk  of 
inference (attribute disclosure); they found that privacy and utility were incompatible 
goals of data mining for the data sets they analysed. The loss of utility was so acute 
that they were doubtful that any data set could be anonymised and useful at the same 
time.480 Using a diferent methodology, Li and Li claim to have found less dramatic 
results,  although  they  still  see  that  utility  decreases  with  increased  privacy.481 
Secondly, even if  the loss of utility does not discourage anonymisation, there is no 
guarantee for success since it requires a non-trivial efort aimed at specifc and well 
laid out goals. Current anonymisation techniques may not prevent the attribution of 
sensitive traits for all cases based on emergent properties as a result. For example, in  
its opinion on anonymisation techniques,  the Article 29 Working Party concludes 
that only two out of  seven evaluated techniques (K-anonymity and L-diversity) are 
capable of eliminating only one out of three risks of re-identifcation (singling out).482 
Not one of the seven techniques can rule out inference.
Data protection by design and by default
Article 25 of the GDPR, titled “Data protection by design and by default” embodies 
the precautionary approach that Klinke and Renn associate with the Pythia risk class 
(“containment in space and time (…),  constant monitoring,  development of  equi-
functional replacements, and investments in diversity and flexibility”).483 It calls on 
controllers to continuously consider the rights and freedoms of data subjects and to 
apply “appropriate technical and organisational measures”. Recital 78 lists a number 
of possible measures:
“minimising the processing of personal data, pseudonymising personal 
data as soon as possible, transparency with regard to the functions and 
processing of personal data, enabling the data subject to monitor the 
data processing, enabling the controller to create and improve security 
features.”
480 Justin Brickell and Vitaly Shmatikov, ‘The Cost of Privacy: Destruction of Data-Mining 
Utility in Anonymized Data Publishing’, Proceedings of the 14th ACM SIGKDD 
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining (ACM 2008) 76–78.
481 Tiancheng Li and Ninghui Li, ‘On the Tradeof between Privacy and Utility in Data 
Publishing’, Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge 
discovery and data mining (ACM 2009) 524–525.
482 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ 
(n 478) 24.
483 Klinke and Renn (n 275) 1086.
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It is difcult to predict whether these types of  measures are specifcally useful  to 
prevent  the  association  of  emergent  properties  with  sensitive  traits.  Technical 
measures  like  limitations  on  data  storage  quantity  or  duration,  or  limits  on  the 
possible  coupling  of  data  sets,  appear  not  likely  to  be  efective  in  preventing 
discriminatory efects. Firstly, such measures run counter to the economic and social 
promise of big data, which limits their feasibility. For example, to make analysis of 
consumer buyer patterns useful, it would typically be necessary to store and analyse at 
least one year’s worth of data points to help account for cyclic behaviours associated 
with seasonal activities and other life events. But one year of data would also be more 
than  sufcient  to  fnd  emergent  patterns  that  reveal  sensitive  traits.  
Pseudonymisation could  be useful  where real  names can indicate sensitive traits. 
However,  in  the examples  given  in  this  chapter,  real  names are not required  for 
discriminatory efects to occur. In cases where algorithms are opaque – as they often 
are, even to controllers – benefcial efects of  monitoring by data subjects may be 
possible by means of verifcation. If a large group of data subjects can compare the 
efects of  processing, discriminatory efects can become clear. However, this would 
require  that  a  large  number  of  data  subjects  be  willing  to  share  their  sensitive 
information  with  other  data  subjects  and  possibly  the  controller.  Otherwise, 
discovering  or  remedying  discriminatory  efects  would  not  be  possible.  In  more 
general  terms,  our  analysis  indicates  that  such  measures  have  limited  feasibility 
because they could only partially solve the problems associated with datafcation or 
solve them only for a limited time. New emergent properties and new algorithms will 
continue to increase the possibilities to discover sensitive traits and introduce new 
risks  of  accidental  discrimination.  Keeping personal  data secure would  not likely 
prevent discriminatory efects, because it is not directly related to the discovery of 
sensitive traits.
Improving enforcement by independent supervisory authorities
Ramping up enforcement activities could reduce the risks by increasing controllers’  
accountability as part of a “constant monitoring” efort. Enforcement could be aimed 
at the material efects of algorithms as well as controllers’ adherence to the principles 
and other requirements of  processing,  for example by stressing the need for data 
protection impact assessments (article 35). An important caveat is that discriminatory 
efects of algorithms cannot be evaluated by traditional data security practices and 
formal statements of controllers alone, or even by examining the source code of the 
algorithms. Datta observes that “traditional preventive access control and information 
flow control mechanisms are not sufcient for enforcing all privacy policies”. External 
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audits of policy, code and data are necessary to discover discriminatory efects.484 New 
emergent properties can arise at any moment and algorithms will  be continuously 
tweaked: audits will provide only a limited form of certainty for only a limited time. 
Accidental discriminatory efects may only be discovered if additional sensitive data is 
available,  which can  pose an unsolvable dilemma for controllers  and  supervisory 
authorities. Another caveat is the interpretation of “similar signifcant efect” in the 
context  of  data  protection  impact  assessments  (art.  35(3)(a)).  An  extensive 
interpretation of this notion could dictate that these assessments are almost always 
necessary for large datasets, which increases the risk that they become ‘a “tick box” 
list for compliance measures regardless of their actual impact on compliance.’485
Raising public awareness and participation
Several authors have noted the “privacy paradox”. Schneier states that “(c)ourts have 
been reluctant to fnd a value in privacy,  because people willingly give it away in 
exchange for so little”.486 It is not certain whether improved awareness of  possible 
discriminatory efects of  data mining and profling will  decrease the risk of  these 
efects occurring.  Sensitive traits are strong drivers for individual behaviour, which 
means that data subjects cannot easily hide or alter them. The free market would 
probably  be the  best  proving  ground  for the  efects  of  increased  awareness.  For 
example, ofers containing a promise not to use data for personalisation and to delete 
data as soon as possible could be attractive for data subjects who place a high value on 
privacy. Such efects are not unthinkable: the fact that end-to-end encryption is now 
commonplace in instant messaging apps indicates that app developers feel pressure 
to increase consumer data security.487 Indeed, Cofone found that the privacy paradox 
is best explained by consumers adapting their behaviour to the result of “uncertainty-
484 Anupam Datta, ‘Privacy through Accountability: A Computer Science Perspective’ in Raja 
Natarajan (ed), Distributed Computing and Internet Technology (Springer International 
Publishing 2014) 46.
485 Moerel (n 87) 52; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Data Protection 
Impact Assessment (DPIA) and Determining Whether Processing Is “Likely to Result in a 
High Risk” for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ (Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party 2017) 17/EN WP248 8.
486 Schneier, Data and Goliath (n 210) 227. See Ignacio Nicolás Cofone, ‘Privacy Tradeofs in 
Information Technology Law’ (Erasmus University 2015) 98–104 for additional references.
487 Andy Greenberg, ‘Whatsapp Just Switched on End-to-End Encryption for Hundreds of 
Millions of Users’ <https://www.wired.com/2014/11/whatsapp-encrypted-messaging/> 
accessed 20 March 2019; Katriel Cohn-Gordon and others, ‘A Formal Security Analysis of 
the Signal Messaging Protocol’, Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), 2017 IEEE European 
Symposium on (IEEE 2017).
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based discounting”, suggesting that reducing uncertainty could solve the paradox.488 
The use of specialised seals and marks (in accordance with art. 42 GDPR) could help 
consumers recognise services that ofer increased data protection. Another possible 
transparency measure is a requirement to open up data and algorithms for public 
scrutiny (which is also a part of “data protection by design and default”, see above). 
However, controllers have a legitimate interest in protecting their algorithms as trade 
secrets  and/or  intellectual  property  rights.  This  could  limit  the  efectiveness  of 
increased transparency.
5.8 Concluding remarks
Ubiquitous datafcation and big data analytics are relatively new phenomena,  the 
risks of which are not yet fully clear. This chapter aims to paint a clearer picture of two 
risks associated with datafcation and analytics: that controllers can induce sensitive 
personal data from non-sensitive data, and that algorithms can show bias based on 
sensitive traits even when the requirements of art. 9 and art. 22 GDPR are met. This is 
possible  because  the  traits  that  count  as  sensitive  in  the  European  context,  are 
strongly  driving  data  subjects’  individual  behaviour.  Complex  systems  science 
identifes emergent properties as root causes for these risks. It also demonstrates that 
addressing  them  requires  considerable  efort  and  may  not  always  be  efective. 
Inconsistency between diferent language versions of the GDPR can cause confusion 
among both data subjects and controllers regarding their rights and obligations in 
this matter. At the same time, controllers wishing to actively prevent discriminatory 
efects from their processing may run afoul of the GDPR if they want to verify specifc 
efects for data subjects sharing sensitive traits. Several measures may help clarify and 
reduce the risks, but there is no one-size-fts-all, comprehensive solution yet.
Due  to  the  information  asymmetries  between  controllers  and  data  subjects, 
independent oversight by specialised supervisory authorities is indispensable and the 
GDPR wisely requires it. But compliance with data protection law alone may not be 
enough  to  prevent  discriminatory  efects.  A  data  subjects’  consent  is  too  easily 
acquired, the consequences of processing are too uncertain, and algorithms are too 
opaque to rule out discriminatory efects even when the GDPR is followed. Efective 
prevention  of  the  discrimination  risk  could  require  additional  enforcement  of 
consumer  protection  law  (concerning  possible  unfair  contract  terms  and  unfair 
commercial  practices),  competition law (concerning possible abuse of  a dominant 
488 Cofone (n 486) 115–120, 127.
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position)  and  non-discrimination  law.  All  these  areas  of  law  have  specialised 
enforcement mechanisms already in place in EU countries. Enforcement eforts also 
need to strike a balance between the positive and negative efects of processing. Big 
data promises greater efciency, e.g. in the feld of  health care, education and the 
market for goods and services. Processing and profling have many lawful and useful 
applications in these areas and EU Member States cannot easily aford to abstain from 
them.
Considering that the risk of the processing of personal data remains ambiguous and 
that all  available remedies have signifcant shortcomings,  we believe that the risk 
management strategy of  the GDPR for sensitive personal  data was not optimally 
chosen.  Designating  deeply personal  properties as “sensitive”  denies the fact that 
these properties can appear as emergent properties in many diferent contexts, and 
are  therefore  expressed  in  countless  ways:  in  today’s  datafed  world,  even  non-
sensitive data can easily reveal  them.  Furthermore,  the usefulness of  the consent 
requirement – carried over from one of the earliest examples of data protection law – 
decreases in the context of omnipresent datafcation. Consent as an avenue of control 
over processing can become meaningless if a data subject has to give it many times 
every  day  in  circumstances  where  the  efects  of  processing  are  not  clear  to  the 
controllers nor the data subjects themselves.  The technologically neutral  terms in 
which the GDPR is drafted makes the legal text durable, but at the same time it does 
not always ofer useful guidance to data subjects and controllers.
But that no comprehensive solution is available does not at all mean that we believe 
that nothing can be done. Following Klinke and Renn’s classifcation, two courses of 
action present themselves.
Firstly,  as  long  as  the risks  of  datafcation remain  ambiguous (the potential  and 
damage potential of datafcation remain unknown), risk management should strike a 
more efective balance between precaution-based and discourse-based measures.489 
Precaution alone, which calls for containment of applications, constant monitoring 
and  more,  may  be  efective  in  preventing  adverse  efects,  but  all-too  efective 
precaution  can  also  make the  benefts  of  datafcation  unattainable.  Applications 
departing from precautionary practice should therefore be possible. But to prevent a 
situation where the risks of datafcation being borne exclusively by the data subjects 
and  the  benefts  enjoyed  exclusively  by  controllers,490 such  deviations  should  be 
489 Klinke and Renn (n 275) 1088.
490 Beck, World at Risk (n 423) 142.
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agreed  on using  discourse-based  strategies,  which “require strategies  building  up 
consciousness,  building  confdence,  strengthening  trustworthiness  in  regulatory 
bodies, and initiating collective eforts of institutions for taking responsibility. These 
are social goals that cannot be accomplished by risk experts or regulators alone.” 491 
Avenues for efective discourse may need to be designed in a bottom-up fashion; 
alternatively,  underrepresented  parties  –  consumers  and data subjects –  could  be 
encouraged  and  subsidised  for  their  eforts  to  improve  their  opportunities  for 
participation in current institutions, similar to the European Commission’s current 
programmes for consumer participation in lobbying and standardisation.492 Some of 
these strategies could be designed for specifc areas of commerce, or at the level of 
Member States, to allow for diversity resulting from diferences at the national level. 
Collective  eforts  of  supervisory  authorities  should  at  least  consist  of  joint 
programmes  for  enforcement  of  data  protection-,  consumer  protection-, 
competition-, and non-discrimination law.
Secondly,  to  increase  the  development  of  efective  regulation  and  enforcement 
strategies, knowledge of the risk potential and damage potential of big data must be 
increased.  Increased  knowledge  can  support  the  correct  assignment  of 
responsibilities. This makes enforcement easier and possibly more efcient, especially 
if  it can reduce the need for discourse-based strategies.  We propose that complex 
systems  science  and  the  associated  understanding  of  emergent  properties  can 
eventually provide insights in why the “computer says no”.493 It will be essential both in 
achieving  a  better  understanding  of  the  GDPR’s  shortcomings  in  the  context  of 
datafcation and in resolving them. Increased knowledge can also enable controllers 
in  remedying  discriminatory  efects.  For  example,  if  an  algorithm  can  replicate 
society’s bias, it can probably also be designed to remove it – something that humans 
may  not  be  able  to  accomplish  by  mere  instruction.  However,  complex  systems 
science is a fairly new discipline.494 It may take some time before the mechanisms 
underlying  emergence  in  groups  of  individuals  are  sufciently  understood,  and 
complex  systems  science  may  provide  only  a  part  of  the  insights  necessary  to 
understand the risks of datafcation. Still, the examples we presented aim to illustrate 
491 Klinke and Renn (n 275) 1088–1089.
492 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 254/2014 of 26 February 2014 on a 
multiannual consumer programme for the years 2014-20 and repealing Decision No 
1926/2006/EC, [2014] OJ L 84/42, art 3(1)(b).
493 Computer Says No (n 456).
494 Bar-Yam (n 372) 1.
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that  this  avenue  of  further  research  ofers  a  real  opportunity  for  increased 
understanding.
Contrary to the assertion of the European Commission that the GDPR is “future proof 
for decades to come”,495 it seems reasonable to assume that new legal and practical 
problems associated with the risks of datafcation will continue to arise. We strongly 
recommend that legal scholarship build lasting alliances with the exact sciences (data 
science,  complex  systems  science,  computer  science)  and  the  social  sciences  to 
evaluate  and  remedy  the  risks  of  datafcation,  its  efects  on  society  and  the 
efectiveness of the law.
495 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation’ (n 81) 104.
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6.1 Answering the research question
This research project aimed at answering the following question: 
To what extent does the GDPR refect or employ theories of power relations 
and  risk  management  presented  by  Komesar,  Barnett  and  Duvall,  Beck, 
Perrow, Klinke and Renn, and complex systems science?
The question focused mainly on cases where consent or the performance of a contract 
provided the lawfulness of processing. The research question was approached using 
four sub-questions:
• How do the decision-making mechanisms in the GDPR itself,  and in the EU 
lawmaking process that produced the GDPR, compare to other available decision-
making mechanisms with regards to opportunities for efective participation by 
data subjects?
• How do the GDPR’s protections for data subjects giving consent or entering into a 
contract compare to the protections in EU consumer protection law?
• To what extent were existing insights from the social sciences and environmental 
law applied in the GDPR insofar as it deals with the identifcation of risks of big 
data or with the addressing of new or unknown risks?
• Is the GDPR’s protection of sensitive personal data adequate in the context of big 
data and relevant insights in the feld of Complex Systems Science?
Considering  the  answers  to  the  four  sub-questions,  the  answer  to  the  research 
question  must  be  that  the  GDPR  does  not  appear  to  reflect  any  of  the  models 
researched. Additionally, the GDPR appears to have used no other models originating 
in relevant scientifc felds aimed at evaluating or addressing the risks of large-scale 
processing of personal data.
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In  chapter 2,  a comparative institutional  analysis  was applied  to the contents  of 
consumer contracts  to  answer the  frst  sub-question.  The goal  was  to determine 
whether article 6(1)(1-2)  would result in any bias favouring either data subjects or 
controllers in terms of  participation opportunities.  The fact that consent and the 
performance of a contract count as grounds for lawfulness of processing, without any 
further qualifcation except the general  principles of  processing,  indicates that no 
explicit measures have been taken to reduce the risks of a bias favouring controllers in 
the outcome of the decision-making process in the market. Additionally, data subjects 
encounter high costs of  information and organisation when entering into privacy 
contracts,  where  controllers  can  spread  these costs  over many transactions.  This 
means  that  controllers  can  be  expected  to  determine  the  terms  governing  the 
collection and use of personal data. The opportunities for data subjects to successfully 
challenge the terms of a privacy contract are small.
The GDPR was fnalised within the EU legislative process, which ofers individual data 
subjects and their associations relatively unfavourable opportunities for participation. 
The EU legislative process compares unfavourably for data subjects because the costs 
of information and organisation in the EU legislative proceedings are higher than in 
their own Member States’ political systems. For controllers, these costs are probably 
lower  due  to  controllers’  lower  numbers  and  higher  stakes.  This  means  that 
controllers have had better opportunities than data subjects in the EU legislative 
process to have the text of the GDPR reflect their own interests, e.g. through lobbying. 
In  chapter 3, Barnett and Duvall’s model of  power in social relations was used to 
conceptualise the power diferentials resulting from big data. Controllers of personal 
data that use the performance of a contract as the basis for lawfulness have structural  
power over consumers, allowing them to dictate the terms of a contract; the data that 
is then collected based on the contract is used to increase a controller’s institutional  
power,  for example the power to observe a consumer and  to share the results  of 
observation with other controllers. 
Power diferentials  can  lead  to  unfair  treatment  if  they  remain  unchecked.  This 
applies both in the context of consumer protection and the context of data protection. 
An analysis using comparative law methods shows that the GDPR does not account 
for these power diferentials as efectively as EU consumer protection legislation does. 
For example, by forbidding unfair commercial practices and unfair contract terms, EU 
consumer protection  law can  ofer  wide-ranging  protections  that  consumers  can 
understand relatively easily. In comparison, the standards governing the GDPR are 
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more difcult  to  understand.  Consumer protection  law also ofers  lower costs  of 
organisation for collective redress than the GDPR does. This could put data subjects at 
a disadvantage, ofering them less efective protections in cases where the GDPR – 
possibly a lex specialis in such contexts – would derogate from consumer protection 
law.
Chapter 4 has shown that,  when compared to EU instruments of  environmental 
protection law, the GDPR’s instruments of risk evaluation and risk mitigation are less 
well-rounded.  Instruments in  the GDPR regulating  contracts  and consent do not 
clearly reflect the insights gained from models of risk management originating in the 
social and exact sciences. The GDPR nor its predecessors display a clear qualifcation 
of  the risks associated with the processing of  personal  data.  In the future,  it will  
therefore be relatively difcult to determine the degree to which the GDPR will have 
achieved its stated goals: protecting data subjects’ rights and freedoms. In contrast, 
several models from the social sciences, including qualifcations of technological risk, 
can be recognised in a number of EU instruments of environmental law.
In the terms of Beck’s model of the risk society, big data is a modern risk: its origins 
and efects cannot be exactly located. Perrow’s theory of Normal Accidents predicts 
that big data, which arguably is based on complex and tightly coupled technology, 
will  cause  inevitable  normal  accidents at  a  system-wide  scale.  Unlike  EU 
environmental protection legislation, the GDPR makes no obvious choices in the risks 
it  wants  to address  in  the cases  of  consent  or contract,  nor does  it  require that 
controllers  or  supervisory  authorities  employ  a  cyclic  improvement  process  that 
encourages the development of better understanding and incremental improvement 
of risk mitigation measures.
The GDPR focuses on the rights of individual data subjects. This denies the possibility 
that adverse efects of big data can express themselves at the level of communities or 
societies. Seen in this way, the GDPR compares unfavourably to EU environmental 
protection law, which aims to protect the environment as a whole as well as individual 
humans, communities, societies and ecosystems. Consequently, the GDPR may not 
necessarily by itself  prevent that a relatively small number of controllers – especially 
platform providers  like,  currently,  “tech’s  frightful  fve”  –  can ofoad the risks  of 
processing  onto data subjects  or society at  large.  If  not addressed  through other 
means, this could count as a power shift all by itself.
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Finally,  regarding the processing  of  special  categories of  personal  data,  the GDPR 
does not apply or reflect relevant insights from complex systems science.  Chapter 5 
has shown that the processing of data covering many aspects of human behaviour has 
made the  GDPR’s  anti-discrimination  provisions  less  efective.  The limits  on  the 
processing of, and profling based on, sensitive data in articles 9 and 22 appear to be 
based  on  a  predominantly  precautionary strategy.  This  strategy  ofers  safeguards 
against enumerating sensitive traits in personal data. But, even if  not enumerated, 
sensitive  properties  can  also  be  detected  as  emergent  properties (as  defned  in 
complex  systems  science),  which  means  that  their  expression  as  robust  order  in 
human behavioural  patterns can be distinguished by algorithms if  datafcation is  
sufciently pervasive.  If  sensitive traits  are not specifed during  the processing  of 
personal data, such processing may not violate the GDPR directly; at the same time, 
the  principles  of  processing  may not  be  consistently  efective  in  protecting  data 
subjects  against  adverse  efects.  When  potentially  discriminatory  algorithms  are 
available on dominant platforms, adverse efects could be expected in many aspects of 
commerce and communications despite precautionary measures. Furthermore, due to 
the inscrutability of  these algorithms, automated discrimination based on sensitive 
traits can happen accidentally and it can remain undetected, both by controllers and 
supervisory authorities.  Klinke and Renn’s approach to risk management suggests 
that in a case like this where the risk is not yet completely understood, a discourse-
based approach would be more suitable than a precautionary one.
6.2 Discussion
As it appears, the models examined in the preceding chapters have not been applied 
or  integrated  into  the  GDPR  clauses  regarding  processing  based  on  contract  or 
consent.  Additionally,  no  other  model  regarding  risk  management  or  power 
imbalances  appears  to  lie  at  the  basis  of  the  provisions  regarding  contract  and 
consent.  In this regard,  the GDPR difers from the Seveso III-directive,  the Unfair 
Terms  Directive  and  the  Unfair  Commercial  Practices  directive:  these  directives 
contain  standards  that  display  some  degree  of  coherence  with  models  of  risk 
management and  power distribution from the social  sciences,  even though these 
models are not expressly applied. This fnding appears to confrm the criticisms from 
Moerel, Koops and Zarsky.496
496 See section 1.7 above.
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The absence of an underlying testable model in legislation could adversely afect the 
expected efcacy of the GDPR in least the following ways: 
• It  could  reduce  the  efectiveness  of  enforcement  strategies  by  Independent 
Supervisory Authorities if a lack of focus in enforcement eforts could prevent a 
cycle of permanent improvement in enforcement or processing practice.
• It  could  make the outcome of  court  cases  less  predictable.  This  could  make 
developing a coherent doctrine in jurisprudence more difcult, which could, in 
turn, complicate the solving of any problems with the GDPR that may become 
evident in the coming years.
A possible explanation for why modelling the efects of big data could have escaped 
the attention of legislators was seen in section 4.5. Datafcation was never the focus of 
regulation, as it may have often been regarded as a mere by-product of  welcomed 
innovation  through  automation.  Another  possible  cause  was  hinted  at  in  the 
introduction and in section  5.2: in step with Moore’s, Keck’s and Kryder’s laws, the 
number  and  the  complexity  of  systems  under  datafcation  has  increased 
exponentially. In this context, “surveillance capitalism” in its current form may be an 
emergent  property  of  a  complex  system  –  a  society  under  datafcation  –  where 
personal  data  has  become  ubiquitous.  Foreseeing  the  emergence  of  the  current 
market for personal data may have been impossible, since emergent properties are 
unpredictable from the properties of the elements in the system.497
Regulating an emergent phenomenon almost at the same time as its emergence could 
be an impossible task for any legislative efort. Under these circumstances, Coase’s 
prediction that the efects of  any possible form of  regulation would not resemble 
“anything  an  economist would  call  optimal”  seems almost  self-evident.498 But  no 
matter why a clear assessment of the associated risks and power shifts is absent, it is 
proposed  here that  the challenge that  big  data  presents  for society  needs  to  be 
identifed before it can be addressed. This research has shown that models from the 
social  and  the  exact  sciences  can  be  of  assistance  in  better  understanding  this 
challenge. 
Legislative intervention to address risks and power imbalances seems appropriate. A 
relatively small number of actors, “Tech’s Frightful Five” prominently among them, 
have managed to increase their structural power by achieving a dominant position in 
497 See section 5.2 above.
498 See section 1.6 above and note 86.
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the market for platforms through the collection of  both capital and personal data. 
This  gives  them great  institutional  power:  the  mere  size  of  the  most  successful  
platforms  implies  that  the  platforms  themselves  can  be  leveraged  to  unilaterally 
dictate terms and thereby increase this structural power even further in almost any 
market  that  can  be  accessed  through  telecommunications  –  including  the 
marketplace of ideas. This increases the risk for unfair treatment. 
For many consumers,  escaping the Frightful  Five’s collection of  personal  data has 
become  almost  impossible  in  the  course  of  their  regular  economic,  social  and 
intellectual  activities.  And  if  escaping  it  were  possible,  it  remains  questionable 
whether consumers would want to do without the benefts that these platforms are 
ofering. Due to the large amounts of capital needed to build a platform with similar 
capabilities  and  market  presence,  new  platforms  that  aim  to  compete  with  the 
frightful fve for dominance may take considerable time to emerge. Even if they do, it 
is uncertain whether these platforms would aim to relinquish any power or carry any 
risk that their competitors have accrued and ofoaded. Competition, at least in the 
sense that consumers are free to choose whether or not and with whom to share their 
personal data, is much more than “a click away”.499 
The European Commission has cited technological  developments as an important 
trigger for drafting the GDPR in 2012.500 But somewhat surprisingly, the evaluation of 
the risks associated with these developments is very similar to the risk evaluations in 
the French Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 and the Council of Europe’s Convention 108 
from 1981. The supporting documents of these three legal instruments, as well as the 
legal texts themselves, focus on the risks for individual rights and freedoms. These 
risks are obviously important,  but no specifc reasoning is provided as to how the 
proposed measures are expected to reduce the risks or mitigate the efects once the 
risks have materialised. At the same time, risks at the level of groups, communities or 
societies should not be ignored.
6.3 Understanding big data better: 
considerations for future legislation
Sections  1.3 and  1.4 presented  a  number  of  particular  risks  of  datafcation  for 
individuals and societies. In the future, new risks and power shifts are likely to emerge 
499 Per Strömbäck, ‘Digital Myth: Competition Is Only One Click Away’ (Netopia, 23 August 
2016) <http://www.netopia.eu/competition-one-click-away/> accessed 21 March 2019.
500 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation’ (n 81) 1.
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due  to  the  progress  of  technology.  Considering  the  conclusions  of  the  previous 
chapters, I propose that future legislative eforts regarding the processing of personal 
data  acknowledge  the  following  propositions  as  a  the  foundation  for  regulating 
contracts and consent.
• Big data has emerged as a new  logic of accumulation resulting in a new divide 
between haves and have-nots: a small  number of  actors have “all  the data on 
everyone” and a much larger number of  actors have gathered much less data, 
even about themselves. Controllers of personal data use their existing structural 
power over consumers to increase their institutional power. This carries with it 
the risk of unfair treatment.
• The resulting information asymmetries and power shifts in the market for goods 
and services have become so large that the market is losing its efectiveness as a 
decision-making mechanism. Consent statements or contracts no longer reliably 
prove that data subjects have formed and expressed their will to accept the efects 
of datafcation in a particular context, or in related contexts.
• The size, complexity and tight coupling of  big data systems makes it harder to 
identify the risks –  meaning both the probability and the efects – of  system 
accidents,  whilst at the same time making it easier to maintain an illusion of 
inherent safety through fantasy documents. Such documents are of limited value 
in the context of a contract or consent and can serve to ofoad risks to consumers.
• The  datafcation  of  complex  systems  (such  as  the  human  body  but  also 
communities  and  societies)  has  become  pervasive  enough  that  emergent  
properties  of  human  activity  are  encoded  in  the  resulting  data  sets.  These 
properties  include insights  in  possibly  intimate details  about  individuals  and 
groups, such as opinions, social interactions and sensitive traits like health status 
and  political  or religious beliefs.  An exclusive focus  on  individual  rights  and 
freedoms may therefore no longer be sufcient to address all the relevant efects 
associated with big data. Larger-scale efects need to be accounted for, especially 
in the case of consumer contracts.
• Information  asymmetries  and  power  diferentials  in  the  market  limit  the 
opportunities  for  consumers  to  participate  in  meaningful  discourse on  risk 
evaluation and mitigation. Limiting discourse-based risks management options 
could  perpetuate  information  asymmetries  and  fantasy  documents.  Applying 
similar standards  as  provided  by EU  consumer protection  law,  especially  the 
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directives on unfair terms and unfair commercial practices, should be considered 
when interpreting the GDPR.
When seen in this light, a number of features of the GDPR merit reconsideration if it 
were to be revised in the future:
• The GDPR casts a wide net, but the wide range of felds that it covers may not be 
suitable for omnibus legislation. Health care, education, employment, executive 
government, commerce and the marketplace of ideas may be better served with a 
more granular approach, as they vary in the risks and power relations at play. 
Especially in addressing risks and power shifts,  these felds of  legislation have 
already  developed  a  vocabulary  of  concepts,  models  and  opportunities  for 
participation,  often  at  the  national  level.  A  set  of  EU  principles  for  data 
protection,  with  a  uniform interpretation  enforced  through judicial  decisions 
from the EU Court of  Justice, could result in setbacks for achievements at the 
national level.
• The complexities of the processing of personal data, combined with a desire of 
national governments to commandeer big data accumulated by private parties, 
could promote regulatory capture. Regulators could have both an incentive and 
an opportunity to pass or maintain laws that beneft data controllers but that are 
at odds with the interests of data subjects, consumers and voters. This would be 
especially true for legislation drafted in the EU legislative process:  Article 294, 
TFEU  and  especially  the  conciliation  committee  procedure  could  provide 
circumstances  where regulatory capture can occur.  Due to the lower costs  of 
information and organisation, national parliaments ofer better opportunities for 
preventing captured legislation than the European legislative apparatus does.
• Technologically neutral legislation encourages the enacting of complex standards  
as opposed to simpler rules. This makes enforcement more complex and possibly 
less  efcient.  It  can  also  lead  to  decision-making  on  important  issues  being 
shifted towards the judicial  system, where consumers have limited options for 
participation and where – as Galanter reminds us – the “haves” could come out  
ahead.
However, these points of reconsideration should not be regarded as policy proposals 
per se. Alternatives may exist, and the approach chosen for the GDPR is not without 
merit. Maintaining the GDPR’s character of omnibus legislation, keeping discourse on 
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lawmaking  and  judicial  decision-making  at  the  EU  level  and  applying  a 
technologically neutral approach has a number of advantages:
• The  GDPR’s  character  of  omnibus  legislation  reflects  the  reality  that  the 
processing of personal data is ubiquitous. Arguably, diferent defnitions or levels 
of  data  protection  for  diferent  applications  could  lead  to  confusion  and 
uncertainty – not only for data subjects, but also for entities that wish to ofer  
processing  services  to  a  wide  range of  corporate  and  government customers. 
General data protection legislation will make it easier for such entities to increase 
their market, become proftable and innovate. Such innovations could also turn 
out to initiate a cycle of continuous improvements as required in environmental 
law.  Indeed, it is by no means certain that such improvements would happen 
more quickly or more reliably if each feld of application would employ its own set 
of data protection principles. 
• Likewise, harmonising data protection law at the EU level has advantages over 
developing and maintaining bodies of data protection legislation at the national 
level.  Such  diversity  between  Member  States  could  interfere  with  the  Four 
Freedoms in the internal market, especially since the processing of data is now 
inseparable from almost any commercial or administrative endeavour. Agreeing 
on a “consistent and high level of protection of natural persons” (recital 10) can be 
a suitable way for Member States to give substance to their obligations arising 
from Article 1, ECHR while respecting the sovereignty of other Member States by 
relying on their Independent Supervisory Authorities. 
• Independent Supervisory Authorities can help relieve the data have-nots from the 
need to litigate contract cases against controllers.
• And even though standards are more complex than rules, they can ofer long-term 
stability  that  allows  undisputed  forms  processing  to  continue  without 
interference, while judicial decisions eliminate controllers’ excesses.
These advantages are not to be dismissed lightly. But our understanding of the risks of 
big  data  may  not  yet  be  sufcient  to  leave  their  mitigation  to  one  size  fts  all-
legislation. At this time, tailor-made legislation within specifc areas (eg. health care, 
news media, education, employment) arguably stands a better chance of identifying 
and  reducing  risks  and  addressing  power  asymmetries  resulting  from  big  data. 
Consider the  example  of  the  Seveso III-directive:  an  abstract  standard  to  reduce 
system accidents could  probably not have been efective before our knowledge of 
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industrial  risks (as codifed in chemistry,  materials science,  long-term statistics et 
cetera) had sufciently developed. Without a similar degree of  understanding, the 
GDPR risks a degree of inefectiveness that is not compatible with the threat that big 
data carries.
Furthermore, as long as insights regarding the risks and power imbalances associated 
with  big  data  are  still  developing,  societies  need  a  forum  where  citizens  and 
consumers have the best possible opportunities for participation in discourse-based 
risk management. The EU legislative and judicial decision-making processes present 
citizens with higher costs of information and organisation than their counterparts at 
the national level. It is also necessary to allow Member States to choose their own 
priorities  when addressing  the risks  of  big  data –  it  is  far from certain that,  for  
example, Finland would arrive at the same solutions as Portugal when addressing a 
risk in the feld of health care. 
Therefore,  efective participation  opportunities  for data  have-nots is  necessary to 
make sure that Member States  can  use their  margin  of  appreciation  in  the best 
interest  of  their  citizens.  This  would  be  a  good  match  with  Klinke  and  Renn’s 
recommendation to apply discourse-based risk management. The political process at 
the level of the Member States is arguably the better forum for discourse-based risk 
management due to the lower costs of organisation and information for consumers. 
National  governments  also  stand  a  better  chance  of  responding  quickly  to  new 
threats,  for instance by delegation of  legislative powers to the executive for well-
defned classes of cases. EU legislation can then serve to consolidate a baseline among 
Member States in areas when the understanding of the risk has increased. 
A  possible  side  efect  of  such  an  approach  could  be  that  the  free  movement  of 
personal data between Member States – one of the few unreservedly precautionary 
measures in the GDPR – would require some qualifcations. But if the protection of 
natural persons’ rights and freedoms is indeed an important goal of the GDPR, such 
qualifcations might be unavoidable.  As long as the risk  associated with big  data 
remains fluid, and as long as new ways to turn the processing of personal data into an 
advantage over data subjects or a tool to achieve commercial dominance,  national 




6.4 Broadening the knowledge base
“Unringing the bell” with regards to advent of big data is not possible: datafcation, 
when seen as a byproduct of automation, is as irreversible as it is indispensable. Over 
time,  consumers,  data  subjects  and  regulators  can  be expected  to  improve their 
understanding of the risks surrounding the use of large quantities of personal data. 
The gradual and ongoing improvements in, for example, the chemical industry and 
commercial  aviation  have  shown  that  shifting  technologies  away  from  Perrow’s 
complex/tightly  coupled  quadrant is  certainly  possible  and  must  be  pursued  in 
proportion to the risk. 
Considering the preceding chapters, changing the focus of  EU data protection law 
should be seriously considered, at least in the area of contract, consent and special 
categories of data. Several models developed in the social and the exact sciences are 
suitable to inform legislative choices that make a cycle of permanent improvement of 
data protection law possible.
Nevertheless, the model proposed in section  6.3 above is still incomplete. After all, 
the expected impact of  big data afects not just contracts for consumers,  but also 
matters  of  health care,  labour relations and the exercise of  public authority.  The 
issued raised by big data are probably not solvable through legislation alone. There is 
a number of areas where an interdisciplinary approach could lead to better solutions,  
based on an improved understanding of the efects of big data:
An observatory at the European level. The most important step in reducing risks is 
the promotion of knowledge and awareness of their existence. In a feld developing as 
rapidly as big data, this awareness requires constant monitoring to minimise the risk 
that  regulatory  eforts  get  stuck  in  the  Collingridge  dilemma.501 Diferent 
developments will be relevant for diferent stakeholders. Data controllers, journalists, 
the academic community, consumer groups and human rights organisations, as well 
as government institutions, the EU and the Council of Europe are all indispensable 
for forming  a complete picture that  can  support  thoroughness  and  coherence in 
policy  development.  Analogous  to  European observatories  in  the  feld  of  energy 
poverty, intellectual property, employment, cultural diversity and audiovisual media, 
a multidisciplinary “Big  Data Observatory”  could  be charged with discerning and 
contextualising relevant developments in big data applications. An observatory could 
also serve as a place where research programmes into the efects of datafcation, as 
501 See note 371 above.
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well as remedies for their adverse efects, could be commissioned or evaluated, and 
provide participation opportunities for civil society.
Promotion of shared values as guiding principle. Addressing the risks and power 
shifts associated with big data requires that legislators, data subjects and controllers 
understand  that  the  focus  of  the  GDPR  is  too  narrow  to  address  all  the  risks 
associated with it. Tackling social, economical and political efects, like the for-proft 
fragmentation of  the marketplace of  ideas  or rent-seeking  behaviour by platform 
providers, requires that other areas of regulation be explored. Based on the preceding 
chapters,  competition  law  and  consumer  protection  law  could  be  well-suited  to 
address  certain  issues  relating  to  power shifts.  Indeed,  laws  in  these felds  were 
enacted  with  similar power shifts  in  mind.  An exclusive focus on the rights  and 
freedoms of natural persons will have inherent limits when addressing efects at larger 
scales. Similar to the fndings of Van der Sloot, this research suggests that regulatory 
eforts specifcally designed for the promotion of  shared values will be essential in 
addressing big data’s risks and power shifts.502
Reducing  information  asymmetries  and  power  diferentials.  Based  on  the 
preceding chapters,  it is also advisable to work towards reducing the information 
asymmetry resulting from datafcation. Data scientists are working on several aspects 
of  this problem. Two examples: Harkous et al.  are aiming to reduce the opacity of 
privacy policies using machine learning algorithms, and Sandvig et al. are designing 
new methods for the visualisation of  the efects of  algorithms.503 These eforts can 
help reduce the shifting of institutional power towards controllers by increasing the 
reciprocity of interactions and by making it easier for data subjects to make informed 
decisions.  Addressing  structural  power shifts  through research and discourse may 
require new forms of sub-politics or the extension of existing formal forums to enable 
the  participation  of  parties  lacking  structural  power.504 An  Observatory,  existing 
502 Bart Van Der Sloot, ‘Privacy as Virtue: Moving beyond the Individual in the Age of Big 
Data’ (Universiteit van Amsterdam 2017) 196–197.
503 Hamza Harkous and others, ‘Polisis: Automated Analysis and Presentation of Privacy 
Policies Using Deep Learning’ [2018] arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.02561; Christian Sandvig 
and others, ‘Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on 
Internet Platforms’ (2014); Ke Yang and others, ‘A Nutritional Label for Rankings’, 
Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Management of Data (ACM 2018).
504 See Nissenbaum’s suggestion in Jaron Lanier and E Glen Weyl, ‘A Blueprint for a Better 
Digital Society’ (Harvard Business Review, 26 September 2018) <https://hbr.org/2018/09/a-
blueprint-for-a-better-digital-society> accessed 20 March 2019.
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standardisation forums,  or specialised  institutions could  all  ofer such a forum at 
diferent levels of centralisation.
Permanent improvement through enforcement, preparedness and response. 
Finally, addressing the power shifts and risks associated with big data requires a long-
term commitment from controllers, data subjects and their organisations, legislators, 
supervisory authorities  and  the courts.  Big  data can become a prime area where 
conflicts between fundamental rights will develop. The identifcation of new risks will 
be more useful  when followed  up by suitable prevention  measures  and  response 
capabilities. Judicial decisions will have to clarify how big data afects the position of 
the right to private life between other fundamental rights like the freedom to conduct 
a business, freedom of expression or the freedom to enter into a contract.
System accidents involving big data lack the visibility and physical turmoil shared by 
many disasters in the physical world, and liability for these accidents may be difcult 
to  determine when  there  is  no  physical  damage.  The GDPR’s  penalty  provisions 
provide a partial solution, but their efectiveness will depend on the interpretation of 
complex standards. Therefore, requiring that controllers implement a plan-do-check-
act  cycle  aimed  at  accident  prevention  is  essential  for  continuous  improvement. 
Finally, well-rounded risk management implies that systems for incident response are 
available.  Similar to the requirements  of  the Seveso III  directive,  controllers  and 
supervisory authorities should identify and test appropriate measures to mitigate the 
efects of  foreseeable incidents and provide the response capabilities necessary to 
implement them when the next normal accident occurs.
6.5 Further research
This research was concerned with the shifts in risk and power associated with big data 
and focused on the ways that the GDPR addressed these shifts.  In the preceding 
chapters, several possible courses of action were recommended based on the research 
into the sub-questions. Apart from these possible suggestions, two questions stand 
out to me as particularly relevant.
The frst question is whether societies need new legal instruments to impose limits on 
the consumers’  freedom of  contract to let  themselves  be observed  in  the digital  
panopticon,  and on governments’  powers to commandeer the resulting data.  Can 
consumers agree to any form of surveillance or should a minimal level of remaining 
privacy  be  required  by  law?  And  if  such  a  minimum  level  of  privacy  is  to  be 
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maintained, who should decide on that minimum? On the one hand, European states 
cannot stand idly by while fundamental rights and freedoms are eroded by permanent 
surveillance through private platforms: positive obligations under the ECHR might 
arise within a decade. On the other hand, national governments – especially their  
police and national security forces – will need some powers of observation now that 
digital platforms have become another space where illegal activity can be planned and 
carried  out.  Public  discourse  on  this  matter  should  take  place  before  regulatory 
capture can obscure the issue from view.
The second question is whether societies need new legal instruments to ensure and 
maintain dynamic competition in the marketplace of ideas. Private platforms can – 
and do – enforce their own notions of acceptable discourse through their terms and 
conditions and through visible enforcement, but they can also create flter bubbles. If 
a platform has a dominant position in the marketplace of ideas, it may not need to 
abuse this position to have harmful efects: the dominant position may be leveraged 
by other information providers using the platform. Users engaging in discourse on 
these platforms may lose their voice if the platform provider disagrees with them or if 
an intransigent minority of  vigorous opponents flag  their expression as “violating 
community standards”. At the same time, the intended audience may be unaware that 
they never receive a message that they were meant to hear, if they are not aware that 
the information that reaches them is automatically fltered and skewed towards their 
calculated  preferences  in  order to  maximise the revenue of  the platform.  At  the 
moment, the GDPR as well as competition law and consumer protection law appear 
insufciently equipped to address these efects of market dominance.
The civil  exchange of  ideas between disagreeing parties is vitally important for an 
informed populace in a democracy.  Competition law is of  only limited use in the 
marketplace  of  ideas,  since  it  is  geared  towards  behaviour  that  interferes  in  the 
functioning of  the price mechanism. If  the marketplace of  ideas is dominated by 
automated  platforms  with  a  proft  motive,  European  democracies  may  need  to 
develop new safeguards to maintain pluralism in civil discourse.
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Big data, big risks, big power shifts: Evaluating the GDPR as an instrument of 
risk control and power redistribution in the context of big data.
Big  data  –  large  amounts  of  data  from automated  processes  –  often  constitutes 
personal data. The processing of large amounts of personal data constitutes a risk and 
can shift power towards those who collect and control the data. The General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR, Regulation EU 2016/679) acknowledges this risk and 
aims to regulate the processing of  personal data in such a way that these risks are 
reduced  to acceptable levels.  Thus,  free movement of  personal  data between EU 
Member  States  should  become  acceptable.  However,  a  number  of  authors  have 
pointed out a number of  shortcomings in the GDPR.  They have claimed that the 
GDPR is not future proof, is based on a number of fallacies of is incompatible with the 
reality of big data.
Evaluating the GDPR’s efectiveness and developing a coherent body of jurisprudence 
depends  on  the  clarity  and  testability  of  the  underlying  assumptions  and 
expectations. One possible way to achieve such clarity and testability is to use models 
developed in the sciences. A number of  models originating in the social and exact 
sciences is  suitable to evaluate the GDPR.  To this end,  this  research has  applied 
Komesar’s theory of comparative institutional analysis, Barnett and Duvall’s theory of 
power in social relations, three theories of  risk evaluation and management (Beck, 
Perrow and Klinke and Renn) and complex systems science.
Within the constraints of these theories, this research answers the following question: 
To what extent does the GDPR refect or employ theories of power relations 
and  risk  management  presented  by  Komesar,  Barnett  and  Duvall,  Beck, 
Perrow, Klinke and Renn, and complex systems science? 
This question was answered using comparative methods (comparative institutional 
analysis  and comparative law)  and by evaluating  two GDPR articles aimed at the 
prevention of  discrimination using complexity theory. The research focuses on the 
protection of data subjects acting as consumers.
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Comparative  institutional  analysis was  used  to  analyse  which  group  of  actors 
(commercial actors or consumers) would have the best opportunities to influence the 
outcome  of  decision-making  processes  in  their  favour.  Relevant  factors  in  this 
comparison are the costs and benefts of participation. The comparison shows that in 
cases where the lawfulness of processing is based on consent or contract, controllers 
can be expected to have better opportunities for participation and therefore more 
opportunities  to  determine the  outcome of  the  decision-making  process  in  their 
favour.
Barnett  and  Duvall  have proposed  a framework for  evaluating  power  relations  in  
social  interactions. In  their  terms,  decision-making  regarding  the  processing  of 
personal data will be characterised by greater structural power for controllers than for 
consumers:  they can dictate the contract terms.  Controllers  then use this  power 
diferential  to  increase  their  institutional  power over  consumers:  controllers  can 
exercise permanent surveillance over consumers. Large power diferentials carry the 
risk of  unfair treatment of  the party holding less power. Applying comparative law 
methods shows that two EU consumer protection directives ofer better opportunities 
than the GDPR to counter unfair treatment of data subjects.
Beck,  Perrow  and  Klinke  and  Renn  have  mapped  the  social  consequences  of  
technological  risks.  EU  environmental  protection  legislation,  like  the  Seveso  III-
directive, contains elements tracing back to their analyses and recommendations. The 
risks associated with big data are comparable to the risks of industrialisation, in the 
sense that they afect not only individuals but also groups, and in the sense that their  
origins are not always clearly identifable.  However,  contrary to EU environmental 
protection legislation, the GDPR does not contain a clear identifcation or evaluation 
of the risks that it aims to address. 
Complex systems science  holds that societies display properties that are not easily 
determined by observing individuals. But if  personal data is gathered in sufcient 
amounts from a sufcient number of  data subjects, societal properties can become 
discernible through analysis, for instance by using machine learning algorithms. In 
many cases, these properties can be mapped to sensitive traits like religious beliefs, 
ethnicity or sexual  preference.  Even though the GDPR aims to ofer data subjects 
special protections when sensitive traits are processed, these protections can become 
inefective when controllers are unable to verify the outcome of their algorithms for 
discriminatory efects.  Likewise,  Independent Supervisory Authorities may not be 
equipped to recognise if an algorithm categorises according to sensitive traits.
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10. Summary
None of  the models researched in the course of  this project have been discernibly 
applied in the GDPR. At the same time, no other underlying conception of the risk 
and the expected efectiveness have presented themselves. This reflects society’s lack 
of a comprehensive understanding of the risks associated with big data. It can make it 
more difcult to evaluate whether the GDPR is serving its purpose, it can cause a lack 
of  focus in enforcement eforts and developing a coherent body of  jurisprudence 
could take longer than necessary.
Based  on  the  results  of  this  research,  this  thesis  proposes  a  framework  for 
understanding the impact of  big data on consumer contracts, and three points for 
reconsideration were the GDPR to be updated. 
The  framework  consists  of  testable  notions  intended  to  serve  as  guidance  for 
enforcement eforts and judicial decisions. These notions are: 
• that  the  accumulation  of  personal  data  concentrates  power  in  the  hands  of 
controllers, 
• that information asymmetries undermine the assumption that consumers enter 
freely into contracts regarding personal data, 
• that big data can lead to accidents at unexpectedly large scale, 
• that the GDPR’s protection of special categories of data is insufcient, and
• that data subjects currently cannot efectively take part in the decision-making 
regarding the risks of big data.
In the light of this research, the following aspects of the GDPR could eventually merit 
reconsideration:
• The usefulness of a general regulation regarding the processing of personal data, 
given that many specifc areas of legislation already have their own concepts and 
methods for dealing with risks and power diferentials;
• The sufciency of  transparency of  the EU  lawmaking  process,  given that the 
legislative process at the national  level  tends to ofer better opportunities for 
participation to data subjects and consumers;
• The application of technologically neutral, complex standards for the processing 
of personal data, given that such forms of legislation tend to be better suited for 
risks that are well understood.
This research was based on four journal articles published between 2014 and 2018.
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11 Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Big  data,  risico’s  en schuivende machtsverschuivingen:  Beoordeling  van de 
Algemene  Verordening  Gegevensbescherming  als  instrument  voor 
risicobeheersing en de regulering van machtsverhoudingen.
Big data – grote hoeveelheden gegevens afomstig uit geautomatiseerde processen – 
bestaat  vaak  uit  persoonsgegevens.  Het  verwerken  van  grote  hoeveelheden 
persoonsgegevens brengt risico’s met zich mee en kan leiden tot het verschuiven van 
machtsverhoudingen  in  het  voordeel  van  degene  die  over  grote  hoeveelheden 
gegevens  beschikt.  De  Algemene  Verordening  Gegevensbescherming  (AVG, 
Verordening EU 2016/679) onderkent dit risico en beoogt zodanige voorschriften te 
geven  voor  het  verwerken  van  persoonsgegevens,  dat  deze  risico’s  tot  een 
aanvaardbaar  niveau  worden  teruggebracht.  Deze voorschriften  scheppen dan de 
voorwaarden  voor  vrij  verkeer  van  persoonsgegevens  binnen  de  Europese  Unie. 
Diverse auteurs hebben echter al gewezen op een aantal tekortkomingen van de AVG: 
ze zou niet toekomstbestendig zijn, er zou een dwaalleer aan ten grondslag liggen of ze 
zou onverenigbaar zijn met de praktijk van big data. 
Het  toetsen  van  de  efectiviteit  van  de  AVG  en  het  ontwikkelen  van  consistente 
jurisprudentie is  alleen goed mogelijk  als  de onderliggende veronderstellingen en 
verwachtingen  helder  en  testbaar  zijn.  Dit  kan  bijvoorbeeld  door  wetgeving  te 
baseren  op  modellen  afomstig  uit  de  wetenschap.  Een  aantal  modellen  dat  is 
ontwikkeld in de sociale wetenschappen en de exacte wetenschappen, is bruikbaar 
voor het evalueren van de AVG. In dit onderzoek is ingegaan op de vergelijking van 
besluitvormingsprocessen (Komesar),  machtsverhoudingen in sociale betrekkingen 
(Barnett en Duvall),  sociale beoordeling en beheersing van technologische risico’s 
(Beck, Perrow en Klinke en Renn) en de theorie van complexe systemen.
In dat kader beantwoordt dit onderzoek de volgende vraag:  In hoeverre geeft de 
AVG blijk van de toepassing van de theorieën over machtsverhoudingen en 
risicobeheersing zoals geformuleerd door Komesar, Barnett en Duvall, Beck, 
Perrow, Kline en Renn en complexe systemen? 
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Deze vraag  is beantwoord met behulp van vergelijkende methoden (vergelijkende 
institutionele  analyse  en  rechtsvergelijking)  en  door  beoordeling  van  twee  AVG-
bepalingen gericht op het voorkómen van discriminatie met behulp van de theorie 
van complexe systemen. Het onderzoek richt zich in het bijzonder op de bescherming 
van betrokkenen die ook consumenten zijn.
Vergelijkende  institutionele  analyse (comparative  institutional  analysis)  maakt 
inzichtelijk  welke  groepen  van  partijen  (bedrijven,  consumenten)  de  meeste 
mogelijkheden hebben om de uitkomst  van  een  besluitvormingsproces  naar hun 
hand  te zetten.  Daarbij  spelen de kosten en baten van deelname een rol.  Uit  de 
vergelijking  blijkt  dat  wanneer  de  rechtmatigheid  van  de  verwerking  van 
persoonsgegevens berust op toestemming of een overeenkomst, verwacht kan worden 
dat verwerkingsverantwoordelijken meer invloed hebben op de overeenkomst of van 
de toestemmingsverklaring en dus een meer mogelijkheden hebben om de uitkomst 
van het besluitvormingsproces in hun voordeel te beïnvloeden.
Barnett  en  Duvall  hebben  een  kader  geformuleerd  voor  de  beoordeling  van 
machtsverhoudingen in sociale interacties. Volgens dit kader zal besluitvorming over 
de verwerking van persoonsgegevens worden gekarakteriseerd door een structureel 
machtsoverwicht voor bedrijven: zij kunnen eenzijdig de bepalingen in het contract 
dicteren. Bedrijven zetten dit machtsoverwicht daarna in voor het bewerkstelligen van 
hun  institutionele  machtsoverwicht,  door  consumenten  te  observeren.  Te  grote 
machtsongelijkheid kan resulteren in oneerlijke behandeling. Rechtsvergelijking laat 
zien dat twee richtlijnen uit  het Europees  consumentenbeschermingsrecht betere 
bescherming tegen oneerlijke behandeling bieden dan de AVG.
Beck, Perrow en Klinke en Renn hebben de sociologische aspecten van het omgaan  
met  technologische  risico’s in  kaart  gebracht.  Europees  milieubeschermingsrecht, 
zoals de Seveso III-richtlijn, bevat kenmerken die ontleend zijn aan hun analyses en 
aanbevelingen. De risico’s van big data zijn tot op zekere hoogte vergelijkbaar met die 
van  milieurisico’s:  niet  alleen  individuen,  maar  ook  (groepen  in)  samenlevingen 
kunnen  worden  blootgesteld  aan  risico’s  waarvan  de  oorsprong  vaak  moeilijk 
aanwijsbaar is. De AVG bevat echter geen duidelijke inventarisatie of evaluatie van de 
risico’s die ze tracht te beheersen.
De theorie van complexe systemen stelt dat samenlevingen eigenschappen hebben die 
niet rechtstreeks herleidbaar zijn op de eigenschappen van individuen. Maar als er 
voldoende persoonsgegevens van een voldoende aantal personen worden verzameld, 
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kunnen  deze  eigenschappen  ook  uit  de  persoonsgegevens  worden  afgeleid, 
bijvoorbeeld  met  behulp  van  automatisch  lerende  algoritmen.  In  veel  gevallen 
kunnen dergelijke  eigenschappen samenvallen  met  gevoelige persoonskenmerken, 
zoals religieuze opvattingen,  etniciteit of  seksuele gerichtheid.  Zelfs de bijzondere 
bescherming  die  de  AVG  biedt  met  betrekking  tot  deze  kenmerken  kan  tekort 
schieten,  als  verwerkingsverantwoordelijken  de  uitkomsten  van  algoritmen  niet 
rechtstreeks  kunnen  beoordelen  op  discriminatoire  efecten.  Ook  onafankelijke 
toezichthoudende  autoriteiten  kunnen  niet  in  staat  blijken  om  discriminatoire 
efecten van algoritmen vast te stellen.
De AVG geeft niet duidelijk blijk van de toepassing de modellen die in dit onderzoek 
aan  de orde zijn  gekomen.  Daarnaast  is  ook  niet  gebleken van  de uitdrukkelijke 
toepassing van andere modellen. Dit is een afspiegeling van ons huidige gebrek aan 
begrip  van  de  risico’s  van  big  data.  Dit  gemis  kan  het  moeilijker  maken  om de 
efectiviteit van de AVG te beoordelen, de juiste handhavingsprioriteiten te stellen, en 
samenhangende jurisprudentie te ontwikkelen. 
Op basis van deze resultaten is een kader ontwikkeld voor de beoordeling van de 
efecten van big data op consumentencontracten, en worden drie punten voorgesteld 
waarop een eventuele opvolger van de AVG zou kunnen worden heroverwogen. 
Het kader bestaat uit toetsbare hypothesen die richting zouden kunnen geven aan 
toezichthouders en judiciMle beslissingen. Deze hypothesen zijn:
• dat het verzamelen van persoonsgegevens leidt tot de concentratie van macht in 
de handen van verwerkingsverantwoordelijken;
• dat informatie-asymmetrie ertoe leidt dat niet zomaar mag worden verondersteld 
dat consumenten uit vrije wil overeenkomsten over persoonsgegevens aangaan;
• dat big data kan leiden tot systeemongevallen op onverwacht grote schaal;
• dat de AVG onvoldoende bescherming biedt voor bijzondere persoonsgegevens;
• en  dat  betrokkenen  op  dit  moment  onvoldoende  inspraak  hebben  bij  de 
besluitvorming over de risico’s van big data.
De volgende aspecten van de AVG zouden op termijn kunnen worden heroverwogen:
• De  bruikbaarheid  van  een  algemene verordening  voor  de  verwerking  van 
persoonsgegevens, gezien het feit dat diverse wetgevingsgebieden al beschikken 
over een vocabulaire en over methoden voor het beschrijven van – en omgaan met 
– risico’s en machtsongelijkheid;
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• De al of niet voldoende transparantie van het Europese wetgevingsproces, gezien 
het  feit  dat  het  nationale  wetgevingsproces  over  het  algemeen  meer 
mogelijkheden biedt aan consumenten en betrokkenen om hieraan efectief deel 
te nemen;
• De toepassing van technologisch neutrale, complexe standaarden, met het oog op 
het feit dat dergelijke standaarden in het algemeen beter op hun plaats zijn bij de 
beheersing van risico’s waarvan de aard en de omvang inzichtelijk zijn.
Dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op vier artikelen, gepubliceerd in de periode 2014-2018.
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